How war, security and coalition math are shaping the Israeli election

Israel uses proportional representation, meaning parties receive Knesset seats broadly in line with their national vote share. A party must win at least 3.25% of the vote to enter parliament. This system gives voters a choice among party platforms rather than individual prime-ministerial candidates.

After voting, the Knesset’s composition determines who can govern. The president asks a Knesset member, usually the person best positioned to build a majority, to form a government. That member must bring parties together in a coalition controlling at least 61 of the 120 seats.

The arrangement matters because election-night winners may still lack governing power. Recent polls put both Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc and the opposition bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot below 61 seats. Smaller parties can therefore gain major influence by joining a coalition, withholding support, or demanding policy concessions.

Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, contains 120 seats. A government needs the support of at least 61 Knesset members, which is more than half the chamber. This threshold gives a governing coalition the basic parliamentary control needed to form and sustain a government.

Outright majorities are rare because seats are divided among several parties through proportional representation. For example, a leading party or bloc may win more seats than its rivals but still fall short of 61. It must then negotiate with smaller parties to reach the governing threshold.

Recent polls described in the article place both Netanyahu’s bloc and the main opposition bloc below 61 seats. That means neither side is currently projected to govern alone. Smaller parties could therefore decide which bloc reaches 61, while using their support to influence policies such as security, Gaza and military conscription.

Israel’s proportional system makes coalition-building essential because major parties rarely win a majority by themselves. Recent polls put both Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc and the opposition bloc led by centrist former military chief Gadi Eisenkot below 61 seats. The remaining seats could determine who forms the next government.

Religious and ultra-Orthodox parties are especially important because Netanyahu’s current coalition includes them. That alliance has been strained by disputes over a Gaza ceasefire and the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men. Their support could be necessary again, but it may come with demands on religious policy, military service or the war.

Arab parties are also contesting the election, and more than 20% of Israel’s population is Arab. However, most major Jewish parties have ruled out alliances with them, and Arab parties have rarely joined governing coalitions. Their seats could still affect coalition arithmetic, negotiations and whether another election becomes necessary.

After the election, the president asks a Knesset member to form a government. Usually, this is the person considered most likely to assemble a majority. The candidate must build support from enough parties to control at least 61 of the Knesset’s 120 seats.

If that candidate cannot gather the required support, the effort can be transferred or repeated under the country’s parliamentary process. Coalition negotiations may involve disagreements over security, Gaza, military service, economic priorities and the role of religious parties. Each partner’s seats can become important when the major blocs are closely matched.

The article states that if repeated attempts fail, another election can be called. This possibility makes the post-election bargaining as important as the vote itself. It also means voters may face another campaign if no combination of parties can create a stable 61-seat governing coalition.

The October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks transformed Israeli society and made protection of the population a central election concern. About 1,200 people were killed and more than 250 were abducted. Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza has killed more than 74,500 people, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health.

The article says Israel has been at war since October 7 and describes a wider “seven-front war.” Defense, confidence in government and accountability are major issues. Mandatory military service is also sensitive, especially because the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men remains a legal and political dispute.

Economic pressure has joined those security concerns. Israel spends around 8% of its gross domestic product on the military, while nearly every family has a soldier or reservist who has left work for months. The election is also the first since the United States and Israel began their joint war against Iran in February, adding regional security to the stakes.

The war has created a large financial and social burden for Israel. The article says the country currently spends around 8% of its gross domestic product on military expenditure. That level of spending affects economic priorities because military needs compete with other public and household concerns.

The burden is also visible in everyday life. Nearly every family has a soldier or reservist who has been called up and has left their job for months. Military service is compulsory for most Jewish, Druze and Circassian Israelis over 18, while most other Arab Israelis are exempt.

This pressure makes conscription a major political issue. The proposed or disputed enlistment of ultra-Orthodox men has strained Netanyahu’s coalition and remains a legal conflict. Economic costs, lost work and unequal service obligations may influence coalition negotiations and the next government’s approach to security and military policy.

In Israel’s parliamentary system, election results do not directly install a prime minister or a single-party program. They determine the Knesset’s party balance. The president then asks a member who can best assemble 61 seats to form a coalition. Policies emerge from agreements among the parties that provide that majority.

For example, Netanyahu returned to power with a coalition containing far-right and ultra-Orthodox parties. Disputes over a Gaza ceasefire and the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men have strained that alliance. A different coalition could face similar pressure over military service, economic spending, security decisions or relations with Arab parties.

Coalition partners can influence how military power is used and how Israel responds to Iran, Gaza and neighboring countries. However, the article says a change in prime minister and coalition would be unlikely to produce a dramatic shift on Palestinian statehood, Iran and other foreign-policy issues. The main consequence may be different leadership and bargaining over implementation.