ECI SIR controversy: Why did UP order scrutiny of Form 6, 7 and 8 entered since April 10? What voters should know

Uttar Pradesh ordered scrutiny of every Form 6, 7 and 8 entered by computer assistants since April 10. The aim is to protect eligible voters from exclusion and prevent irregular changes from reaching the electoral roll. The review covers all 403 assembly constituencies.

The decision followed complaints in Pilibhit Sadar. Political parties alleged that voter names had been changed while EPIC and serial numbers stayed the same. The CEO’s office said 10,470 entries were irregular. A computer assistant had entered 13,779 Form-8 applications, but the office had no application forms or supporting records for those entries.

The scrutiny comes before preparations for the Special Summary Revision. Officials must review pending forms daily, preserve physical applications, and correct irregular Form-8 entries under prescribed rules. The instructions also shift digitisation of physical forms to booth-level officers using the BLO App, with officials warned that negligence can lead to action.

Form 6 is used when a person seeks inclusion of a name in the electoral roll. It supports adding an eligible voter’s record. Form 7 is used to object to someone’s inclusion or request deletion of a name. Form 8 handles corrections and other changes to an existing electoral entry.

These forms therefore cover the main types of roll updates. A Form 6 can add a record. A Form 7 can challenge an entry or seek its removal. A Form 8 can change details already recorded. The Pilibhit controversy involved Form 8 applications for changes in voter details.

Because these forms can alter who appears on the roll and what their record says, officials must handle them carefully. The CEO ordered daily review of pending applications, secure preservation of physical forms, and correction of irregular Form-8 entries according to prescribed norms.

The Pilibhit irregularity was large: the Uttar Pradesh CEO’s office found problems in 10,470 electoral-roll entries. The controversy arose after complaints that some EPIC numbers displayed details belonging to other voters. The Congress alleged that 13,150 names had changed while EPIC and serial numbers remained the same, and the Samajwadi Party raised similar concerns.

A detailed inquiry found that one computer assistant entered 13,779 Form-8 applications between May 31 and August 29, 2026. These applications sought changes in voter details at the Voter Registration Centre. Of the total, 10,470 were approved and 3,309 were rejected.

The inquiry also found that no application forms or supporting records for these entries were available in the office. Authorities ordered legal action against two serving and former electoral registration officers and dismissal of the computer assistant. The case prompted wider scrutiny across Uttar Pradesh.

Changing voter details without valid applications or supporting records undermines the required checking process. It can create irregular electoral-roll entries and make it difficult to verify whether a change was properly requested. The Uttar Pradesh CEO therefore ordered correction of irregular Form-8 entries under prescribed norms.

Pilibhit provides the clearest example. A computer assistant entered 13,779 Form-8 applications between May 31 and August 29, 2026. Investigators found that 10,470 were approved and 3,309 rejected, but no application forms or supporting records related to the entries were available in the office.

The consequences included legal action against two serving and former electoral registration officers and dismissal of the computer assistant. The CEO also warned that EROs, assistant EROs and computer assistants could face action under Section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. District election officers may also be held responsible for lax supervision.

The new instructions create a clearer chain for handling voter applications. Electoral registration officers must review all pending Forms 6, 7 and 8 daily and dispose of them promptly under the rules. Physical applications must be preserved securely, so the paper record remains available for checking.

Computer assistants may not enter applications received in physical form. Instead, booth-level officers must digitise those forms through the BLO App. EROs then handle review and disposal, while irregular Form-8 entries are corrected according to prescribed norms. The article also directs officials to address complaints received through several channels.

The process is intended to reduce unsupported changes and improve accountability before the Special Summary Revision. Officials must handle complaints from the National Grievance Service Portal, the Public Grievance Redressal System, social media and other channels. They must also protect ERONET login credentials and monitor duplicate-voter complaints.

Responsibility is spread across several election officials. EROs must review and dispose of Forms 6, 7 and 8. Assistant EROs and computer assistants are also accountable for irregularities. Divisional commissioners, acting as roll observers, must monitor electoral-roll work intensively. District election officers are responsible for supervision.

The Pilibhit inquiry shows why this shared responsibility matters. A computer assistant entered 13,779 Form-8 applications, including 10,470 that were approved, while no related application forms or supporting records were available. Authorities ordered legal action against two serving and former electoral registration officers and the dismissal of the computer assistant.

The CEO warned that officials could face action under Section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, which concerns breaches of official duty in preparing, revising and correcting electoral rolls. District election officers may also face responsibility for lax supervision, while commissioners must act against negligent monitoring.

An electoral roll records who is registered to vote, so accuracy matters to participation in an election. The Uttar Pradesh review was launched partly to avoid excluding any eligible voter from the final roll. It also responds to allegations that voter details were changed irregularly. These concerns make reliable records central to protecting a citizen’s voting opportunity.

Pilibhit illustrates the risk. Complaints said some EPIC numbers displayed details belonging to other voters. The Congress alleged that 13,150 names had changed while EPIC and serial numbers stayed the same. The CEO’s office later identified 10,470 irregular entries, many linked to unsupported Form-8 applications.

Duplicate entries or incorrect changes can make records confusing and may affect whether a citizen’s details appear correctly. The article directs officials to review duplicate-voter complaints, correct irregular entries, preserve applications and prevent repeat errors. It does not describe the outcome for individual voters in these cases.