Supreme Court issues notice on plea against Chhattisgarh anti-conservation law

When the Supreme Court issues notice, it asks the governments named in the petition to present their responses. The Court has not yet decided whether Chhattisgarh’s law violates the Constitution. The notice brings the governments formally into the case.

Here, a bench led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant issued notices to the Union and Chhattisgarh governments. The petition was filed by Isai Adivasi Mahasabha, which represents tribal Christians. The bench also directed that the case be heard with challenges to similar laws in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan.

The case now moves toward fuller arguments. A similar challenge is already pending in the Chhattisgarh High Court. The Supreme Court said it could ask that court to hear the matter quickly, while the petitioner’s lawyer agreed to consider seeking transfer of the High Court case to the Supreme Court.

Chhattisgarh’s law targets conversions it considers improperly obtained. Its stated purpose is to prevent conversions carried out through force, inducement, fraud, or misrepresentation. The dispute concerns how broadly those terms are defined and whether they can reach voluntary religious choices.

The petition challenges provisions treating a promise of a “better lifestyle” as allurement. It also objects to treating “glorifying one religion against another” as prohibited inducement. The petitioner argues these phrases could cover ordinary preaching, explaining religious beliefs, and charitable or humanitarian work.

The law also imposes advance and post-conversion declarations. A person must publish details about the current and proposed religion before conversion, then make another declaration afterward. The petition says these requirements turn a fundamental choice into a government-controlled and publicly disclosed process.

The law contains severe punishments. In cases of mass conversion, it provides for life imprisonment. For other offences covered by the law, the punishment starts at seven years’ imprisonment. That minimum makes the legislation especially significant for people accused under its provisions.

The sentence can extend to 10 years when the convert is a minor, a woman, or belongs to the Other Backward Class, Scheduled Caste, or Scheduled Tribe category. The article also describes penalties linked to conversion declarations. Failure to complete required steps can make a conversion illegal or void, although it does not assign a separate prison term in the passage.

These punishments are part of the constitutional challenge. The petitioner argues that the law regulates voluntary religious belief too broadly. The Supreme Court has sought government responses, so the law’s validity and the effect of its penalties remain undecided.

Civil rights groups argue that anti-conversion laws can violate individual rights and curb interfaith marriages. The petition says choosing a religion is an intimate part of personal autonomy protected by Article 25. It challenges rules that require government notice and public disclosure before someone changes faith.

Isai Adivasi Mahasabha, which represents tribal Christians, brought this challenge against the Chhattisgarh law. The petition objects to broad definitions of inducement, including a promise of a better lifestyle or glorifying one religion over another. It says these could reach preaching, religious teaching, and charitable work.

The challenge also targets the law’s procedure. A person must publish their name, current faith, and proposed religion on government websites and local notice boards. After conversion, another declaration and personal appearance are required. The petitioner says failure can make the conversion illegal and void, placing a private decision under official control.

The petition warns that broad language could affect peaceful religious activity. It specifically challenges treating a promise of a “better lifestyle” as allurement and praising one religion over another as inducement. The petitioner says these formulations may capture normal preaching, explaining doctrine, and humanitarian or charitable work.

The law also creates a detailed approval-like process. Before conversion, an applicant’s name, current faith, and proposed religion must be published on a website and local notice boards. After conversion, the person must submit another declaration within 30 days and appear personally within 21 days. Missing these steps means no Certificate of Conversion is issued.

The stated consequence is serious: the conversion may be rendered “illegal and void”. The article presents these concerns as arguments by the petitioner, not as a court ruling. The Supreme Court has sought government responses before deciding the challenge.

The Supreme Court may combine these matters because the Chhattisgarh law belongs to a wider series of anti-conversion laws. Challenges to laws in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan are already pending before the Court. Hearing them together could let the judges examine related constitutional arguments in one coordinated proceeding.

The Chhattisgarh petition raises issues that overlap with those cases. It questions restrictions on voluntary conversion, broad definitions of inducement, and mandatory public declarations. Senior advocate Colin Gonsalves said that once the Supreme Court decides the similar cases, proceedings in the High Court could become redundant.

There is also a jurisdictional complication. A similar challenge is pending in the Chhattisgarh High Court. The Supreme Court said it could ask that court to hear the case quickly, but it cannot force High Court petitioners to move. Gonsalves agreed to consult them about a possible transfer petition.

Article 25 is the constitutional foundation cited by the petitioner. It protects religious freedom, including a person’s choice of religious belief and the ability to profess, practise, and propagate religion. The petition describes that choice as a deeply personal expression of autonomy.

The law is presented as targeting conversions caused by force, inducement, fraud, or misrepresentation. That reflects the state’s stated interest in preventing coercive or deceptive religious change. However, the petition argues that terms such as “better lifestyle” and religious glorification are so broad that they may reach voluntary conduct protected by Article 25.

The constitutional question is therefore about boundaries. The state may seek to stop coercion and fraud, but the petitioner says it cannot make voluntary conversion dependent on advance publicity, official declarations, and personal appearances. The Supreme Court has issued notices, so it has not yet resolved how the law fits within Article 25.