What challenges lie ahead for Serbia's new leaders?

Serbia’s parliamentary election brought the Student List to victory and ended Aleksandar Vučić’s long period in power. That is historic because a student-led protest movement has moved from street demonstrations into national government. The result also triggered mass celebrations.

The movement’s leaders have not yet been formally named. Its prominent candidates include former central bank governor Dejan Šoškić and cardiologist Ilija Srđanović. Their platform combines political reform with major changes to Kosovo policy, relations with Russia, corruption controls and economic management.

The victory is only the beginning. The new government must address stalled EU accession talks, Serbia’s energy dependence on Russia, allegations of corruption, inflation and youth emigration. It must also turn broad promises into workable institutions, laws and budgets while managing difficult relations with Kosovo, the EU, Russia and the United States.

The expected governing force is the Student List, a movement created by Serbia’s student-led protests. Its leaders have not yet been named, so the article identifies prominent candidates instead. They include Dejan Šoškić, a former central bank governor, and Ilija Srđanović, a cardiologist.

Their immediate problems are unusually broad. They must decide how to handle Kosovo, whose independence Serbia rejects, and stalled European Union accession talks. They must also manage energy ties with Russia, including gas supplies from Gazprom and Russia’s stake in NIS. At home, they promise tougher action against corruption and changes to the economy.

The candidates face a difficult governing reality. They want domestic reforms before a final public vote on EU membership, but their Kosovo position conflicts with EU expectations. They also oppose sanctions on Moscow while relying on energy and sanctions arrangements involving Russia, Hungary and the United States.

Kosovo declared independence from Belgrade in 2008. Serbia rejects that separation and the Student List says Kosovo remains an integral part of Serbia. Its candidates describe the territory as temporarily occupied and say reintegration should be pursued peacefully through diplomacy and dialogue.

The movement’s practical priorities focus on Kosovo’s Serbian population, especially in the north. It wants to prevent their departure and strengthen Serbian-funded institutions, including healthcare and education. It also supports autonomous Serbian communities and rejects earlier arrangements concerning energy, vehicle licence plates and the dinar currency.

Kosovo matters beyond Serbia’s domestic politics because it is tied to EU accession. Serbia’s membership path requires Belgrade to normalise relations with Pristina. The Student List’s position therefore creates a major obstacle. Its government would need to balance its promise to protect Kosovo’s Serbs with European demands for workable relations between the two sides.

Serbia is deeply dependent on Russian energy, even though the Student List says that dependence does not amount to geopolitical alignment. Gazprom, Russia’s gas company, supplies about 2.2 billion cubic metres of gas to Serbia annually. It sells the gas below market prices, making the relationship economically important.

Russia also has a stake in NIS, the company operating Serbia’s only oil refinery. Serbia is waiting for Russia’s stake to be sold to Hungary’s MOL. Until that happens, the incoming government would depend on United States sanctions waivers to maintain crude imports. This creates a second vulnerability alongside gas dependence.

The arrangement gives Russia major influence over Serbia’s energy security. Replacing those supplies would require new contracts, infrastructure or alternative fuels, none of which the article details. The Student List therefore inherits a delicate choice: preserve affordable energy while resisting political alignment with Moscow and managing pressure from Washington and Brussels.

Serbia faces two linked consequences. Its position that Kosovo remains part of Serbia conflicts with the EU requirement to normalise relations with Pristina. Its refusal to impose sanctions on Moscow over the war in Ukraine also keeps it apart from the EU’s broader foreign-policy approach. Together, these positions could further delay accession talks, already stalled by insufficient reforms.

Energy makes the choice harder. Serbia relies on Gazprom for about 2.2 billion cubic metres of gas each year and depends on arrangements surrounding Russia’s stake in NIS. The government may need United States sanctions waivers to maintain crude imports while that stake awaits sale to Hungary’s MOL.

The future government must therefore balance principle, diplomacy and supply. A sharper break with Moscow could improve relations with Western partners but raise energy risks. Maintaining current ties could protect short-term supplies while limiting Serbia’s progress toward EU membership and complicating relations with Washington.

Reducing Russian dependence would mean replacing both gas and oil links, not simply changing a contract. The article identifies Serbia’s exposure but does not provide a detailed alternative energy strategy. In general, Serbia could seek more gas from other suppliers, expand regional pipeline interconnections, build storage and increase renewable electricity and energy efficiency.

For oil, it could diversify crude purchases and use the planned sale of Russia’s NIS stake to Hungary’s MOL as part of a broader ownership and supply reset. For gas, longer-term contracts with non-Russian exporters, improved interconnections and larger reserves could provide backup. These options would require investment and coordination with neighbours.

The transition would have to protect households and industry from sudden disruption. Russian gas currently arrives at below-market pricing, so replacement supplies could cost more. The government would also need to manage sanctions rules, refinery operations and infrastructure timing. These alternatives are established energy-policy options, not measures specified in the article.

Independent courts, police and oversight bodies divide power and make wrongdoing harder to conceal. Courts can apply the law without protecting governing parties. Police accountable to prosecutors can investigate officials and organised crime more credibly. Oversight bodies can examine budgets and contracts before public money disappears. These safeguards also help protect protest rights and equal treatment.

The Student List proposes an independent police unit accountable to prosecutors rather than the Interior Ministry. It also wants to remove officers linked to organised crime or violent protest crackdowns. Its programme would ban party loyalists from state-company appointments, audit officials’ assets and allow illegally acquired wealth to be seized and returned to the budget.

Independent institutions matter because rules must survive political pressure. The movement also wants public scrutiny of major infrastructure contracts and independent oversight bodies. If implemented fairly, these measures could improve trust, fiscal control and rights protection. Their success would depend on real autonomy, transparent procedures and courts willing to review government action.