High-level delegation visits Iran to try to avert flare-up with US and Israel

The most immediate goal is to prevent renewed fighting involving Iran, the United States, and Israel. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan sent senior officials to Tehran as rhetoric intensified. They want Iran to use its influence over the Houthis and help reduce attacks on Saudi territory. They are also pushing for an agreement between Tehran and Washington.

The talks involve Saudi defence minister Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir, and Turkey’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın. The Houthis have claimed missile and drone attacks damaged Saudi infrastructure, hurt its economy, and even closed Riyadh airport. That makes the Yemen conflict a direct concern for the visiting officials.

The meeting has a broader purpose too. Iran could potentially join a new security arrangement involving Islamic countries. The delegations therefore face a difficult balance: demand immediate compromises from Tehran while exploring a longer-term regional system that includes Iran rather than excluding it.

A regional security pact is a formal arrangement for countries in the same area to cooperate on defence and security. Members may promise mutual support, consult during crises, and build shared rules. The article describes competing visions: one relying heavily on US involvement, and another in which regional countries, including Iran, manage security themselves.

Iran’s inclusion could change the balance because Tehran would have a seat inside the system instead of standing outside it. Gulf states might gain a channel for dialogue and reduce the risk of miscalculation. Iran could also help shape rules affecting conflicts, bases, and regional threats. Oman has already explored a pact that includes Iran.

Yet many governments would resist. They blame Tehran, directly or through intermediaries such as the Houthis, for damaging regional economies. The three visiting countries also recently signed a defence agreement that some Iranians viewed as directed against Tehran. Any pact would therefore require trust that does not yet exist.

Iran is involved as a major party in the wider confrontation with the United States and Israel, and as a country with influence over the Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis are fighting across Yemen and have claimed responsibility for attacks against Saudi targets. The article presents the relationship through the delegations’ request that Iran persuade them to stop.

The attacks matter because they reach beyond Yemen’s battlefield. The Houthis claimed to have closed Riyadh airport and caused heavy damage to the Saudi economy. Missile and drone strikes on infrastructure can disrupt transport, energy systems, and public confidence. They also make Saudi Arabia more likely to demand immediate security guarantees.

That gives Iran a central role in the talks. The visitors want a practical concession now, while Iran may prefer discussion of a wider security architecture. The negotiations could produce broader cooperation, but a pact may take months and may not satisfy Washington’s separate demands over the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage linking the Gulf with the wider ocean. Based on established energy estimates, roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption passes through it, and around one-fifth of global seaborne oil trade uses the route. The exact share of total maritime trade is not fixed, because “maritime trade” includes many goods beyond oil.

Its importance comes from concentration. Large volumes of oil and gas move through one chokepoint, so a closure or sustained attack can delay shipments and raise fears about supply. Gulf producers depend on access through the strait to reach customers. Buyers worldwide therefore watch its security, even when fighting occurs elsewhere.

The source reports that Qatari mediators spent Sunday in Tehran seeking terms for Iran to reopen Hormuz. It also says a future pact may not meet Washington’s demand to reopen the strait before sanctions are lifted. That links maritime access directly to diplomacy, sanctions, and military escalation.

Sustained attacks on Gulf infrastructure could interrupt airports, energy facilities, transport links, and other economic systems. The article already describes heavy damage to Saudi Arabia’s economy and claims that Riyadh airport was closed. If the Strait of Hormuz also remained shut, energy shipments would face a major bottleneck. The source does not quantify the possible economic loss.

The key mechanism is mutual pressure. Attacks can reduce production, interrupt exports, raise insurance and shipping risks, and make governments spend more on defence. A prolonged disruption would likely put upward pressure on energy prices and threaten supplies to importing countries. These effects are established consequences of major supply-route disruptions, not figures given in the article.

Politically, the crisis could deepen distrust and trigger retaliation. Iran has attacked US bases and Gulf energy infrastructure, while the Pentagon is preparing for a possible assault. Continued fighting could strengthen hardliners, expand military deployments, and make a negotiated security pact harder to reach.

Gulf countries could seek a layered approach rather than one exclusive protector. Options include direct talks with Iran, agreements among neighboring states, and confidence-building rules on attacks, bases, and military exercises. They could also keep limited cooperation with the United States while developing stronger regional mechanisms. The article presents Oman’s exploration of a pact including Iran as one example.

A regional network could focus on non-aggression, consultation, and shared interests. Javad Zarif called for a comprehensive system based on mutual trust and shared prosperity. Such arrangements could create communication channels before crises spread. They might also address the concern that foreign military bases can provide reassurance to some states while creating insecurity for others.

The obstacles are substantial. Gulf governments distrust Iran because of damage caused directly or through intermediaries such as the Houthis. The Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani defence agreement also reflects the appeal of mutual protection. Any alternative would need credible commitments, practical enforcement, and months of negotiation.

States form alliances to increase security when they cannot manage threats alone. A defence commitment can deter attacks, coordinate military responses, and reassure smaller or exposed countries. It can also share intelligence, resources, and diplomatic weight. These benefits are especially attractive when conflict threatens borders, infrastructure, or trade routes.

But alliances change how other states judge the regional balance. The three countries’ Mecca agreement was described by its signatories as a mutual defence pact. Some in Iran feared it was constructed to challenge Tehran. The same arrangement could therefore appear defensive to its members but threatening to Iran, depending on intentions and past conduct.

This dilemma complicates the proposed regional pact. Including Iran might reduce exclusion and create trust, yet other states fear Tehran’s direct or proxy actions. Excluding it may reassure opponents but deepen Iran’s insecurity. Durable protection would require transparency, consultation, and credible limits on aggression.