Germany's Merz heads to Asia as security issues loom large

Merz is visiting Singapore, Japan and South Korea to deepen Germany’s economic and security partnerships. The tour comes as geopolitical tensions threaten global supply chains. Germany’s president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is separately visiting China, giving Berlin two high-level diplomatic tracks in Asia.

In Singapore, Merz will deliver a major foreign policy speech and meet Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. In Japan, he will meet Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and attend the German-Japanese Business Summit. In Seoul, he will meet President Lee Jae-myung and open a German business conference.

Security will shape all three stops. Merz and Japanese officials are expected to discuss China, Taiwan, supply chains and rare earths. In South Korea, he will visit the Demilitarized Zone and discuss North Korea, Russia and sanctions. The tour aims to build partnerships as regional uncertainty grows.

Merz’s delegation contains 30 senior businesspeople. Their presence shows that the tour is not only about military or diplomatic cooperation. Germany is also seeking stronger commercial relationships and more secure access to important technologies, components and energy connections.

The delegation represents German industry, technology companies, defense companies and energy suppliers. These sectors are especially relevant when governments are trying to protect strategic industries and reduce vulnerability to disrupted supply chains. Business leaders can identify practical opportunities that official talks alone may not deliver.

The group will accompany Merz during meetings and events, including the German-Japanese Business Summit and the Asia-Pacific Conference of German Business in Seoul. Its size and composition underline Berlin’s effort to combine economic outreach with security diplomacy during geopolitical instability.

Germany, Japan and South Korea face connected but different security pressures. Germany’s main concern is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Japan is watching China, North Korea and Russia, especially as China strengthens ties with Moscow and Pyongyang. South Korea’s immediate security focus is North Korea, alongside the wider effects of North Korea’s links with Russia and China.

Japan’s concerns include China’s military activity, pressure over Taiwan and joint China-Russia exercises near Japan. South Korea is dealing with North Korea’s military posture and its reported troop involvement in the Ukraine conflict. Seoul is also trying to communicate with Pyongyang.

These threats overlap because conflict or cooperation in one region can affect another. Merz’s meetings will therefore connect European and Indo-Pacific security, sanctions, supply chains and strategic technology. The article presents partnership-building as a response to this shared uncertainty.

A rules-based order is an international system in which states respect agreed principles, commitments and peaceful procedures. It is meant to prevent stronger countries from simply imposing their will on weaker ones. A free and open Indo-Pacific describes a region where countries can trade, travel and cooperate without coercion or unlawful restrictions.

In this article, the idea matters because Japan is concerned about China’s growing power, Taiwan and contested territories. Japan’s policy connects security with open trade and resilient supply chains. Protecting access to the sea, technology and components becomes part of defending the wider regional system.

The concept does not remove competition or disagreements. Instead, it seeks to manage them through partnerships and shared standards. Takaichi is expected to stress these principles while Germany and Japan discuss security cooperation, strategically important industries and access to rare earths.

A conflict involving Taiwan or disputed South China Sea territories could disrupt major channels of global trade. The article stresses that such disruption would not remain local. Germany, whose economy depends on international supply chains, would also feel the consequences through interrupted deliveries and reduced access to components.

The mechanism is straightforward: fighting or military tensions can make shipping routes unsafe, delay transport and restrict trade. Companies may lose access to crucial materials, including rare earths and other technologies. Factories could face shortages, while energy suppliers, technology firms and manufacturers encounter higher costs and uncertainty.

The result could be broader economic instability and pressure on governments to protect strategic industries. This is why Merz and Takaichi are expected to discuss supply-chain resilience and technology access. Germany’s Asian outreach treats economic security as part of national security, not as a separate commercial issue.

The article does not address German reunification or lessons for South Korea. Based on established historical knowledge, Germany’s reunification shows that merging divided societies requires sustained investment, institutional coordination and attention to economic differences. It also shows that political unity does not instantly erase social or regional divides.

South Korea could study how Germany managed legal integration, infrastructure, public administration and economic adjustment after reunification. Those lessons would be relevant if the Korean peninsula ever moved toward closer integration. Preparation would likely involve planning for humanitarian needs, governance and major economic disparities.

The situations are different. German reunification followed the peaceful collapse of East Germany’s communist government and occurred within a European framework. North Korea remains a separate authoritarian state with nuclear capabilities and strong ties with China and Russia. Therefore, German experience offers comparisons, not a ready-made blueprint.

Supply-chain resilience means ensuring that essential goods, materials and components remain available despite shocks. It matters for national security because modern defense systems, communications networks and industries depend on complex international production chains. A disruption can weaken a country without a conventional attack.

Rare earths are a clear example. The article describes them as critical to a range of advanced technologies and says they remain largely controlled by China. If access were restricted, companies and governments could struggle to produce or maintain important technologies. Diversifying suppliers, protecting key industries and building partnerships can reduce that vulnerability.

This is why Merz and Takaichi are expected to discuss supply-chain resilience and access to technologies and components. Germany and Japan are connecting economic planning with security policy. Their aim is greater resilience before a geopolitical crisis, rather than emergency action after supplies have already been disrupted.