'Form 6 has not been amended': EC files reply in SC, rejects charges against CEC

A Special Intensive Revision, or SIR, is a thorough review of electoral rolls. It checks voter records and helps identify entries that need confirmation, correction, addition, or removal under election rules. The article does not give the Commission’s specific stated reason for beginning this SIR, so its exact policy objective is not explained here.

The EC defended three SIR orders, issued in June 2025, October 2025, and May 2026. It said all three were unanimous decisions. The process includes online and physical applications, document collection, and possible hearings. Voters whose records are not initially matched can receive help from Booth Level Officers.

The SIR matters because electoral rolls determine who can vote. The EC said unmapped voters generally need not attend hearings. BLOs will collect documents from their homes, with hearings reserved for exceptional cases, preferably online. The Commission’s affidavit seeks to reassure the Supreme Court that the revision follows formal procedures and does not allow arbitrary deletions.

Form 6 is the standard application used to request inclusion of a name in an electoral roll. It is distinct from the SIR declaration, which is an additional document connected with the Special Intensive Revision. The article does not describe every field or eligibility requirement in Form 6, but it clearly distinguishes the two documents.

The EC said Form 6 had not been amended and that only the Centre could amend it. However, it admitted that the online display could be read as an amendment because the SIR declaration appeared with the application. From October 21, the online application was to be split into Form 6 and the separate declaration, matching the physical form.

This distinction matters because changing an official form and adding a separate declaration are different actions. The planned redesign aimed to remove confusion. It also addressed a central allegation in the petition: that voter-enrolment forms had been changed without proper authority.

Three members approved the counter-affidavit: Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar and Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi. Their unanimous approval matters because the affidavit presents the Commission’s institutional response to allegations about SIR, voter forms, deletions, databases, and internal authority.

The EC also said all three SIR orders, issued in June 2025, October 2025, and May 2026, were unanimous Commission decisions. It explained that notes, queries, or suggestions made while a file moves between officials are not themselves Commission decisions. Files normally go to one Election Commissioner, then the other, and finally the CEC; urgent approvals may be electronic and recorded later.

Thus, the EC’s position is that formal decisions require collective approval, even though files may circulate sequentially. The affidavit directly challenges the petition’s portrayal of unilateral decision-making. It also says officers issuing orders beyond delegated powers can face action, reinforcing the claimed limits within the system.

The July 28 work-allocation order concerned how responsibilities within the election machinery were assigned. The EC said it was issued by an Additional Secretary who was on deputation. This became relevant because the petition raised concerns about the Commission’s internal decision-making and alleged concentration of authority.

According to the affidavit, both Election Commissioners wrote to the Cabinet Secretary on July 29, one day after the order. The EC then issued a joint direction on July 30. Because of that direction, the July 28 order was never implemented. The response does not describe the order’s detailed contents.

The EC used this sequence to show that the order did not change how the Commission operated in practice. It also said officers who issue orders beyond their delegated powers will face action. The episode therefore forms part of the Commission’s broader argument that internal checks existed and that disputed administrative steps did not automatically become operative.

During the SIR, some voter records may not initially match the available electoral data. The EC called these people “unmapped voters.” Its stated position is that an unmatched record does not automatically require the voter to appear before officials or attend a physical hearing.

Instead, Booth Level Officers, or BLOs, will collect documents from unmapped voters’ homes. The Commission said hearings should occur only in exceptional cases. Where a hearing is necessary, it should preferably be conducted online. This arrangement is intended to handle verification while reducing the burden on voters.

The process matters because a record that is not initially matched could otherwise create uncertainty about continued enrolment. The EC’s affidavit presents home document collection and limited hearings as safeguards against unnecessary exclusion. The article does not specify which documents are required or define the exceptional circumstances that would trigger a hearing.

The Electoral Registration Officer, or ERO, is the official with authority to order additions or deletions from the electoral roll. The Election Commission said neither its electronic database nor ECINet independently makes those changes. This places the formal decision with the designated electoral-roll officer.

The EC stated that no name is added or deleted in ECINet except by order of the ERO. It also said a committee containing experts from IIT and IISc had been established to check compliance. The affidavit therefore separates the system that records or displays changes from the official who authorises them.

This mechanism is central to the EC’s response to allegations of irregular deletions. It says database action must follow an ERO’s order, rather than occurring automatically or through an informal technical process. The article does not explain the ERO’s full legal procedure, appeal process, or evidentiary standards, but it identifies the ERO as the decision-making authority.

The Chief Election Commissioner can be removed only through a process comparable to removing a Supreme Court judge. The article gives this protection as the EC’s answer to the plea seeking suspension of the CEC. It does not set out the constitutional reasoning behind the safeguard.

The practical effect is that the CEC cannot be suspended or removed through an ordinary administrative decision. The EC said the plea to restrain the CEC was not maintainable because removal requires the protected process. This differs from a routine challenge to an official’s conduct or an internal order.

The broader principle is institutional independence. A difficult removal process can shield an election authority from retaliation or pressure connected to decisions about electoral rolls and election administration. That rationale is established constitutional context, not a reason stated in this article. Here, the EC relied on the safeguard to contest the petitioner’s requested remedy.