‘Diabolical regime’: Ex-US general warns Iran rebuilding nuclear programme

Iran’s nuclear programme includes its nuclear facilities, nuclear material, and the infrastructure needed to restore nuclear capabilities. The article does not list every technical activity, but it identifies Natanz and Isfahan as important sites. Their condition matters because uncertainty about Iran’s work has created proliferation concerns.

Natanz includes the Pickaxe Mountain complex, an underground facility considered especially sensitive. Isfahan has also been targeted in US and Israeli strikes. The IAEA says it lacks access to Iranian facilities and enough information about nuclear material, particularly at Isfahan. Those gaps make it harder to determine what remains at the sites.

Iran is rebuilding and fortifying facilities while diplomatic efforts continue. Without inspections and reliable information, outside governments cannot easily verify Iran’s activities or whether materials are being used as declared. The IAEA is seeking a durable, verifiable agreement that could restore monitoring and reduce the risk of renewed escalation.

Pickaxe Mountain is believed to be buried more than 300 feet below the surface near Iran’s Natanz nuclear site. Its depth makes the facility especially important in the debate over Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and the possibility of renewed attacks.

An underground location provides physical protection from direct access. The article says the depth makes Pickaxe Mountain a particularly sensitive target. Iran has also built makeshift earth mounds around Pickaxe Mountain and Natanz. These barriers are intended to complicate potential ground raids, adding another layer of protection around the sites.

The facility’s depth does not resolve the wider dispute over Iran’s programme. Satellite images show construction and fortification, while the IAEA still lacks access and information. If fighting resumes, protected sites could make damage assessment and inspection more difficult. That would deepen uncertainty about Iran’s nuclear activities and material.

Satellite imagery shows Iran rebuilding and fortifying sensitive facilities after US and Israeli strikes. The work includes construction at the Pickaxe Mountain complex near Natanz, stronger protection around nuclear facilities and security-related bunkers, and defensive preparations for possible renewed attacks.

Images analysed by the Institute for Science and International Security showed makeshift earth mounds around Pickaxe Mountain and Natanz. The mounds are meant to complicate potential ground raids. The article also reports that Iran has used the pause in direct fighting to restore missile and drone facilities and replenish its arsenal.

These activities suggest Tehran is preparing for more than one kind of threat. It is protecting nuclear and security sites while rebuilding offensive capabilities and strengthening defences. The work is occurring as diplomatic efforts continue, but monitoring remains limited. Continued construction could make future inspections, damage assessments, and efforts to prevent escalation more difficult.

Iran is restoring its nuclear, ballistic-missile, and drone capabilities because its leadership has not abandoned those programmes. Retired General Jack Keane said the nuclear ambition defines the regime. He also said Iran recognised the threat its weapons posed to adversaries and had recommitted to recovering its capabilities.

The rebuilding includes nuclear infrastructure, missile and drone facilities, and the replenishment of Iran’s arsenal. At the same time, Tehran is reinforcing nuclear sites and security-related bunkers. This combines recovery of offensive capabilities with protection against further strikes. The pause in direct fighting has given Iran time to carry out that work.

The article presents the rebuilding as part of preparation for renewed conflict, not as proof that fighting will certainly resume. Diplomatic efforts are still under way, but Iran’s actions increase concern among its opponents and international monitors. Without better verification, rebuilding could raise tensions and complicate attempts to prevent another escalation.

If international inspectors cannot monitor Iran’s nuclear activities, they may be unable to determine what is happening at damaged or rebuilt facilities. The IAEA has already warned that its lack of access and insufficient information about nuclear material create proliferation concerns. This is especially serious at Isfahan, which was targeted in strikes.

Inspections provide the access and information needed to assess nuclear sites and materials. Iran suspended cooperation after the June 2025 US and Israeli strikes, although it later indicated inspectors could return under agreed arrangements. Tehran insists that inspections of damaged sites must follow specially agreed procedures.

If access remains limited, uncertainty will continue. Governments may suspect that nuclear work or material is not being fully accounted for, while Iran may resist inspection terms it considers unacceptable. That could weaken diplomacy, intensify pressure, and make renewed fighting more likely. The article identifies a durable, verifiable agreement as the route toward resolving the dispute.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is the UN nuclear watchdog responsible for monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities and assessing information about its nuclear material. Its role matters because independent inspections can help establish what is happening at facilities affected by strikes or rebuilding.

The IAEA says it currently lacks access to Iranian nuclear facilities and sufficient information about nuclear material. Its latest quarterly report highlighted proliferation concerns, particularly at Isfahan. Iran suspended cooperation after the June 2025 strikes, but later indicated that inspectors could return under agreed arrangements. Tehran wants special procedures for damaged sites.

The agency needs meaningful access and reliable information to reduce uncertainty. IAEA director general Rafael Grossi has called for a durable, verifiable diplomatic agreement to resolve the disputes. If Iran and the agency can agree on inspection arrangements, monitoring could improve. If they cannot, concerns about the programme and the risk of escalation are likely to persist.

A durable, verifiable diplomatic agreement could replace uncertainty with agreed rules for inspections and reporting. It would give the IAEA a clearer role and help address disputes over Iran’s nuclear activities, damaged sites, and nuclear material. That could reduce fears that important information is being withheld.

The key mechanism is verification. Iran could allow inspectors to return under procedures agreed by both sides, while the IAEA receives access to facilities and sufficient information about materials. This is especially relevant to Isfahan and other sites affected by US and Israeli strikes. Reliable findings would give governments a stronger basis for decisions.

Better monitoring could reduce the pressure created by suspicion and make military action less attractive. It could also help resolve the disputes that followed Iran’s suspension of cooperation. The agreement would not erase every disagreement, but the article presents durable verification as the way to address proliferation concerns and lower the risk of renewed fighting.