Elections in Israel: Can Netanyahu Hold on to Power?

Israel’s parliament is the Knesset, the national legislature. Voters do not directly elect a prime minister in this election. They vote for party lists, and those results determine the balance of power in parliament. This matters because the government must command parliamentary support to govern.

The election is shaped by foreign and security policy, the response to the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack, Haredi military-service exemptions, and high inflation. The main contest is between Netanyahu’s right-wing religious bloc and more moderate forces led by Gadi Eisenkot.

The results will decide which parties can build a governing coalition. A change in the leading bloc could affect Israel’s leadership and tone, but it would not automatically end the wars or produce a new policy toward Palestinians. The article notes that many voters want a more responsible government while still supporting military operations.

The two main camps are separated by very little in the polls. Netanyahu leads a right-wing religious bloc, while former Israel Defence Forces chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot leads more moderate forces. The article first calls them neck-and-neck, then cites political scientist Sergei Medvedev, who says Eisenkot’s opposition alliance has a slight lead.

That distinction matters because a small polling advantage does not necessarily produce a governing majority. Israel’s governments depend on parties joining together, so the decisive question is whether either side can assemble enough parliamentary support. Smaller parties may therefore become crucial after voting ends.

The current reality is uncertain. Even an opposition victory might not bring a sharp change in policy, because many opponents share Netanyahu’s worldview and have moved rightward on key issues. The election could change leadership while leaving much of the security debate intact.

Israel uses a parliamentary system, so the prime minister must be able to govern with support from a majority of lawmakers. The party winning the most seats may have the best chance to form a government, but it does not automatically control parliament. Coalition-building is therefore central to the result. This explanation uses established knowledge about Israel’s electoral system, which the article does not detail.

After the vote, party leaders negotiate with other parties. A leader can remain prime minister if enough partners agree to support a coalition, even if the leader’s bloc is not the largest. Conversely, the largest bloc can fail if it cannot attract partners. Policy promises and shared ideology often shape these negotiations.

For Netanyahu, this means the election is not simply a contest for first place. His right-wing religious allies would need enough seats and discipline to keep him in power. If they cannot, Eisenkot’s forces or another coalition could replace him, even without a landslide.

Haredi communities are ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities in Israel. Many Haredi men have historically received exemptions or deferrals from compulsory military service while studying religious texts. The article identifies military service for ultra-Orthodox Haredi Jews as a major election issue, but it does not explain the legal details. The broader explanation here uses established background knowledge.

The dispute is politically powerful because compulsory service places demands on much of the population, especially during prolonged military operations. Supporters of exemptions defend religious study and Haredi community life. Critics argue that wartime burdens should be shared more equally. The issue also affects coalition stability because Haredi parties are important political partners.

The election may therefore decide whether exemptions are protected, limited, or renegotiated. Any change could reshape relations between secular and religious voters. It could also influence the government’s ability to pass budgets and maintain a stable coalition while wars continue.

A Netanyahu defeat could change Israel’s leadership, public tone, and approach to accountability. Critics hope a new government would confront mistakes surrounding the 7 October attack and permit an investigation into political responsibility. The article also says even small changes could matter. Yet leadership change alone would not transform Israel from the bottom up.

The mechanism is electoral rather than automatic. A new coalition would set priorities, appoint ministers, and decide how to handle investigations and relations with Washington. But its parties would still respond to voters who support military operations. Many opposition leaders also share Netanyahu’s worldview and have shifted further right on some issues.

The likely outcome is therefore mixed. The wars might continue, and policy toward Palestinians might not change fundamentally. Still, a new government could alter responsibility, decision-making, and Israel’s direction. The article presents Netanyahu’s departure as a possible halt to further deterioration, not a guaranteed peace settlement.

The attack of 7 October 2023 remains a central political wound. Israeli voters are being asked to consider not only security policy, but also whether leaders should answer for the failures that preceded the attack. This matters because accountability can shape trust, reform, and the country’s ability to recover. The article presents a state commission as the way to clarify political responsibility.

La Libre Belgique argues that Netanyahu has refused to allow such a commission, even three years later. A formal inquiry would examine what led to that fateful day and identify political responsibility. Its findings could influence public judgment, leadership choices, and future security decisions. The article does not provide the commission’s proposed membership or legal powers.

The issue will remain important after the election. A new government could open the investigation, while a Netanyahu-led government might continue resisting it. The broader implication is moral as well as political: the article says no society can calmly face the future while turning away from its past.

Israel’s proportional electoral system allocates parliamentary seats according to parties’ shares of the vote, rather than giving all power to one winner. Because several parties usually enter parliament, governments depend on coalitions. This matters because a prime minister must keep partners together to pass laws, approve budgets, and survive politically. The article does not explain these mechanics; this is established background knowledge.

The key mechanism is negotiation. A large party may need religious, nationalist, centrist, or other partners. Those partners can demand ministerial posts or policy commitments. In this election, Haredi military service, war policy, accountability for 7 October, and relations with Palestinians could all be shaped by coalition bargaining.

The result is often both continuity and compromise. A new leader might make small but meaningful changes without ending military operations or changing the Palestinian question fundamentally. Conversely, a fragile coalition could delay decisions or prolong government formation, especially among irreconcilable parties.