Analysis: No Elon Musk, Russian soldiers in Ukraine are not 'kids' who have 'no choice but to fight and die' - The Kyiv Independent

A Russian soldier who voluntarily signs a military contract is a paid volunteer, not a one-year conscript assigned to the standing army. The soldier agrees to serve under a short-term contract with Russia’s Defense Ministry. This distinction matters because the contract army supplies most of Russia’s forces fighting in Ukraine.

The article says recruits receive sign-up bonuses and monthly salaries several times higher than Russia’s national average. Regional governments add their own bonuses while following recruitment quotas imposed by Moscow. For people in poorer regions, one enlistment decision can address years of financial hardship. Social benefits also add to the offer, including free education and housing subsidies.

This does not mean every recruit is free from pressure. Financial hardship, recruitment quotas, and the promise of benefits can strongly influence a decision. Still, the article’s central point is that most soldiers are recruited through paid contracts, rather than being conscripts forced abroad.

NATO estimated in August that Russia was recruiting up to 40,000 people each month. This figure refers to the continuing inflow of people signing up for military service, mainly through contracts. It matters because Russia needs a constant supply of soldiers for its war in Ukraine.

The article links this recruitment rate to Moscow’s use of paid volunteers. Recruits receive federal and regional sign-up bonuses, plus monthly salaries several times higher than the national average. These offers are especially attractive in poorer Russian regions. The Kremlin can therefore replace losses and maintain offensive operations without openly ordering a nationwide mobilization.

The number also helps explain why Russia can continue repeated infantry assaults. Many soldiers are killed or wounded before reaching assigned objectives, yet tens of thousands continue to enlist. The article presents this recruitment system as central to sustaining Russia’s military campaign.

Russia operates two armies with different roles. Its conscript army is the standing force used to defend Russia itself. Eligible men are called up twice yearly, in spring and fall, and must serve for one year. By law, these conscripts cannot be sent abroad to fight.

The contract army is different. It consists of paid volunteers and soldiers who sign short-term contracts with the Defense Ministry. This is the force Moscow relies on for its war in Ukraine. Recruits are attracted by large sign-up bonuses, high monthly salaries, and social benefits. Regional governments add payments while meeting Kremlin recruitment quotas.

The distinction matters because public discussion often treats all Russian soldiers as unwilling young conscripts. The article says most soldiers fighting in Ukraine chose to enlist. Russia’s continued reliance on contract recruitment also shows how Moscow avoids sending the legally protected conscript force abroad.

The Kremlin relies on financial incentives because it is afraid of mobilizing its people, according to Russia researcher Kateryna Stepanenko. A new nationwide mobilization could create public resistance and expose the human cost of the war more directly. Paid recruitment gives Moscow another way to keep its forces supplied.

Russia offers federal sign-up bonuses, high monthly salaries, and additional payments from regional governments. These regions operate under strict recruitment quotas imposed by Moscow. For people facing serious financial hardship, military service can appear to offer a rapid solution. NATO estimated that up to 40,000 people were recruited each month in August.

This system allows Russia to continue offensive operations without formally relying on mass forced enlistment. It also supports the article’s distinction between conscripts and contract soldiers. The contract system does not remove coercive pressures, but it lets the Kremlin present recruitment as voluntary while sustaining heavy battlefield losses.

The article describes enlistment as voluntary on paper but shaped by powerful financial and social pressures. Recruits receive sign-up bonuses and monthly salaries several times higher than Russia’s national average. These payments matter most in poorer regions, where one contract can address years of financial hardship.

The Kremlin also adds social rewards. The article names free education and housing subsidies among the benefits. Federal payments from the Defense Ministry are supplemented by regional bonuses. At the same time, Russian regions face strict recruitment quotas imposed by Moscow. The contract itself is the legal route into the wartime force, while conscripts are legally barred from being sent abroad.

Together, these incentives help explain Russia’s continuing recruitment. They do not prove that every person is forced to enlist. But they show how economic hardship, official quotas, and promised benefits can strongly shape decisions that are described as voluntary.

Russia’s repeated infantry assaults sharply reduce a recruited soldier’s chance of survival. Since the Battle of Bakhmut, Russian offensive tactics have relied on a near-endless stream of dismounted attacks. Commanders often treat assault soldiers as single-use troops rather than preserving them for repeated operations.

The assault groups have shrunk from teams of six to ten soldiers around 2023 to infiltration teams of two, or sometimes one. Russian POW interviews describe missions that require soldiers to reach a map location and wait for orders, often beyond Ukrainian lines. Drones, shells, and mines frequently kill or wound them before they arrive.

Some soldiers survive, receive reinforcements, and are sent out again. Many do not. Yet Russia continues recruiting tens of thousands each month, using money to replace losses and sustain the same costly approach. The system’s continuation means new volunteers may face the same high-risk missions.

The article draws both a legal and moral distinction between the two armies. Russia’s conscripts serve one year and, by law, cannot be sent abroad. Most Russians fighting in Ukraine are instead contract soldiers who chose paid military service. Ukraine’s soldiers are described as fighting to defend their country and its freedom.

The difference is clearest in the purpose of the war. Pavel Luzin calls Russia’s side an occupying force trying to subjugate another country and its people. He describes Ukraine’s side as fighting for freedom. The article therefore rejects treating the suffering of both forces as morally equivalent, even though soldiers on both sides face battlefield danger.

This distinction matters when discussing Russian casualties. Calling Russian fighters helpless children ignores the recruitment system that brings most of them into the war. The article presents them mainly as volunteers responding to financial and psychological incentives, while Ukraine’s military is resisting an invasion.