Netanyahu, with Trump’s backing, could lose election and still lead a divided Israel

Israel’s election does not necessarily remove a sitting prime minister immediately. If the winner cannot assemble a governing coalition, the existing government can continue in a caretaker role. That would let Netanyahu remain prime minister temporarily despite losing the election.

The article says Netanyahu could exploit political gridlock if Eisenkot refuses a partnership. He could stay caretaker prime minister and ultimately seek to force another vote. The key mechanism is the failure to form a new coalition, not a direct reversal of the election result.

This possibility makes coalition negotiations especially important. Polls reportedly favor Eisenkot, but Netanyahu’s political future could depend on whether Eisenkot can build a government. If neither side can secure enough support, Israel could face prolonged uncertainty and another election rather than an immediate transfer of power.

A unity government brings major rival political camps into one governing coalition. A rotation agreement divides the prime minister’s term between two leaders. This can create a broader government when neither side can govern alone, but it requires both leaders to trust the arrangement.

The article points to the 2020 deal between Benny Gantz and Netanyahu. Netanyahu became the first prime minister, while Gantz was supposed to take over later. Under a possible new deal, Netanyahu could join forces with Eisenkot, abandon far-right partners such as Ben Gvir, and lead a more moderate coalition before Eisenkot’s turn.

That outcome remains doubtful. Eisenkot first said he would not serve under Netanyahu, even in a rotation agreement. He later gave a more measured response, saying Israeli voters would determine the election outcome. Distrust from the 2020 collapse still weighs heavily.

The article describes the contest without giving exact polling percentages or seat counts. It says most polls show Israelis preferring Eisenkot as the next prime minister, while Eisenkot has led Netanyahu in recent weeks. That indicates an advantage, but not a quantified level of support.

The article also does not mention Arab parties, their projected seats, or whether either bloc might seek their backing. In Israel’s parliamentary system, parties can matter through coalition negotiations even when they do not lead the largest bloc. Their influence would depend on the election’s seat distribution and the willingness of larger parties to work with them.

Therefore, the text supports only a qualitative conclusion. Eisenkot appears ahead in public preference, but Netanyahu remains a serious coalition contender. The size and bargaining power of Arab parties cannot be established from the information provided.

A failed coalition-building process does not necessarily produce an immediate new government. The existing administration can continue as a caretaker government while political parties try to break the deadlock. That allows routine governance to continue, but leaves major political decisions constrained by uncertainty.

The article gives Netanyahu a specific possible strategy. If Eisenkot rejects a partnership, Netanyahu could take advantage of political gridlock, remain caretaker prime minister, and ultimately seek to force another vote. The mechanism is prolonged failure to form a coalition rather than a new leader automatically taking office.

The result could be a repeated election and an extended period of instability. Eisenkot’s ability to form a government would therefore matter as much as his election performance. Even if he leads the polls, he would still need enough political partners to replace Netanyahu’s government.

The intervention is unusual because a sitting US president publicly tried to influence Israel’s leadership choice. Trump urged Israelis to vote for Netanyahu and repeatedly pressured Israeli President Isaac Herzog to pardon him while Netanyahu faced corruption charges. The article describes this as unprecedented involvement by a US president in Israel.

Trump endorsed Netanyahu on October 18, calling him a “great warrior prime minister” and a partner against Iran. He repeated the endorsement Sunday. Trump’s pressure also reached beyond electoral preference, touching an active Israeli legal case involving Netanyahu.

The intervention matters because polls generally favored Eisenkot, making Trump’s backing especially direct and politically consequential. US Ambassador Mike Huckabee said Trump apparently made the endorsement on his own. Huckabee declined to explain Trump’s motives and said his job was to work with whichever government Israelis elected.

Benny Gantz ran against Netanyahu in 2020 but then formed a unity government with Likud. The agreement made Netanyahu the first prime minister in a rotation arrangement, with Gantz expected to take over later. The coalition collapsed before that transfer happened.

The article says Netanyahu was widely accused of engineering the collapse to keep Gantz from reaching the top job. That alleged maneuver is the key reason a new rotation proposal is difficult to trust. It gives Eisenkot a concrete precedent for fearing that Netanyahu might not honor a future handover.

This history shapes today’s negotiations. Eisenkot has said he will not serve under Netanyahu, even in a rotation agreement, although he later answered more cautiously. Observers also cite the men’s lack of trust and Eisenkot’s commitment to removing Netanyahu as obstacles to unity.

Israel’s parliamentary system centers on seats in the legislature rather than a direct nationwide presidential contest. A leader can therefore become prime minister without winning most of the national vote, provided their party or bloc can assemble enough seats and partners to form a government.

The article illustrates this through coalition negotiations. Netanyahu may seek a unity government with Eisenkot, while Eisenkot would need support from other parties if he leads the polls. The decisive mechanism is bargaining among parties after the election. The largest party does not automatically govern alone.

The article does not provide the exact electoral rules, vote shares, or seat totals. The broader explanation comes from established knowledge of parliamentary coalition systems. In this case, election results would determine the available seats, while post-election alliances would determine who can actually govern.