What to know as Israel holds first vote since 7 October

Israel is voting in its first election since Hamas attacked on 7 October 2023 and since the war that followed in Gaza. The central question is who should be held responsible for the security failures that allowed the attack to happen. That makes accountability, rather than only future policy, the election’s core issue.

Benjamin Netanyahu has been prime minister for nearly two decades across three periods. He has long presented himself as Israel’s protector and argues that only he can guide the country through war. His main challenger, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, offers a different leadership style and has promised a formal investigation.

The campaign has largely focused on Israel’s own security failure, not the subsequent war in Gaza. Eisenkot’s Yashar party moved ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud in most final polls. Neither major candidate supports a Palestinian state, and both support West Bank settlements, but their biggest divide is over accountability and leadership.

Accountability has become central because 7 October was a direct security failure inside Israel. More than 1,200 people were killed in southern Israel, and 251 were taken hostage. Voters are therefore asking who failed to prevent the attack and who should answer for those decisions.

The Gaza war followed the attack. It has caused more than 74,000 deaths according to the article and reduced much of the territory to rubble. It has also prompted genocide accusations from a UN commission and in a case at the International Court of Justice, which Israel rejects. Yet those issues have not dominated the Israeli campaign.

The political mechanism is simple: elections often focus most sharply on failures voters experienced directly. Netanyahu has resisted calls for a state commission of inquiry, while Eisenkot promises one. That contrast makes responsibility for 7 October more immediate than the wider Gaza conflict for many voters.

A state commission of inquiry is a formal investigation created to examine a serious national failure. It gathers evidence, questions relevant officials and institutions, and produces findings about what happened. Its purpose is to establish facts and responsibility, rather than settle the issue through campaign claims alone.

Israel has used this kind of investigation after other security failures. The article says Netanyahu has resisted strong demands for a commission into 7 October for three years. That resistance has made the issue a major test of his willingness to accept scrutiny.

Gadi Eisenkot has promised to create the commission if elected. He is a former head of the Israeli military, and his son and two nephews were killed fighting in Gaza. His proposal would give the country an official account of how the attack became possible. He has also promised equal military drafting across society, including ultra-Orthodox men, many of whom do not serve.

Around 7.3 million people are eligible to vote in the election. They are choosing representatives for the Knesset, Israel’s 120-seat parliament. The size of the electorate shows the national scale of the contest, while the fixed number of seats determines how power is measured afterward.

A governing majority requires 61 seats. That is one seat more than half of 120. The final polls projected Netanyahu’s bloc and the opposition parties behind Eisenkot at roughly 52 or 53 seats each, so neither side appeared able to govern alone.

The numbers point to negotiations after voting ends. The two main blocs would each be short of the required threshold, while the Arab parties were projected to hold about 14 seats together. That makes the election less about one party winning outright and more about which combination can assemble 61 supporters.

The article’s final polls showed both main blocs falling short of 61 seats. Netanyahu’s bloc and the opposition parties aligned behind Eisenkot were each projected to win about 52 or 53 seats. That creates deadlock because neither side can form a majority from its core partners alone.

The immediate consequence is negotiation. Parties must decide whether to join a governing coalition, support one from outside it, or refuse cooperation. The Arab parties are especially important because the Joint List and Ra’am together were polling at about 14 seats, enough to change which side can reach 61.

Under Israel’s parliamentary system, if negotiations produce no viable majority, the country may face a prolonged political stalemate or another election. That final possibility is general parliamentary practice, not a specific outcome stated in the article. The article establishes only that the projected arithmetic leaves both main blocs short of power.

Arab citizens make up around one-fifth of Israel’s population, and the Joint List and Ra’am were polling at about 14 seats together. That bloc could become decisive because Netanyahu’s side and the opposition each appeared to have only 52 or 53 seats.

Adding the Arab parties to the opposition would create, on paper, a comfortable majority against Netanyahu. Both parties have indicated that they are willing to help bring him down. Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas said he wants to be an influential partner, while Joint List leader Yousef Jabareen also signalled opposition to Netanyahu.

They would not necessarily need to hold cabinet posts or formally join a government. In parliamentary politics, outside support can help a government reach the votes needed to take office or survive key votes. The article does not state exactly what arrangement would emerge, but it shows why Arab parties could determine the outcome.

Israel’s proportional-representation system converts each party’s national vote share into a roughly corresponding share of Knesset seats. This gives smaller parties a route into parliament instead of awarding all representation to the largest party in each local district. The result is a legislature containing several parties.

The article’s figures show the mechanism. Netanyahu’s bloc and the opposition parties behind Eisenkot were each projected to win about 52 or 53 seats. The Joint List and Ra’am were projected to hold about 14 seats together. Their seats could therefore alter which side reaches the 61-seat governing threshold.

Because the Knesset has 120 seats, a party or bloc needs 61 for a majority. When the largest bloc falls short, it must negotiate with other parties over support and policy. This is why election night does not necessarily identify the next government immediately. Coalition-building determines who can command the required votes.