EC says decisions were unanimous but leaves a big question unanswered

The central unanswered question concerns the Commission’s internal decision-making. The issue is whether all members were consulted and informed before actions were taken in the Commission’s name. It is different from asking whether the Commission later approved those actions. That distinction matters because formal approval may not show how the process actually worked.

The article cites 14 notes written over 10 months by Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi. Most were recorded after a decision, system, order, or case already existed. The notes said the Commissioners had not been told. In the Form 6 dispute, the online change went ahead even after both Commissioners had objected in writing.

The Commission’s affidavit describes how decisions are formally taken, but does not identify who approved the July online implementation. It also presents later ECINet safeguards without mentioning earlier proposals by Joshi and Sandhu. The process therefore remains a question of practice, not only legal authority.

Two of the Commission’s three members are involved: Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi. Over 10 months, they recorded 14 notes. These notes concerned decisions, systems, orders, or cases carried out in the Commission’s name without the Commissioners being told beforehand.

The timing is the striking detail. Most notes were written after the relevant action had already happened. Joshi objected to changing Form 6 before the online version was altered. Sandhu later learned about that change from a newspaper report. On ECINet, both Commissioners also raised concerns about software and oversight after development work had begun.

The notes do not necessarily show that every final decision lacked approval. They show that the Commissioners said they were not consulted or informed at important stages. The Commission’s affidavit describes formal decision-making, but it does not explain who approved particular actions or why they proceeded despite the written concerns.

Form 6 is the statutory form citizens use to apply for inclusion in the electoral roll. Because it is prescribed by the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, changing the form involves a legal process. The dispute was about whether the online version could include a new declaration without formally amending those rules.

In May, Vivek Joshi recorded that Form 6 could not be altered without an amendment to the rules. Sukhbir Singh Sandhu agreed. Nevertheless, a declaration connected with the SIR was inserted into the online Form 6 in July. Sandhu learned about it from a newspaper report and later called it “unauthorised/illegal.”

The Commission’s affidavit now says the declaration was a separate document, not an amended Form 6. It also accepts that the online presentation could look like an amendment and needed correction. On October 21, the ER Division decided to separate the statutory form from the declaration.

ECINet is the platform through which electoral-roll functions are carried out. Its operation matters because software does more than store information. It can determine which officials have access, which actions are possible, and whether statutory decisions can be implemented. The article links it to concerns about centralisation of the electoral-roll database.

The Commission says the Electoral Registration Officer remains responsible for the roll. No entry may be added, deleted, or modified except by that officer’s order. Yet Joshi warned about gradual centralisation and proposed outside expert certification of database credentials. Sandhu also said new modules had been built without being brought to the Commission.

The Commission later announced a review committee including experts from IIT Mumbai and IISc Bengaluru. It also promised scrutiny of new IT modules. These steps address compliance, but the article notes they do not prove officers could perform every required action when the earlier concerns were recorded.

Goa provides the clearest example of the practical consequence. The Commission’s affidavit refers to 97 voters who were left off the final electoral roll. It says 88 of them later applied through Form 6. That records what happened afterward, but not why the original deletions could not be promptly reversed.

In February, Goa’s election office made eight requests in seven days asking the software to allow Electoral Registration Officers to reverse the deletions. The Commission’s own Deputy Election Commissioner noted that the “IT system cannot block necessary action.” This indicates that the software was affecting how statutory decisions could be implemented.

The affidavit does not explain why the system prevented the reversals at that time. The Goa example therefore supports the article’s wider distinction: declaring that the Electoral Registration Officer is legally responsible does not establish that the software enabled the officer to exercise that responsibility.

Under the Commission’s stated position, the Electoral Registration Officer, or ERO, is the statutory authority responsible for the electoral roll. This includes decisions to add, delete, or modify a voter’s entry. ECINet is described as a tool that should help the ERO exercise those legal powers.

The affidavit makes the rule explicit: “no entry is added or deleted or modified except by order of the Electoral Registration Officer.” This legal responsibility was central to the Commission’s response about ECINet. It argued that the platform itself does not replace the officer’s statutory authority.

The article separates that formal rule from the system’s practical operation. In Goa, the software reportedly did not allow EROs to reverse deletions, despite repeated requests. Sandhu also recorded that field officers could not use the system to do what the law required. Thus, legal responsibility rested with the ERO, while the article questions whether the software always enabled that responsibility.

Officials must be consulted and informed because decisions made in an institution’s name require clear accountability. Members need to know what is being authorised, how it will operate, and whether it matches the law. This is especially important when an independent constitutional institution relies on administrative systems and software to carry out public functions.

The article gives two examples. Joshi and Sandhu objected to changing Form 6, yet the online version was altered later. In ECINet, Joshi proposed outside certification of database access, while Sandhu said new modules had been developed without being brought to the Commission. Goa then showed how software could prevent officials from reversing deletions.

Consultation alone cannot guarantee that a system is lawful or effective. But it creates a record of responsibility and allows problems to be identified before implementation. The Commission’s later review committee and module scrutiny are steps toward that, though the article says they do not resolve what happened earlier.