Israel braces for an election each side warns could bring ruin

This election is unusually consequential because it is a direct referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership after four years of crisis and war. Voters can punish him for the security failures behind the Hamas-led October 7 attacks or reward him for what he calls unprecedented military successes since then.

If Netanyahu and his far-right coalition win, they are likely to renew the war with Iran in an effort to topple its regime. They could also intensify their crackdown on Israel’s democratic institutions and move to end Netanyahu’s corruption trial. Netanyahu’s campaign centered heavily on the Iranian nuclear threat.

The opposition arrived more organized and motivated, but Netanyahu has repeatedly defied expectations. He may not need an outright victory: enough seats to block an opposing coalition could let him remain caretaker prime minister for six more months, until another election.

The central question is whether Netanyahu should be held responsible for the security failures that enabled the Hamas-led October 7 attacks. This is Israeli voters’ first chance to judge him electorally for that failure. His opponents say the country needs accountability and a national commission of inquiry.

Netanyahu presents a different case. After three years of war and two military campaigns over the last 18 months, he claims Israel destroyed Iran’s nuclear program. His campaign focused on the danger of Iran moving closer to a nuclear bomb, including an AI-generated image showing Tel Aviv destroyed by such an attack.

The result will show which argument carries more weight. Opponents also criticize government dysfunction, Qatar payments involving advisers, and the failure to draft ultra-Orthodox men. Netanyahu says he did not know about the payments, while his aides describe them differently.

More than 7 million Israelis are eligible to vote, and 61 seats are required to control a majority. That number matters because neither major camp can govern alone unless it assembles enough supporting parties. Coalition arithmetic, rather than simply finishing first, determines who can form a government.

The 3.25% electoral threshold is the minimum vote share a party needs to qualify for seats. Parties below it risk winning no representation, so their votes do not help either camp’s seat total. The article identifies this as a serious risk for pro-Netanyahu parties, while the opposition faced little comparable danger.

Small differences in turnout and party performance can therefore change the result. Arab turnout was expected to be the highest ever, with two Arab parties projected to win about 15 seats combined. Those seats could form a significant bloc in coalition negotiations, where 61 remains the key target.

A coalition government is a governing alliance formed by multiple parties. In this election, the winning camp must gather enough partners to reach 61 seats. Because several parties compete separately, the largest party or bloc does not automatically control the government.

Netanyahu’s strategy can work without a clear victory. If his bloc wins enough seats to prevent the opposition from reaching 61, opponents may be unable to form a coalition or swear in a minority government. That blocking position could preserve his authority without giving him a governing majority.

Under the scenario described, Netanyahu could remain caretaker prime minister for another six months while the country heads toward another election. This makes seat totals, party alliances, and the ability to unite quickly more important than simply identifying which bloc finishes first. The opposition would need Eisenkot to bring its partners together.

An Israeli strike before voting could have transformed a campaign maneuver into a regional military crisis. IDF chief of staff General Eyal Zamir warned that even preparatory steps might cause a miscalculation, quickly escalating hostilities with Iran. The danger was not limited to the initial action.

Netanyahu had spent weeks seeking President Trump’s approval for a strike. In the final 72 hours, he tried to order the IDF to prepare for a possible attack or take steps short of one. Zamir refused, saying there was no operational urgency before the election and warning about escalation.

Zamir eventually persuaded Netanyahu to back off. Israeli officials said a wider conflict could have forced the election to be called off. The episode shows how the vote was entangled with military decisions, and why the timing of any Iran action could affect both Israel’s security and its democratic process.

The October 7 inquiry is central because opponents say voters need an official account of the security failure. Gadi Eisenkot campaigned on holding Netanyahu accountable and creating a national commission of inquiry. He also backed drafting ultra-Orthodox men to strengthen the IDF after three years of war.

Military service has become a practical question about manpower and fairness. Eisenkot’s proposal links the burden of prolonged war to the country’s need for a stronger army. Netanyahu’s bloc includes ultra-Orthodox parties, making the issue politically sensitive. Naftali Bennett separately attacked what he called extreme government dysfunction.

Arab parties matter because their projected seats could influence who reaches 61. Turnout among Israel’s Arab minority was expected to be the highest ever, with two Arab parties projected to win around 15 seats combined. Their strength could shape coalition bargaining, though the opposition also faced internal divisions.

In proportional representation, parties receive seats broadly according to their share of the vote rather than one party taking all power. Israel’s 120-seat parliament is therefore divided among competing party lists. A party’s national vote total determines whether it enters parliament and how many seats it receives.

The 3.25% threshold is the gatekeeper. A party below it receives no seats, while a party above it can add seats to its bloc. That is why the article highlights the danger of pro-Netanyahu parties losing voters below the threshold. Small parties can also become essential partners when neither main camp reaches 61 alone.

The result is powerful coalition bargaining. Arab parties were projected to win about 15 seats, while opposition parties sought to unite behind Eisenkot. Netanyahu could also use this system defensively: by preventing rivals from assembling 61 seats, he might remain caretaker prime minister even without leading the largest bloc. This explanation adds standard background to the article’s seat-threshold facts.