Like Blair and Starmer before him, Burnham has found his Middle East war

Britain is sending Royal Air Force fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. Defence Secretary Wes Streeting described the mission as protection for Saudi cities and critical oil infrastructure. It matters because the deployment deepens Britain’s military role in Yemen’s wider regional conflict.

The move responds to Houthi attacks on Saudi airports and oil assets. The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014. Saudi Arabia then led a coalition against them, with British backing. The conflict has since expanded into Saudi territory.

The government presents the deployment as defensive. However, it places British forces alongside a Saudi state accused in the article of waging an 11-year war and siege against Yemen. The mission could therefore make Britain more directly associated with Saudi security policy and the consequences of the conflict.

The Houthis are the Yemeni movement also called Ansar Allah. The article identifies them as the force that seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014. Their rise triggered Saudi Arabia’s intervention and the formation of a Saudi-led coalition, backed by Britain.

The Houthis now attack Saudi airports, cities and oil assets. The article presents these strikes within a wider war, not as an isolated campaign. Saudi Arabia has backed military operations against the Houthis, while the Houthis have launched attacks inside Saudi Arabia and fought Saudi-backed forces in Yemen.

The result is an expanding battlefield. Houthi offensives have taken the conflict beyond Yemen’s borders, while Saudi strikes continue across Yemen. The article reports that recent Saudi attacks killed four members of a family in Sanaa and caused dozens of further casualties nationwide.

The Saudi-led war in Yemen has lasted 11 years, according to the article. Its scale matters because the conflict is not merely a short border confrontation. It has involved a prolonged siege, air strikes and fighting between Saudi-backed forces and the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia intervened after Ansar Allah seized Sanaa in 2014. Britain was a key backer of the Saudi-led coalition. The article says Saudi strikes recently hit targets across Yemen, killing four members of a family in Sanaa and causing dozens more casualties nationwide.

The reported death toll is hundreds of thousands. That figure places the RAF deployment in the context of a humanitarian catastrophe, rather than a simple defensive operation. Continued British support could expose the government to criticism over civilian harm and over its role in sustaining a war that shows no clear resolution.

The word “defensive” frames Britain’s deployment as protection rather than participation in a wider war. The Ministry of Defence says RAF jets will defend Saudi cities and critical oil infrastructure from Houthi attacks. That language is politically important because it presents military action as safeguarding people and essential facilities.

The article compares this reasoning with Starmer’s decision to let the US use UK bases for “defensive” strikes on Iran’s missile infrastructure. Those strikes were described as protecting UK allies after Trump and Israel launched a war on Iran. The comparison shows how defensive labels can cover active military involvement.

British forces could therefore protect Saudi urban and oil targets, support regional allies, or become involved in operations against missile infrastructure. The article warns that such commitments may draw Britain deeper into conflicts shaped by Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United States and the Houthis.

Britain’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is rooted in a century of political, military and commercial ties. Arms deals with the Al Sauds have helped support Britain’s military-industrial complex and made Saudi security important to successive governments. Those links help explain Britain’s backing for the Saudi-led coalition.

The key example is the Al-Yamamah arms deal of the 1980s. The article calls it the biggest and most corrupt deal in British history. In 2007, Tony Blair shut down an inquiry into it after Saudi warnings that intelligence sharing on terror threats would be withdrawn.

This history shows how military cooperation, commercial interests and security arguments reinforce one another. Britain’s current deployment is therefore part of a longer relationship, not a new commitment. The same ties may make it politically difficult for Burnham’s government to challenge Saudi actions or distance Britain from the Yemen war.

The political danger is that Burnham may inherit a war that becomes identified with his leadership. The article compares this possibility with Tony Blair’s support for the 2003 Iraq invasion and Keir Starmer’s support for Israel’s war in Gaza. It says Iraq helped finish Blair’s premiership, while Gaza helped finish Starmer’s.

Burnham has already supported the US-led order and voted for the Iraq invasion. His government now backs a military deployment to defend Saudi cities and oil infrastructure. That choice could link him to Saudi Arabia’s 11-year war and siege, which the article says killed hundreds of thousands.

Burnham currently enjoys a political honeymoon and a poll bounce. But public patience may change if British forces become involved in Saudi operations or if civilian casualties continue. The article’s warning is that a “defensive” mission can still become a major political liability when voters connect it to a destructive foreign war.

A sovereign wealth fund is a state-owned pool of money invested to preserve or grow national wealth. Gulf states built huge funds from accumulated oil revenues and used them to acquire assets in Western countries. These investments can give them economic influence far beyond their borders.

The article contrasts that approach with Britain’s decision to privatise its North Sea oil riches in the 1980s. Instead of retaining comparable state funds, the UK allowed those resources to pass through a privatised system. Gulf governments therefore became major owners and investors, while Britain lost a powerful public financial cushion.

The result is a post-imperial Britain increasingly reliant on capital inflows from the Arabian Gulf. That dependence can shape foreign and defence policy. It may make ministers more willing to protect Gulf partners, accept their investments and maintain close ties, even when those partners are involved in controversial wars.