What could change in Israel if Netanyahu leaves the government?

If Likud loses, Israel could form a government without Netanyahu, its longest-serving prime minister. The biggest changes would likely concern institutions and domestic politics, rather than the broad direction of the Gaza war or opposition to a Palestinian state.

The opposition promises an independent investigation into the failures that allowed October 7. It also wants to end military-service exemptions for ultra-Orthodox religious students, stop the judicial reform that would limit the Supreme Court, and bar criminally indicted politicians from becoming prime minister. Netanyahu faces corruption cases.

Foreign policy could also shift. A new coalition would seek better relations with Europe and support from both major U.S. parties. In the West Bank, it would dismantle illegal settler outposts and prevent settler violence. Yet the new government would still oppose Palestinian statehood, keep security control over the territory, and refuse to leave Gaza until Hamas disarms.

Israel’s Knesset has 120 seats, and a governing bloc needs at least 61 to form a government. That number matters because neither of the two main camps is projected to win a majority on its own. Election results therefore create a negotiation problem, not an automatic winner.

A projection from October 12 placed Yashar first with 23 seats and Likud second with 20. Even those figures are far below 61. The parties must therefore seek support from other groups, including smaller right-wing parties, ultra-Orthodox parties, or center-left parties.

The final government will depend on those negotiations. Netanyahu currently relies on far-right parties led by Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Gadi Eisenkot would need to attract less radical right-wing parties and the center-left Democrats. Their demands could determine the coalition’s policies and even who becomes prime minister.

A coalition government is formed when several parties combine their parliamentary seats and agree to govern together. In Israel, this is essential because a government needs 61 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. The largest party does not automatically govern if it lacks enough partners.

The article projects a close contest: Yashar could win 23 seats and Likud 20. Those totals leave both far short of a majority. Netanyahu currently governs with far-right parties led by Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Their support helps him stay in power, but it also gives them influence over policy.

After the election, smaller parties could choose the governing camp. Eisenkot would need less radical right-wing parties and the center-left Democrats. Netanyahu would need to preserve support from his current allies or find alternatives. Their conditions could decide the coalition’s priorities, its stability, and the identity of Israel’s next prime minister.

A new government led by Eisenkot could change how Israel manages Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank. He supports settlements in principle, but insists they follow Israeli law. That would distinguish him from Netanyahu’s government, under which settlements expanded and illegal outposts appeared.

Eisenkot promises to dismantle those unauthorized outposts and stop settler violence against Palestinians. He also opposes the E1 project, approved by Netanyahu’s government, because it would divide the West Bank and separate it from East Jerusalem. The project’s stated aim among settlers is to bury the possibility of a Palestinian state.

The shift would be significant but limited. Eisenkot would not end the settlement project entirely, since he supports settlements. He would instead impose legal limits and greater enforcement. Netanyahu’s current far-right partners support annexing all Palestinian territories, so coalition negotiations could determine how much of Eisenkot’s approach becomes policy.

The Gaza war and Palestinian statehood are central because both candidates define Israel’s security around continued control and Hamas’s removal as a military threat. Netanyahu and Eisenkot reject an independent Palestinian state and oppose the two-state solution, which guided peace negotiations for generations.

In Gaza, Israeli troops control about two-thirds of the territory, while more than two million residents live in the remaining third under Hamas’s political control. Both candidates say Israel will not leave Gaza until Hamas disarms. Both are also prepared to resume the war if necessary. Eisenkot wants to replace Hamas’s administration within 18 months.

Their difference is mainly about methods and timing. Eisenkot would pursue a U.S.-mediated plan or use force to replace Hamas. Regarding Iran, he would support another attack only if Tehran moved toward a nuclear weapon. Thus, an election victory might change management and diplomacy, but not these core positions.

Military-service exemption for ultra-Orthodox religious students has become a major political issue because it divides Netanyahu’s coalition from the opposition. Netanyahu depends on ultra-Orthodox parties and wants to formalize the benefit. Ending the exemption is one of the opposition’s central promises.

The mechanism is straightforward: the parties that support the exemption can help keep Netanyahu in office, while parties demanding equal military obligations can make their support conditional on removing it. The issue therefore affects both public policy and coalition arithmetic. It is not merely a religious question; it can determine which alliances are possible.

If Likud loses, a new coalition would probably try to end the exemption. If Netanyahu remains dependent on ultra-Orthodox partners, he would continue seeking to formalize it. The election could therefore decide whether the current arrangement is protected or overturned, alongside other disputes over judicial reform and the October 7 investigation.

The two-state solution is the idea of creating an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. The article identifies it as the basis for generations of peace negotiations. Rejecting it means Israel’s political leadership does not accept that framework for resolving the conflict.

Both Netanyahu and Eisenkot oppose an independent Palestinian state. They also support Israel maintaining security control over the entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. In the West Bank, that position connects to settlements and to the proposed E1 project, which opponents say would divide the territory and isolate East Jerusalem.

This stance would shape Israel’s long-term borders, security arrangements, and relations with Palestinians. It also means an election victory by either leading candidate would not produce a major change on Palestinian statehood. The main difference would be enforcement in the West Bank, including illegal outposts and settler violence, rather than acceptance of the two-state framework.