A Delhi event unveils fault lines in the Dalit-OBC formulation of SP politics

Rajkumar Bhati joined a mass Buddhist Dhamma Diksha ceremony in Delhi and recited Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s 22 vows. The viral video showed him rejecting Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh, Rama and Krishna as gods. It also showed him repeating a vow against rituals performed by Brahmin priests. These are the most politically sensitive parts of Ambedkar’s pledge.

BJP supporters used the video to attack Bhati, and he faced an FIR. SP leaders also criticised him. Ram Gopal Yadav threatened to remove him from his party post, while Shivpal Yadav said, “Hum Ishwarwadi hain.” The reaction reflected the SP leadership’s cultural connection to Lord Krishna and its concern about appearing anti-Hindu.

Bhati later said he repeated the words out of respect for the organisers and Ambedkar, not to change his religion. Still, he argued that Ambedkarites would understand his position. The episode exposed the gap between praising Ambedkar and endorsing his vows’ radical content.

Ambedkar’s 22 vows were a checklist for followers adopting his form of Navayana Buddhism. They asked converts to reject Hindu deities, including Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh, Rama and Krishna. They also included a refusal to worship those gods or accept religious rituals performed by Brahmin priests.

The vows mattered because Ambedkar feared that reform movements were repeatedly absorbed into the dominant Hindu fold. He did not want followers to move from one ritualistic or superstitious framework into another. The pledge therefore made conversion a deliberate psychological and social break, not just a change in religious label.

Ambedkar took the vows with his followers on October 14, 1956. The article presents them as both a rejection of Hindu social authority and a foundation for a distinct Buddhist identity. Their explicit language remains politically difficult for parties that seek Dalit support while maintaining broader Hindu appeal.

SP’s social-justice strategy draws on the size of Uttar Pradesh’s backward-caste and Dalit electorates. The article cites roughly 40% OBC voters and 20% Scheduled Caste voters in the State. These figures explain why combining the groups is central to the party’s effort to capture state power.

The political logic comes from Ram Manohar Lohia’s slogan, “Pichhde paavein sau mein saat,” which demanded a much larger share for backward communities. SP leaders seek to turn this numerical idea into an electoral coalition. Rajkumar Bhati’s Dalit outreach and his rally for Akhilesh Yadav fit that strategy.

The figures suggest considerable electoral potential, but numbers alone do not guarantee unity. The article stresses that OBCs and Dalits have occupied different positions in the rural social hierarchy. Ambedkar’s idea of graded inequality helps explain why a large combined vote can still contain deep social barriers and competing political identities.

The SP’s PDA formula means Pichhda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak: backward communities, Dalits and minorities. It is Akhilesh Yadav’s attempt to revive Lohia’s numerical strategy by bringing together groups that have often stood outside so-called upper-caste hegemony.

The mechanism is electoral aggregation. OBC voters provide the largest component cited in the article, while Dalit and minority voters expand the coalition. Bhati’s outreach to Dalits, including his participation in the Dhamma Diksha ceremony, fits this wider effort. SP also wants Congress to help bring mature Dalit voters into the INDIA bloc.

The formula faces an important contradiction. The article says OBCs and Dalits have not occupied identical positions in rural society. OBC groups were socially backward compared with upper castes but historically ranked above Dalits. PDA therefore seeks political unity across communities that may still carry social distance, cultural tensions and separate leadership loyalties.

Ram Manohar Lohia’s strategy was to unite communities outside upper-caste dominance and translate their numbers into political power. His slogan called for backward groups to receive a much larger share. He also promoted roti-beti, or social mixing through shared food and marriage, as a way to weaken caste barriers.

Mulayam Singh Yadav put part of this strategy into practice in 1993 by joining hands with Kanshi Ram, the Bahujan Samaj Party founder. Their alliance was celebrated through the slogan, “Mile Mulayam-Kanshi Ram, hawa mein ud gaye Jai Shri Ram.” It demonstrated the electoral appeal of a non-upper-caste partnership.

Yet the article says caste barriers remained despite the alliance. That unresolved problem shapes the SP’s current PDA project. The party again seeks numerical unity among OBC, Dalit and minority voters, but Bhati’s controversy shows how cultural identity, religious practice and unequal social positions can challenge a shared political platform.

If SP leaders distance themselves from Bhati, they may reduce immediate criticism over the vows’ rejection of Hindu gods and Brahminical rituals. The party’s leadership appears concerned about its cultural ties to Lord Krishna and about accusations that the gesture is anti-Hindu. That caution could help preserve its wider electoral appeal.

The cost could be distrust among Dalit and Ambedkarite voters. Bhati was addressing voters whom SP wants to draw away from Mayawati’s hold. A sharp reprimand could make the PDA formula look limited: supportive of Ambedkar as a symbol, but unwilling to accept the radical substance of his vows.

Bhati could also follow Rajendra Pal Gautam’s path. Gautam faced similar pressure in 2022, resigned from Delhi’s Cabinet and later joined Congress. The article asks whether Bhati might find space in Congress if SP gives in. Such a move could deepen tensions within the INDIA bloc over Dalit representation and electoral shares.

Ambedkar’s idea of graded inequality rejects a simple two-sided picture of caste. The article says the Hindu caste structure contains several ranked groups, each positioned differently. OBCs or Shudras may face social backwardness compared with upper castes, but they historically stood higher than Dalits in the rural socio-economic hierarchy.

That difference can shape everyday power and social relations. OBC communities may oppose upper-caste dominance while still benefiting from status above Dalits. A coalition built only on being outside upper-caste control therefore cannot erase unequal experiences. Shared political interests do not automatically produce social trust or common identity.

This is a central problem for SP’s PDA formula. The party wants backward, Dalit and minority voters to aggregate numerically, but the Bhati episode shows how cultural and ideological differences can become flashpoints. Unless leaders address those divisions, a large combined electorate may remain politically useful yet socially fragile.