Eisenkot says Israel has chosen change, wants to form government

Gadi Eisenkot said the election result showed that Israel had chosen change. His statement challenged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and suggested that voters had not endorsed Netanyahu's political direction. That matters because Eisenkot was presenting himself as the person who should try to translate the result into a governing coalition.

Eisenkot told supporters that he would seek to form a new government. He also warned Netanyahu not to use Israel's security for political needs, apparently referring to Netanyahu's threats of new strikes on Iran. Eisenkot therefore linked coalition-building with a warning about national security decisions.

He said he did not want a second election. Because turnout was high, he called rerunning the election a mistake. He said it was his duty, and everyone's duty, to make the people's will a reality. His next step was coalition negotiations, not immediately returning voters to the polls.

In Israel, forming a government means assembling a group of parties that agree to govern together. The leading candidate negotiates with party leaders over policy, ministerial posts, and shared priorities. The goal is to create a coalition that can receive the Knesset's support and keep governing.

For example, a candidate may finish first but lack enough seats for a majority. That candidate can approach smaller parties and offer them roles or policy commitments. If enough parties sign on, the candidate becomes prime minister and the coalition takes office. The key mechanism is parliamentary confidence, not simply finishing first in the election.

This explains why Eisenkot said he would seek to form a government rather than declare victory alone. The election result starts negotiations. If he cannot win enough support, Netanyahu or another candidate may get an opportunity. If no workable coalition emerges, Israel may face another election under its parliamentary system.

Israel's national parliament, the Knesset, has 120 seats. A simple majority is 61 seats, so a coalition normally needs support from at least 61 lawmakers to control parliamentary business and sustain a government. The threshold is one more than half of all seats.

For example, a party with 45 seats would still need at least 16 additional lawmakers to reach 61. Those extra seats could come from one larger partner or several smaller parties. The mechanism is arithmetic: parties combine their seats, and the total determines whether they can command a majority.

This matters in the election described because neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot could govern merely by claiming a strong result. They would need enough partners to cross the 61-seat line. Palestinian or Arab-led parties could therefore affect the outcome if their seats become necessary for either candidate's coalition, depending on their willingness to support or join it.

Winning the most seats does not automatically produce a majority in Israel. A party can lead the result yet hold fewer than 61 of the Knesset's 120 seats. Without enough additional support, its leader cannot reliably pass laws, approve budgets, or sustain a government.

For example, a leading party might win 50 seats while several smaller parties divide the remaining seats. It would need partners whose combined seats reach at least 61. Those partners may demand policy agreements, cabinet positions, or other commitments. The key mechanism is coalition bargaining: separate parties pool their parliamentary strength.

That is why Eisenkot said he would seek to form a government after claiming Israel had chosen change. His election performance, whatever its exact size, would need to translate into a workable alliance. Netanyahu could face the same problem. The candidate who builds the most dependable coalition, not necessarily the party with the biggest vote total, can govern.

Palestinian or Arab-led parties can affect coalition arithmetic by winning seats that neither main candidate controls. Their gains may increase the number of lawmakers available to support a government, but they can also make coalition-building harder if their policies or conditions differ sharply from those of the leading blocs.

For example, suppose Netanyahu and Eisenkot each fall short of 61 seats. A Palestinian or Arab-led party could support one candidate, join a coalition, or withhold support from both. The key mechanism is that every seat changes the totals. A small group can become decisive when the two main camps are closely matched.

The headline identifies Palestinian gains as blocking Netanyahu and the opposition from forming a government. That means their electoral strength affected the immediate coalition possibilities. The article does not state which parties would back either candidate. Their final choices, and the negotiations that follow, would determine whether Eisenkot, Netanyahu, or neither can govern.

If no candidate can assemble a coalition supported by the Knesset, Israel cannot establish a functioning government from that election result. The failure shows that the elected parties have not produced a parliamentary majority or a stable enough arrangement to govern.

Under Israel's parliamentary practice, the president first gives a candidate a mandate to try forming a government. If that attempt fails, another candidate may receive an opportunity. A further period can allow lawmakers to find a compromise. If no government wins support within the legal process, the Knesset is dissolved and a new election is held.

That possibility explains Eisenkot's warning against a second election. He said that, given the high percentage of voters, rerunning the election would be a mistake. His stated aim was to make the people's will a reality through coalition-building. The article does not say whether negotiations succeeded, so the next outcome remained unresolved.

Israel elects its 120 Knesset members through nationwide proportional representation. Voters choose party lists, and parties receive seats broadly in proportion to their share of the vote, subject to the electoral threshold. This system gives smaller parties a route into parliament instead of awarding every district to one local winner.

For example, if several parties each win meaningful shares, none may approach the 61 seats needed for a majority. The seats are therefore divided across multiple groups. The key mechanism is proportional allocation: votes become party seats, and party seats must then be combined through coalition agreements.

The result is a political system in which coalition governments are normal. A candidate must negotiate with parties that represent different voters and priorities. In the election described, those negotiations were especially important because Palestinian gains reportedly blocked Netanyahu and the opposition from forming a government. Eisenkot said he would try to overcome that impasse without another election.