Dramatic Changes Are Unlikely in Israel, Even if Netanyahu Is Ousted

The exit poll suggested Netanyahu might lose his position as prime minister. Eisenkot’s centrist change bloc was projected to lead his right-wing bloc by two seats. That result mattered because it raised the possibility of a new governing coalition after Netanyahu’s long tenure.

Channel 12’s projection gave Eisenkot’s bloc 52 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Netanyahu’s bloc was projected to hold 50, while Arab-led parties were projected to win 18. The figures showed a possible advantage, not a completed election result or government.

The outcome remained uncertain. Ballots would take days to count, and coalition negotiations could take weeks or longer. Eisenkot still needed enough partners to assemble a government. Even if Netanyahu were ousted, the article argues that Israeli policy on Gaza, the West Bank, and a two-state solution might change only modestly.

The exit poll showed a closely divided parliament. Eisenkot’s centrist change bloc appeared to lead with 52 seats. Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc followed with 50, while Arab-led parties were projected to hold 18. No bloc had a majority on its own.

The numbers matter because Israel’s parliament has 120 seats, making 61 the basic majority threshold. Eisenkot’s bloc therefore fell nine seats short of governing alone. Netanyahu’s bloc was even farther from that threshold. Both sides would need support from other parties or blocs.

These were preliminary projections, not final results. The article says counting all ballots would take days. Forming a government could take weeks or more. The Arab-led parties’ 18 projected seats therefore appeared potentially important, although the article does not state whether they would support either side.

An exit-poll lead does not automatically create a government. Eisenkot’s bloc would need the official results to confirm its position and then negotiate with other parties. Those talks would determine whether it could command a majority in the 120-member parliament.

The key mechanism is coalition building. Eisenkot’s bloc was projected to hold 52 seats, while a majority requires 61. It would therefore need at least nine additional lawmakers, or dependable support from other parties, to govern. The article identifies Arab-led parties as holding a projected 18 seats, but it does not say how they would act.

The process could take weeks or longer. Until a coalition forms, Netanyahu’s government is not automatically replaced simply because his bloc trails in an exit poll. The article therefore describes Eisenkot’s path to power as hardly assured, even though his bloc appeared to lead.

Changing the prime minister would not necessarily change the underlying political constraints. The article argues that Netanyahu is broadly within Israel’s mainstream on the issues Washington often emphasizes. His opponents may criticize him personally, but they do not differ dramatically from his coalition on core policy questions.

The clearest example concerns Gaza, the West Bank, and a two-state solution. Eisenkot’s change bloc includes centrist and other opposition leaders, yet the article says its positions on these issues are not very different from the current coalition’s. A new government could therefore change tone or priorities without reversing the main direction of policy.

This is why the article criticizes what it calls “Bibi Derangement Syndrome.” Some observers blame Netanyahu for outcomes that also reflect Israeli public opinion and political incentives. If Eisenkot replaces him, Washington may welcome the personal change, but dramatic policy shifts are not guaranteed.

The Dahiya Doctrine was an Israeli military strategy built around overwhelming punishment. Its purpose was to make an enemy stronghold so costly to attack that the adversary would be deterred from confronting Israel again. The strategy included extensive damage to civilian and economic infrastructure.

The doctrine was named after Dahiya, a southern suburb of Beirut and Hezbollah stronghold. Israel implemented it during the 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Gadi Eisenkot coined the term while serving as head of the military’s operations directorate.

The article recalls this history because Eisenkot could become Israel’s next prime minister. It connects his earlier military role with the current election without claiming that a future government would simply repeat the doctrine. The broader point is that Eisenkot’s leadership might represent political change, but not necessarily a sharp break from Israel’s established security thinking.

The article presents the change bloc as a government of repair or reconstruction. Its priorities emerged in the context of Israel’s wars and the failures surrounding the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023. The bloc’s focus is therefore not only who leads Israel, but how the state examines and responds to those failures.

On September 26, Eisenkot and other change-bloc leaders released a priorities document. It promised to establish a state commission of inquiry into the failures surrounding the October 7 attacks. That mechanism would provide a formal investigation into what happened, rather than leaving the issue only to political debate.

The article does not provide the document’s full list of proposals; its text ends while discussing term limits for the prime minister. It does show that accountability and institutional reconstruction are central themes. The bloc’s future government would therefore begin with investigation and repair, even if its broader security and territorial policies remained close to the mainstream.

Israel’s parliamentary system allows several parties to share power. Voters elect a 120-member parliament, and governments are normally formed through negotiations among parties. The prime minister is the leader able to assemble a coalition that can command parliamentary support.

The mechanism is simple: a party can fall short of a majority and still lead the government if other parties join it. A majority generally means support from at least 61 of the 120 lawmakers. In the projected result, Eisenkot’s bloc had 52 seats, so it would need partners. Netanyahu’s bloc, with 50, faced the same problem.

That is why exit polls cannot settle the premiership. The official count must come first, followed by negotiations over a governing coalition. The article says those talks could take weeks or more. If Eisenkot secures enough support, he can replace Netanyahu without his own bloc winning most seats.