Who won Israel's election? The biggest test is just beginning

The election has not produced a straightforward winner. Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party is projected to gain the most seats, with 24 to 25 in the 120-seat Knesset. Yet the opposition bloc, likely led by Gadi Eisenkot, appears to have a small advantage in the numbers needed to form a government. This distinction matters because winning the most seats does not automatically deliver power.

Exit polls put Eisenkot’s broader bloc at 52 to 53 seats, compared with about 50 for Netanyahu’s bloc. Arab parties are projected to win seven and 10 to 11 seats, giving them the potential to decide which side reaches the 61-seat threshold. Eisenkot could also gain support from Likud members who defect.

The figures are only exit-poll projections. Parties must negotiate alliances, and President Isaac Herzog will choose the candidate with the best chance of forming a government. Much can still change before a final result.

The Knesset is Israel’s parliament, where elected parties receive seats after a national election. The article identifies it as a 120-seat legislature. Those seats are the basic currency of Israeli coalition politics because governments need support from at least 61 members.

The election projections show why the Knesset matters. Likud is expected to win 24 to 25 seats, while Gadi Eisenkot’s party is projected to take 21 to 23. Neither comes close to 61. Smaller parties, including Ra’am and the Joint List, can therefore become crucial partners even without leading the election.

The seat count is not the same as a government result. After votes are counted, parties negotiate to assemble a majority. President Isaac Herzog is expected to ask the candidate with the strongest chance of reaching that majority to form a government. The Knesset’s final balance will shape those negotiations.

Israeli governments need support from at least 61 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. That is a simple majority, but no party in Israel’s history has won enough seats to govern alone. The threshold therefore makes coalition negotiations central to the election’s outcome.

Exit polls project Gadi Eisenkot’s broader opposition bloc at 52 to 53 seats. Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc is projected to win about 50. Both fall short, so each would need extra support. Arab parties are projected to hold seven seats for Ra’am and 10 to 11 for the Joint List. Those parties could significantly alter the balance.

Eisenkot appears closer to a governing path, but he still needs partners or outside support. Possible routes include cooperation with Arab parties, support without formal coalition membership, or defections from Likud. Netanyahu has fewer obvious options, though the article cautions against ruling him out.

Winning the most seats makes a party the largest parliamentary force, not automatically the government. Israel’s 120-seat Knesset requires at least 61 seats for a governing majority. Since no party in the country’s history has reached that number alone, governments must be built through negotiations and alliances.

The current projections show the mechanism clearly. Likud may lead with 24 to 25 seats, but Netanyahu’s wider bloc is projected at only 50. Eisenkot’s party may win fewer seats than Likud, at 21 to 23, while his broader bloc could reach 52 to 53. Both leaders therefore need additional backing.

That backing could come from smaller parties, Arab parties, or individual defectors. President Isaac Herzog will name the candidate judged most likely to form a government. The winner of that assignment still has to turn parliamentary support into at least 61 seats.

Arab parties and Likud defectors could provide Gadi Eisenkot with the extra parliamentary support his opposition bloc lacks. Eisenkot’s bloc is projected to have 52 to 53 seats, below the 61-seat threshold. Even a limited form of cooperation could therefore determine whether he becomes prime minister.

The article gives two routes. Arab parties could formally join an Eisenkot-led government, as Ra’am joined Naftali Bennett’s government in 2021. They could also support the government without becoming coalition members. Separately, Likud members could defect from Netanyahu’s camp and join Eisenkot, adding seats directly.

Each option carries political complications. Eisenkot had ruled out working with Arab parties before the election, while the Arab parties have expressed openness to him. A minority government might also be possible if his coalition moves close to 60 seats. The negotiations will show whether these possibilities become workable agreements.

After the election, President Isaac Herzog has an important constitutional role in the government-forming process described by the article. He will assess which candidate appears most capable of assembling the required parliamentary support. He does not simply appoint the party with the most seats.

The article says Herzog is expected to name Gadi Eisenkot. That expectation reflects the projected strength of Eisenkot’s broader opposition bloc, which could win 52 to 53 seats, compared with about 50 for Netanyahu’s bloc. Eisenkot would still need to negotiate with other parties to reach at least 61 seats.

Herzog’s decision begins the next stage rather than ending the election. Parties will immediately negotiate alliances, possible outside support, and defections. Because exit polls are not final results, and because several coalition routes remain uncertain, Herzog’s nomination may lead to a prolonged effort before a government is formed.

A government cannot be formed unless a candidate secures support from at least 61 Knesset members. If no candidate can reach that threshold, the election leaves Israel without a clear governing coalition. The article stresses that negotiations are central and that the process may take weeks.

The immediate possibilities include further bargaining, a national unity government, or a minority arrangement if a bloc comes close to 60 seats. The article also refers to new elections as an alternative when no clear majority emerges. It notes that 55 percent of Israelis preferred a unity government over new elections in that situation.

The source does not describe one automatic next step after every failed coalition attempt. It does show that deadlock has precedent: Netanyahu and Benny Gantz formed a power-sharing government in 2020 after three elections in less than a year. That agreement later collapsed, triggering another election.