Naga group to stage rally against SoO in Manipur on October 31

The United Naga Council and Meitei groups are coordinating protests against the Suspension of Operations agreement with Kuki militants. The Meitei-led COCOMI has called a Mega Rally in Imphal, Manipur’s valley area. The UNC has endorsed it and asked people in Naga-majority areas to participate. The joint action matters because Naga and Meitei organizations are presenting a shared response to rising insecurity and their complaints about security arrangements.

On October 31, 2026, the UNC plans simultaneous peaceful sit-ins or solidarity rallies at all Naga district headquarters. They are scheduled to start from 11.00 AM onward. COCOMI’s main rally will take place in Imphal, while the Naga events will occur across Naga districts. The UNC also urged its frontal organizations to mobilize support and gather in the valley and Naga-majority areas.

The protests are linked to demands for ending the SoO Pact and replacing Assam Rifles with another border force, such as the BSF. They follow renewed Meitei-Kuki tension, the killing of three Meitei woodcutters, and the discovery that more than 150 cadres were missing from a SoO camp. The coordinated rallies could deepen pressure on the Centre.

The Suspension of Operations, or SoO, Pact is a ceasefire arrangement involving the government and armed Kuki groups. In practice, participating cadres are linked to designated camps, where their presence and activities can be monitored. The agreement is important because it is meant to reduce fighting while creating a framework for security checks and political engagement. The article says it was signed more than 20 years ago.

The article identifies the covered fighters only as Kuki militants, Kuki militant cadres, or SoO militants. It does not provide the names of individual armed organizations. Established background on the pact describes it as an arrangement with Kuki-Zo armed groups, but the specific group list is not supplied here. The pact is therefore the subject of the current dispute, rather than an agreement with Naga or Meitei organizations.

The Centre has not renewed the agreement after it expired last month. That delay has become more serious after security forces inspected a camp and found over 150 cadres missing. The CRPF then took over the camp, marking the first such takeover since the pact began. These events have intensified demands for abrogation.

The article describes a serious security problem involving a monitored camp, missing cadres, weapons, and renewed ethnic violence. During an inspection of a SoO militant camp, security forces found that over 150 cadres were missing. They also arrested 17 outsiders who were carrying weapons and allegedly posing as SoO militants. These figures show that the problem involved both absent camp members and people allegedly using the SoO identity.

The inspection followed the killing of three Meitei woodcutters by Kuki militants, an incident that placed Manipur on high alert. The CRPF subsequently took over the SoO camp. According to the article, this was the first takeover of an SoO camp since the agreement was signed more than 20 years ago. The Centre has still not renewed the pact after it expired last month.

The immediate security picture includes ethnic clashes, armed movement, and buffer zones separating communities. The article does not provide a total number of militants, camps, or weapons seized. It does show that authorities are questioning whether existing controls are working. The missing cadres and arrested outsiders are central evidence behind the current political pressure.

Naga and Meitei organizations want the SoO Pact abolished because they associate it with continuing insecurity and alleged weaknesses in controlling Kuki militants. Their concerns intensified after three Meitei woodcutters were killed, more than 150 cadres were found missing from a SoO camp, and 17 outsiders were arrested while carrying weapons and posing as SoO militants. These events have made the pact a focus of public anger.

The groups also accuse Assam Rifles of bias. The article says both Naga and Meitei organizations believe the force favors Kuki tribes and is biased against them. They are therefore demanding that Assam Rifles be removed and replaced by another border force, such as the Border Security Force. Their proposed changes target both the ceasefire arrangement and the security agency overseeing border duties.

The demands reflect a wider crisis in which Manipur’s districts have become divided along ethnic lines. Government forces now maintain buffer zones across districts. The UNC describes the situation as a threat to indigenous people and is supporting COCOMI’s rally. Whether these demands change policy depends on the Centre’s response to the expired agreement and the continuing violence.

The CRPF takeover matters because it is the first takeover of a SoO camp since the agreement was signed more than 20 years ago. It followed an inspection that found over 150 cadres missing and 17 outsiders carrying weapons while posing as SoO militants. The change places the camp under a different security force and shows that authorities considered the existing arrangement inadequate in that moment.

In practical terms, the takeover could mean closer control, new inspections, and greater scrutiny of who is present in the camp. The article does not state exactly what new procedures the CRPF will use. It does establish that the takeover came after serious security findings. It may also increase political pressure on the SoO system, since Naga and Meitei groups already demand its abolition.

The Centre has not renewed the agreement after it expired last month. That delay creates uncertainty over the status of the ceasefire arrangement and the camps connected to it. It could make negotiations harder and raise tensions among Meitei, Naga, and Kuki communities. The article does not confirm future consequences, but the unresolved pact is likely to remain central to Manipur’s security debate.

The SoO agreement has shaped Manipur by creating a formal arrangement for Kuki militants and their camps for more than 20 years. It gave the government a framework for dealing with armed Kuki groups while keeping their cadres connected to designated locations. The article does not describe the agreement’s full history or original results. It does show that the arrangement remains central to current security and political disputes.

Relations have worsened as violence has continued among communities. The article describes an ongoing Naga clash with Kukis and renewed Meitei-Kuki tension after three Meitei woodcutters were killed. An inspection then found over 150 cadres missing from a SoO camp, while 17 outsiders were arrested with weapons. These developments have weakened confidence in the agreement among Naga and Meitei groups.

The pact’s expiration last month, without Centre renewal, has added uncertainty. The CRPF’s takeover of a camp was the first since the agreement began, while Naga and Meitei organizations now demand abrogation. Manipur’s districts are divided on ethnic lines, with buffer zones in place. The agreement’s future could affect relations, but the article gives no final policy decision.

Ceasefire agreements are arrangements that pause fighting between a government and armed groups. They commonly set rules for weapons, movement, camp locations, and monitoring. Fighters may be placed in designated camps so authorities can check who is present and limit their access to conflict areas. Such agreements can create space for negotiations, but their success depends on compliance and credible oversight. The article does not provide the SoO Pact’s full legal terms.

The Manipur example shows why monitoring matters. Security forces inspected a SoO camp and found over 150 cadres missing. They also arrested 17 outsiders carrying weapons and posing as SoO militants. The CRPF then took over the camp. These events suggest that designated camps are intended to make armed groups more visible and controllable, even though the article does not state every monitoring procedure.

Buffer zones serve a different immediate purpose. They separate opposing communities and can reduce direct contact between armed or hostile groups. The article says government forces have created buffer zones across Manipur’s districts because ethnic conflicts divided them along community lines. Such zones may lower immediate clashes, but they also reflect continuing separation. Their long-term effect is not stated.