Gulf states working on multipart peace deal to avert renewal of US-Iran war

The Gulf states’ plan is a linked peace package, not a single concession. Its immediate goals are to reopen the Strait of Hormuz after sanctions relief and secure a substantial Houthi withdrawal inside Yemen. The wider aim is to stop renewed fighting between Iran and the United States. The plan matters because the strait is a vital regional trade route, while Yemen remains a major source of conflict involving Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iran has offered to reopen the strait four days after economic sanctions are lifted, reducing an earlier seven-day proposal. Iran also appears willing to discuss Yemen because it backs the Houthis and can influence their choices. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have discussed Saudi terms for ending the Yemen conflict with Tehran.

The broader proposal would create an inclusive security system involving Iran and the six Gulf states. It could include a non-aggression pact and a reduced or ended US presence. Iran still resists returning UN inspectors, so the package remains incomplete.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow international waterway between Iran and Oman. It connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Ships carrying oil, gas, and other goods use it to reach global markets. Its geography makes it strategically important: alternatives are limited, slower, or more expensive.

In these negotiations, Iran has made reopening the strait a central condition. Dr Ali Bagheri said Iran was willing to reopen it four days after economic sanctions were lifted. That shortened an earlier seven-day proposal. Iran is therefore linking a physical trade route to the economic guarantees it wants from the United States and other countries.

The article presents the strait as part of a wider bargain involving Yemen and regional security. A reopening could support sanctions relief and trade. A continued closure would keep pressure on Gulf economies and make a broader peace agreement harder to achieve.

The source article does not state how much of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Established energy estimates commonly place the figure at roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption, or around 20 to 21 million barrels per day in recent years. The exact amount changes with production, demand, and shipping patterns.

That scale explains why reopening the strait is such a powerful negotiating tool. Iran’s proposal would connect passage through this major energy chokepoint to the lifting of economic sanctions. The timing matters too: Tehran reduced its proposed reopening delay from seven days to four days.

The figure also shows why governments outside the region pay close attention. The article focuses on Gulf states, Iran, the US, and European powers, but disruption would affect energy markets worldwide. The estimate is broader context rather than a figure supplied by the article, which discusses the strait’s role without quantifying oil flows.

If the Strait of Hormuz remained closed, oil shipments would face a major bottleneck. Buyers could compete for fewer available cargoes, pushing prices higher. Refineries and fuel distributors in importing countries could face delays or shortages. The size of the effect would depend on how long the closure lasted and how much traffic could use alternative routes.

The consequences would extend beyond crude oil. The strait also carries gas and other commercial cargoes, so energy supplies and regional trade could be disrupted together. Ships might need longer routes, raising transport costs and delivery times. Gulf exporters could lose reliable access to customers, while importers would face greater uncertainty.

This is why the article places reopening at the heart of the proposed bargain. Iran offered to reopen the passage four days after sanctions relief. A lasting closure would damage confidence in any regional settlement and could make the wider economic potential described by Oman’s foreign minister much harder to achieve.

Iran is focused on guarantees that sanctions will actually be lifted in return for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Its officials have reduced the proposed reopening delay from seven days to four, but Tehran still wants economic relief secured first. This matters because reopening would be a major practical concession, while sanctions relief is Iran’s main desired reward.

The US and European powers are seeking a different assurance. They want Iran to readmit UN weapons inspectors and allow visits to bombed nuclear sites. British foreign secretary Ed Miliband pressed Abbas Araghchi on this point. European diplomats view inspector access as a minimum requirement for a breakthrough with Donald Trump.

The two sides therefore prioritise different risks. Iran wants enforceable economic benefits before changing its position on the strait. Washington and Europe want independent nuclear monitoring before trusting Iran’s commitments. Iran has so far accepted only talks in principle about its nuclear programme, leaving the central bargain unresolved.

The Houthis are a Yemeni movement and armed faction involved in the parallel Yemen conflict. The article says Iran backs them and can influence them, while Houthi forces control territory inside Yemen. It does not give a full history of the movement. Their position matters because the Yemen war is one part of the wider crisis threatening a new US-Iran confrontation.

Iran could use its influence to develop a settlement that stops short of a Houthi military victory. The article says many consider such a victory unobtainable. In return, the Houthis demand that Saudi Arabia lift what they regard as a naval and air blockade of Houthi-held territory. Mohsen Rezaei’s meeting with Houthi ambassador Ibrahim al-Dulaimi signalled Tehran’s role.

That influence makes Iran an essential participant in any Yemen agreement. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan travelled to Tehran to discuss Saudi terms. A withdrawal agreement could support the broader peace package, but the article records no final settlement.

The article identifies the 1979 Islamic Revolution as the point since which Iran has been ostracised by the Gulf states. It does not provide a complete history of the rivalry. In broad regional terms, the divide has involved competing political visions, security interests, and influence. That long estrangement helps explain Iran’s desire for a new regional order rather than another agreement focused only on its nuclear programme.

The proposed answer is an inclusive security arrangement involving Iran and the six Gulf states. It would include a non-aggression pact and could reduce or end the US presence in the Middle East. Oman’s foreign minister described eight countries living at peace with the wider world as having enormous economic potential.

For Iran, an agreed regional commitment could make difficult nuclear concessions easier to accept. The arrangement could also reduce the chance that disputes become wars. However, the article shows that major obstacles remain, especially Iran’s refusal so far to readmit UN weapons inspectors.