The Army’s only remaining SFAB helped broker a ceasefire in southeast Asia

A Security Force Assistance Brigade, or SFAB, is a specialized Army unit built for long-term military advising. It trains and advises partner forces, helps their leaders plan, and supports cooperation between U.S. and foreign units. The Army created SFABs so this work would not depend on repeatedly rotating regular combat units into advisory roles.

SFAB personnel come from experienced conventional troops who have led squads, platoons, and larger formations. The 5th SFAB embeds advisers with partner headquarters, professional military academies, and senior leaders. Its teams also coordinate with country teams, security cooperation offices, and defense attachés to provide detailed reporting and advice.

Today, the 5th SFAB is the Army’s only remaining train-advise-assist brigade. It works across the Indo-Pacific, from Mongolia to the Philippines, and supports exercises such as Balikatan and Cobra Gold. Its continuing role reflects the importance of sustained military relationships in the region.

The 5th SFAB did not negotiate the ceasefire itself. ASEAN and the Malaysian Land Forces led the peace talks after months of fighting linked to a century-old border dispute. Malaysian forces sought advice from 5th SFAB advisers positioned near the land force headquarters.

The advisers answered practical questions about how to organize and conduct the talks. They reported to U.S. Army Pacific and drew on experts from higher headquarters. A separate 5th SFAB team in Thailand shared observations from the country team, although no adviser was near the fighting or front line.

This arrangement gave decision-makers detailed, timely information about what partners were seeing, hearing, and requesting. The brigade’s established relationships with Thailand and Malaysia made that support possible. The episode shows how persistent advisers can help partners take the lead during a regional crisis.

By May 2020, the Army had established six SFABs. Each was aligned with a different geographic command, giving the service dedicated advising capacity across several regions. The brigades were staffed by volunteers leaving operational assignments, bringing experience from conventional Army units.

That structure later contracted sharply. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered most SFABs dissolved last year. The Europe- and Africa-focused brigades were shuttered, while the CENTCOM and National Guard counterparts are scheduled to disappear by the end of the year. The 1st SFAB was reorganized as Army Security Cooperation Group-South in January.

Therefore, the article identifies the 5th SFAB as the Army’s only remaining SFAB. Its survival preserves a dedicated train-advise-assist capability for the Indo-Pacific. The article also presents its continued existence, alongside ASCG-S, as evidence that advising still matters in two priority regions.

The 5th SFAB supports U.S. efforts to remain trusted among Indo-Pacific countries. It works with militaries that might otherwise move closer to China’s growing military power. Its value comes from persistent engagement, not just occasional exercises or crisis deployments.

The brigade embeds advisers in partner headquarters and professional military academies. It helps develop training plans, supports senior leaders, and connects partner units with U.S. formations. Its teams also work directly with country teams, security cooperation offices, and defense attachés. These links provide detailed reporting and reduce friction during multinational exercises.

The 5th SFAB has helped prepare exercises such as Balikatan and Cobra Gold and has worked with forces from Mongolia to the Philippines. Its continued presence gives U.S. Army Pacific a standing network across the region. The article suggests that removing such units could leave the United States less prepared and less connected before a future crisis.

The Army created SFABs because training foreign militaries had become a continuing mission. In Afghanistan, advising the Afghan army seemed to have no clear endpoint. The service also expected this work to expand beyond U.S. Central Command, making repeated temporary assignments increasingly difficult to manage.

Instead of rotating regular infantry and other combat units through advisory missions, the Army developed specialized brigades. Volunteers came from operational assignments with experience leading squads, platoons, and larger formations. Their background made them better prepared to coach partner units, support headquarters, and sustain relationships over time.

The first SFAB deployed to Afghanistan in 2018. By May 2020, six had been established for different regions. The article contrasts this model with the “train-and-pray” approach criticized by West Point’s Modern War Institute. That criticism argues that eliminating dedicated advisers could leave the United States unprepared in a future war.

The article does not provide a complete alternative plan for replacing SFABs. It does identify several partnership tools that can continue building military ties: multinational exercises, professional military academies, conventional-unit exchanges, country teams, security cooperation offices, and defense attachés. Together, these can preserve contact even when specialized brigades are reduced.

For example, the 5th SFAB helped create training plans for Balikatan and Cobra Gold. Its advisers also worked in partner academies and headquarters. In a reduced-SFAB model, those institutions could remain channels for education, exercises, senior-level contact, and coordination between visiting U.S. units and partner forces.

These alternatives may not fully replace persistent advisory teams. The article emphasizes that SFAB advisers connect many activities, provide granular reporting, and ease friction between partners and U.S. formations. Removing that dedicated layer could produce the “train-and-pray” model criticized by the Modern War Institute and leave the United States less prepared.

Military training and advising build trust because partners work together repeatedly, not just during a crisis. Advisers learn what a partner needs, while foreign forces see how U.S. units operate. This steady contact supports relationships among commanders, staffs, and training institutions.

The 5th SFAB demonstrates the mechanism. Its teams help partner units define training objectives, build progressions, and prepare for exercises with U.S. divisions. They also work in headquarters and academies, where leaders can align doctrine, planning, and professional development. Country teams, security offices, and defense attachés add further connections.

The result is greater interoperability: partners have practiced together, understand shared objectives, and know whom to contact. The article links persistent advisers to exercises such as Balikatan and Cobra Gold. It also calls the brigade the “WD-40” of U.S. Army Pacific because its teams ease friction between partner nations and visiting conventional units.