Laos Expected to Scuttle ASEAN’s South China Sea Code of Conduct

Laos is expected to delay the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct because it is deeply dependent on China’s economic and political support. A united ASEAN position would limit Beijing’s ability to negotiate separately with weaker states. Laos therefore has strong reasons to defend China’s preferred approach.

The article points to growing Laos-China cooperation. China and Laos recently opened a Military Joint Support and Training base north of Vientiane. They also held “Peace Train 2026” military exercises in September. These developments are compared with China’s development of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base.

Cambodia may no longer want the pressure of blocking the process, while Myanmar is excluded from summits and Timor-Leste is cautious. That leaves Laos as Beijing’s most reliable option. An ASEAN source says Laos could shatter the Philippines’ effort to use its chairmanship to advance the Code of Conduct.

The China-ASEAN Code of Conduct is intended to create shared rules for handling maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The sea carries almost a quarter of world trade, so unstable or confrontational waters could affect regional security and global commerce. The process has continued for more than two decades without a final agreement.

Its central mechanism is collective negotiation. ASEAN would act as a united political and trade bloc representing the interests of its 11 Southeast Asian states. The article links this approach to a rules-based order and peaceful resolutions for disputes affecting important sea lines of communication.

The process remains vulnerable to delay. China publicly supports ASEAN involvement at times, but the article says it uses proxies to obstruct negotiations. Cambodia previously helped freeze progress, and Laos is now expected to defend Beijing’s interests. A delayed Code would leave disputes unresolved.

The ASEAN chair helps set the bloc’s diplomatic priorities and host important meetings. The Philippines used its year as chair to push the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct to the top of the regional agenda. This created an opportunity to turn a stalled diplomatic process into a central ASEAN project.

The Philippines also has a direct stake in the issue. Manila has faced tensions with China over the South China Sea, including the Scarborough Shoal standoff and maritime activity in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Philippine officials have demanded respect for international law while managing ASEAN responsibilities.

The opportunity is not the same as control. ASEAN decisions require cooperation among member states, and China can use sympathetic governments to obstruct progress. The article says the 49th ASEAN Summit in Manila, chaired by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., could become the next test of whether the Philippines can advance the agreement.

The article describes the South China Sea as a major waterway for global commerce. It accounts for almost a quarter of world trade and contains sea lines of communication used by countries across the region. That scale makes stability there important to trade, shipping, and wider international relations.

The Code of Conduct is meant to address the maritime and territorial disputes that affect these waters. The article does not provide a dollar value or a detailed breakdown of the trade. It does establish that the waterway’s importance extends far beyond the countries making competing claims.

This economic significance raises the stakes of diplomatic delay. If disputes remain unresolved, governments may continue facing confrontations and military pressure around contested waters. The article links China’s expansive claims and military bases on artificial reefs to the broader security problem, while presenting ASEAN negotiations as a peaceful way forward.

Negotiating separately gives China greater freedom to manage each dispute on its own terms. A united ASEAN position could increase pressure on Beijing and require it to address regional concerns collectively. Bilateral talks instead divide the issue among individual Southeast Asian states.

The article gives Cambodia’s 2012 conduct as an example. When the Philippines and Vietnam wanted ASEAN to mention the Scarborough Shoal standoff and Chinese encroachment in their Exclusive Economic Zones, Cambodia argued that such disputes should be handled bilaterally. No joint communique was issued after that meeting, and the Code of Conduct was effectively frozen.

This approach also protects China’s existing position. The article says bilateral negotiations enable Beijing to reject the 2016 arbitral ruling on the South China Sea while preserving its expansive unilateral claims and military bases on artificial reefs. China therefore has incentives to obstruct collective negotiations.

The Code of Conduct is intended to provide a peaceful, collective framework for maritime and territorial disputes. If it fails, ASEAN would remain unable to negotiate with China as a united entity. The article presents that unity as important for protecting regional interests through a rules-based order.

The 2012 ASEAN meeting shows the immediate consequence of obstruction. Cambodia resisted references to the Scarborough Shoal standoff and Chinese encroachment in Exclusive Economic Zones. ASEAN ended without a joint communique, and the Code process was effectively frozen. This illustrates how one member’s position can weaken collective action.

A further delay would preserve the current imbalance. The article says China could continue rejecting the 2016 arbitral ruling, maintaining expansive claims, and protecting military bases on artificial reefs. It also suggests that pressure on Laos could block the Philippines’ current effort, leaving disputes unresolved and regional security tensions in place.

An exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, is a maritime area extending from a coastal state’s shore in which that state has special rights to explore, use, manage, and conserve natural resources. It is not the same as full territorial waters. Other countries generally retain navigation rights, while the coastal state exercises economic jurisdiction.

International maritime law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, generally measures an EEZ from a country’s coastal baseline and allows it to extend up to 200 nautical miles. Where zones overlap, states usually must agree on a boundary based on equitable principles. Disputes can also go to arbitration or another legal process.

The article refers to alleged Chinese maritime encroachment in Philippine and Vietnamese EEZs. It also mentions the 2016 arbitral ruling on the South China Sea. The article does not explain EEZ law in detail; these legal definitions come from established international maritime law.