Israel After the Election: Who Will Form a Government?

Israel’s election showed that Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc remained competitive but lacked a governing majority. It was slightly ahead of the opposition alliance led by Gadi Eisenkot, yet neither camp appeared able to reach the required 61 seats. The result therefore weakened Netanyahu’s claim to an easy return and kept Eisenkot’s alliance in contention.

The key mechanism was the unfinished seat count. Around two-thirds of votes had been counted, so the balance could still shift before the provisional final result. Even so, the early figures showed that neither major camp could govern alone. Smaller parties, especially Arab parties, could become decisive in coalition negotiations.

The immediate reality was uncertainty. Eisenkot potentially had better coalition prospects, but possible partners had said they would not ally with Arab parties. If negotiations fail, Israel could face another election, while Netanyahu might remain interim prime minister.

A coalition government is an administration formed by multiple political parties that agree to govern together. Parties share power and usually negotiate a common program. This matters when no single party or bloc controls enough parliamentary seats to pass laws, approve budgets, and sustain a government.

Israel may need such an arrangement because the election did not give either major camp the required majority. Netanyahu’s bloc was slightly ahead, while the opposition alliance led by Gadi Eisenkot remained close. Smaller parties, including Arab parties, could supply the seats needed for a minority or majority government. Their support would come with political conditions.

The next step is coalition bargaining. President Isaac Herzog must decide who has the best chance to form a government. Eisenkot could have an opportunity, but potential partners had rejected cooperation with Arab parties. If no workable agreement emerges, another election could follow.

Israel’s Knesset has 120 seats, so a majority requires 61. That threshold is important because a governing coalition needs more support than the opposition to pass measures and remain politically viable. Winning the most seats is not enough if a bloc cannot gather at least 61 supporters.

The election produced a near-deadlock around this number. Netanyahu’s bloc was slightly ahead of Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition alliance, but neither appeared to have secured 61 seats while around two-thirds of votes were counted. The missing seats could come from smaller parties or Arab parties, depending on coalition negotiations.

The political consequences remain open. A candidate might form a minority government with outside support rather than a formal majority coalition. If no candidate can assemble sufficient backing, Israel could hold another election. The provisional final result was expected on Thursday.

Isaac Herzog’s role is to decide which politician should receive the first chance to form Israel’s next government. He is not simply rewarding the bloc with the most seats. The article says he must assess who has the best prospects of building a workable coalition.

That decision matters because the election produced no obvious majority. Netanyahu’s bloc was slightly ahead, but the opposition alliance led by Gadi Eisenkot also remained in contention. Herzog must consider the political divide between people shocked by the 7 October massacre and many Arab citizens angered by the destruction of Gaza.

The person receiving the mandate then faces coalition negotiations. Eisenkot could be given the task of forming a minority government, but support from Arab parties would be controversial. If the attempt fails, the alternative could be another election in three months.

A government that does not depend on Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich could change Israel’s direction. The article links their exclusion to stronger action against settler violence and less support for encouraging Palestinian emigration or weakening the Palestinian Authority. That could alter both domestic security policy and the government’s approach to the conflict.

Such a government could also be more receptive to initiatives from the United States and regional actors concerning Gaza. However, excluding these ministers would not remove the central problems. Leaders would still need to decide how to disarm Hamas, rebuild Gaza, and restore order and respect for law in the West Bank.

The possible change is therefore significant but limited. It would affect the government’s political priorities and alliances, not automatically settle the conflict. Its success would depend on whether the new coalition could agree on practical policies and maintain parliamentary support.

If neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot can assemble enough support, Israel may be unable to form a stable government. Smaller parties and Arab parties could provide the missing seats, but political disagreements make that support uncertain. The result would be continued uncertainty rather than a clear transfer of power.

The article identifies another election as the main alternative. La Stampa describes a possible vote in three months if Eisenkot receives the mandate but cannot build a minority government. NRC also raises a broader scenario: a general election in 2027 after deadlock over cooperation with Arab parties.

During a prolonged impasse, Netanyahu could remain interim prime minister. That would preserve his position even without a fresh governing majority. Israelis seeking political change would face the prospect of another election cycle, recalling the five elections held between 2019 and 2022.

The article does not explain Israel’s voting system. Under its proportional representation system, parties receive Knesset seats broadly according to their share of the vote. This allows several parties to enter parliament and makes a single-party majority unusual. Governing therefore usually requires agreements among parties with different priorities.

The election illustrates the mechanism. Netanyahu’s bloc was slightly ahead, and Eisenkot’s alliance remained competitive, but neither appeared to have 61 seats. Smaller parties, including Arab parties, could become kingmakers. They might join a formal coalition, support a minority government, or stay in opposition. Each choice can change who governs.

This structure can produce broad representation, but it can also create deadlock. If parties refuse necessary partnerships, no candidate can form a government. Israel’s recent history in the article shows the risk: five elections took place between 2019 and 2022, and another could follow this result.