Ukraine Recaptures Territory, Forces on the Offensive, Zelensky Says

An army on the offensive is actively attacking rather than mainly defending its positions. Its goals can include seizing ground, forcing an opponent to retreat, disrupting supply routes, or breaking an enemy plan. Recapturing territory means regaining land that opposing forces had previously occupied. Both actions can improve a military’s position before future fighting or negotiations.

The article gives three Ukrainian examples. The Air Assault Forces campaign liberated more than 800 square kilometers and 26 settlements. Operation Vivaldi retook 277 square kilometers and more than 16 towns and villages. Near Kupiansk, Ukrainian forces used underground routes to emerge behind Russian positions, turning an infiltration tactic against its original users.

These gains mattered beyond the map. Operation Vivaldi pushed Russian forces away from the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk highway and disrupted a planned northern advance. Zelensky said Ukraine’s frontline positions were the strongest they had been in a long time, though he linked future strength to continued partner support, especially air defense.

The article provides exact or minimum figures for only two of the three operations. The Air Assault Forces campaign liberated more than 800 square kilometers. It also recovered 26 settlements across Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions. Operation Vivaldi later retook 277 square kilometers near Lyman in Donetsk region.

Together, those two reported area figures amount to more than 1,077 square kilometers. Their settlement figures total more than 42: 26 from the Air Assault campaign and more than 16 from Operation Vivaldi. The wording matters because both reports use minimum figures, not precise final totals. The article does not provide an area or settlement count for Operation Veles.

Operation Veles is described through its underground maneuver instead. Ukrainian troops traveled more than 15 kilometers through underground infrastructure, emerged behind Russian positions, and captured more than 30 Russian soldiers. So the article measures the three operations differently: territory and settlements for two, and battlefield effects for Veles.

The three operations occurred in different parts of Ukraine’s front. The Air Assault Forces campaign stretched across three regions: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia. Zelensky said it ran from Jan. 29 through Aug. 12 and liberated 26 settlements. Its wide geographic reach made it the largest operation by reported area in the article.

Operation Vivaldi was conducted by the 3rd Army Corps near Lyman, in Donetsk region. It ran from July until mid-October and ended on Oct. 14. Ukrainian commanders said it recovered 277 square kilometers and more than 16 towns and villages in an area where Russia had concentrated its assaults.

Operation Veles is described as taking place near Kupiansk. There, the Khartiia Corps used underground gas pipelines and related infrastructure to move more than 15 kilometers beneath the battlefield. The troops surfaced behind Russian positions, turning Russia’s earlier underground infiltration method against Russian forces.

Operation Vivaldi mattered because it attacked the position Russia planned to use for a northern advance. Russian forces reportedly intended to move from a bridgehead along the Chornyi Zherebets River, bypass Lyman, and approach Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the north. Another Russian grouping was advancing from the Dobropillya direction.

Ukrainian forces eliminated the bridgehead and pushed Russian troops back from the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk highway. The article calls that road a key supply route for both cities. By removing the bridgehead, Ukraine forced Moscow to abandon its planned northern advance. Ukrainian commanders also said the operation disrupted Russia’s wider plan to encircle the two cities.

The effect was therefore larger than the 277 square kilometers retaken. The operation protected access along an important route and prevented Russian forces from combining advances around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Biletsky called the disruption of Russia’s strategic plan more important than the territory itself.

Russian forces had previously tried using underground gas pipelines to slip past Ukrainian positions and launch attacks. Ukrainian forces then adopted the same basic method, but refined it for a counteroffensive. The aim was to bypass Russian positions, reach their rear, and create a sudden attack from an unexpected direction.

According to Zelensky, Ukrainian troops moved more than 15 kilometers through underground infrastructure without GPS or daylight. They emerged behind Russian positions overhead. The Khartiia Corps described the maneuver as the world’s first full-scale underground counteroffensive. More than 30 Russian soldiers were captured, while Russian losses exceeded 100.

The operation shows how a battlefield tactic can be reversed against the force that introduced it. Instead of merely defending against underground infiltration, Ukrainian troops used the same access routes to attack from behind. The article does not provide a separate territorial gain for this operation, but it reports prisoners, casualties, and a successful disruption of Russian positions.

The article presents Sloviansk and Kramatorsk as strategically important strongholds in Donetsk region. They were still held by Ukraine, and Russian forces reportedly planned to capture them. Their importance came from their position in Russia’s broader offensive plan and from the need to maintain access between them.

The highway connecting the cities was a key supply route for both. Operation Vivaldi pushed Russian forces back from that road. Ukrainian commanders said Russia wanted to approach from the north after using a bridgehead along the Chornyi Zherebets River, while another grouping advanced from Dobropillya. The plan involved bypassing Lyman and threatening the cities from multiple directions.

By eliminating the bridgehead, Ukraine disrupted the planned northern advance and Russia’s broader effort to encircle Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The article therefore links the area’s strategic value to two factors: the cities’ role as remaining Ukrainian strongholds and the highway’s role in supplying them.

Air-defense systems can affect battlefield strength because they help protect troops, positions, infrastructure, and other assets from attacks from the air. Better protection can help a country hold ground and maintain its frontline. In the article, Zelensky linked Ukraine’s strong frontline position with the need for continued partner support, particularly air-defense systems.

The diplomatic connection is also explicit. Zelensky said Ukraine would be in a much better diplomatic position if partner support were equally strong. The article does not describe a specific negotiation, but the logic is clear: stronger defenses can make military gains more durable and give a country greater confidence when dealing with opponents and partners.

Ukraine reported recovering more than 800 square kilometers in one campaign and 277 in Operation Vivaldi. Protecting such gains would matter as the war continued. Air defense was therefore presented as both a battlefield requirement and a measure of how strongly international partners were backing Ukraine.