Israel’s election: The battle between change and anti-Palestinian sentiment

A coalition government is an agreement between multiple parties to share power and support a prime minister. It matters because Israel’s Knesset has 120 seats, so a government normally needs support from at least 61 members to pass laws, appoint a speaker and function reliably.

In this election, the Netanyahu-led bloc had 54 seats. The opposition had 49. Either could reach 61 only by gaining support from other parties, especially the Arab-dominated Ra’am and Joint List, which together held 17 seats according to the preliminary count.

The prime minister therefore cannot govern on the strength of the largest bloc alone. President Isaac Herzog must choose the candidate most likely to assemble partners. If coalition talks fail, the mandate can move to another member of parliament, and eventually the Knesset can be dissolved for another election.

The Knesset is Israel’s 120-member parliament. A governing bloc needs at least 61 seats to hold a majority. That threshold allows it to support a speaker, pass legislation and maintain a working government.

The preliminary results showed a sharp gap between the required number and the leading blocs. The outgoing coalition led by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud had 54 seats. The opposition bloc had 49. The Arab-dominated Ra’am and Joint List held 17 seats between them, making them central to coalition arithmetic.

The figures were not final when the article was published. Nearly 80 percent of votes had been counted by Wednesday afternoon, with the final tally expected by Friday and official results scheduled for November 4. Until then, the 61-seat threshold remained the key measure of governing strength.

The election produced two leading but incomplete blocs. Benjamin Netanyahu’s outgoing coalition, centred on Likud, had secured 54 seats. Former military chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition bloc had 49 seats. Both totals were below the 61 needed in the 120-seat Knesset.

The missing seats were politically difficult to secure. The Arab-dominated Ra’am and Joint List held 17 seats and could theoretically lift either bloc above the majority line. Yet neither major side appeared ready to ally with Arab parties. Some opposition parties also rejected particular partners, including ultra-Orthodox parties.

The result was a political stalemate rather than a clear victory. The vote count was still incomplete, so the numbers could change. If the final tally does not create a workable partnership, party leaders may face another election after coalition-building attempts fail.

Ra’am and the Joint List could determine the government because their 17 seats were more than the 7-seat gap separating either major bloc from a majority. In theory, their support could help appoint a speaker, pass legislation and form a working government.

The mechanism is simple parliamentary arithmetic. Netanyahu’s bloc had 54 seats, so it needed seven more. The opposition had 49, so it needed 12. The Arab-dominated parties had enough seats to supply either number, at least in theory.

Their influence was limited by political resistance. The article says neither major bloc appeared ready to ally with Arab parties. Opposition leader Avigdor Lieberman ruled out such a coalition, while Naftali Bennett said there was “no mandate” for one after the October 7 attack. Their choices could decide whether Israel forms a government or returns to the polls.

Israel’s coalition process has several stages. President Isaac Herzog first consults party leaders and then tasks the candidate he believes has the best chance of forming a government. That candidate receives 28 days to build a coalition.

A possible 14-day extension can lengthen the first attempt. If it still fails, the mandate may pass to another member of parliament, who must also try to assemble a governing coalition. This process gives more than one candidate a chance to solve the deadlock.

If the second attempt also fails, the Knesset is dissolved and Israelis return to the polls. The current cabinet remains in office as a caretaker government during that period. The article therefore presents another election as the final outcome when no candidate can overcome the parties’ disagreements.

The article describes a political climate marked by anti-Palestinian sentiment and campaigns critics called racist. Likud made unsubstantiated claims that the opposition planned to rely on Arab parties. The Joint List was also petitioned against running, showing how cooperation became a charged electoral issue.

This attitude directly affects coalition arithmetic. Avigdor Lieberman ruled out a coalition with Arab or ultra-Orthodox parties. Naftali Bennett, despite having joined a coalition that included Ra’am in 2021–22, said there was “no mandate” for such a government after the October 7 attack.

The result is a narrower path to power. Ra’am and the Joint List had 17 seats, enough to help either main bloc cross 61. But refusing or avoiding Arab partners leaves both blocs short, increasing the chance of prolonged negotiations or another election.

Israel uses a parliamentary system in which voters choose party lists, and seats are distributed among parties according to their electoral support. This allows parties with different ideological positions to enter the Knesset instead of forcing all voters into two large parties. The Knesset has 120 seats.

The election shows the consequence. Likud led one bloc, while the opposition combined parties ranging from Yair Golan’s relatively left-wing Democrats to Avigdor Lieberman’s hard-right Yisrael Beiteinu. Arab parties also won seats. No bloc reached 61, so winning the most seats was not enough.

Coalition bargaining becomes necessary because parties must combine their seats into a majority. In this case, the 17 seats held by Ra’am and the Joint List could theoretically complete either bloc’s coalition. Political taboos and disagreements, however, made that arithmetic difficult to turn into a government.