Who is Gadi Eisenkot, the former army chief challenging Netanyahu?

Gadi Eisenkot is Israel’s former army chief and the central figure in the opposition’s challenge to Benjamin Netanyahu. He matters because Israel’s political landscape has shifted sharply since the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023, subsequent military campaigns, and disputes over military conscription.

Eisenkot leads a broad opposition bloc. It includes right-wing, centrist, left-wing Jewish and Palestinian parties. This range gives him a potential route to gather enough parliamentary support for a government. The key mechanism is coalition building, since a prime minister needs backing from at least 61 Knesset members.

The article says Netanyahu’s Likud party and allies are struggling to reach that majority in opinion polls. Eisenkot therefore has the strongest chance yet of ending Netanyahu’s long grip on power. Israelis are due to vote on 27 October, making the contest a major test for both leaders and their blocs.

The Knesset is Israel’s national parliament. Its members are elected by voters and represent political parties rather than a single governing party automatically taking power. The Knesset matters because the government must command its confidence to govern effectively.

After an election, parties negotiate to form a coalition. The central mechanism is parliamentary support: a leader must assemble backing from enough Knesset members to reach a majority. That support can come from several parties with different positions, not just one winning party. Israel’s system therefore makes coalition negotiations crucial.

The article identifies 61 seats as the majority needed to form a government. It says Netanyahu’s Likud party and allies are struggling to reach that number, while Gadi Eisenkot leads a broad opposition bloc. The election’s outcome will depend on which side can secure or assemble that majority.

The Knesset has 120 seats. A majority requires more than half of them, which means at least 61 seats. This threshold is important because a government needs majority parliamentary support to be formed and sustained.

The mechanism is straightforward but politically difficult. Parties may win seats without controlling a majority, so they must persuade other parties to join or support their coalition. One additional seat can therefore separate a governing bloc from one that cannot take power. Smaller parties can become decisive when the larger blocs are closely matched.

The article says Netanyahu’s Likud party and allies are struggling to secure 61 seats in opinion polls. Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition bloc also needs to assemble that number. With voting scheduled for 27 October, the central question is not simply who leads the polls, but who can build a majority.

A bloc that falls short of 61 seats cannot form a majority government on its own. It must negotiate with other parties and offer them enough common ground to join or support a coalition. This matters because election results can produce a leading bloc without producing a governing majority.

The key mechanism is bargaining. Parties may combine despite major ideological differences if they agree on a governing arrangement. The article describes Eisenkot’s bloc as spanning right-wing, centrist, left-wing Jewish and Palestinian parties, illustrating how wide such cooperation can be. If no workable combination reaches 61, coalition formation remains unresolved.

The article does not specify the precise next constitutional steps. In general, unsuccessful negotiations mean continued attempts to form a government, while a prolonged deadlock can lead to another election. Netanyahu and Eisenkot therefore need both votes and reliable partners after 27 October.

The Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023 became a major turning point in Israeli politics. The article links their fallout, together with Israel’s military campaigns across the Middle East, to a reshaping of the country’s political landscape. Support for Netanyahu and his governing coalition has eroded.

The important mechanism is political accountability and public reassessment. A major security shock, followed by continuing military campaigns, can change how voters judge the government and its leadership. The article does not identify specific polling figures or explain each voter’s reasons. It does establish that these events weakened Netanyahu’s position and opened space for a stronger opposition.

That shift is visible in current polling. Netanyahu’s Likud party and allies are struggling to reach the 61 seats needed to govern. Eisenkot now leads a broad opposition bloc, and recent polls suggest he has the strongest chance yet of ending Netanyahu’s long grip on power.

The conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jewish men is a divisive issue because it concerns who serves in Israel’s military and how religious communities organise their lives. It matters politically when different groups disagree over whether military service should be shared broadly or whether religious exemptions should continue.

The key mechanism is coalition pressure. Ultra-Orthodox parties can make support for their community’s position a condition of joining or backing a government. Other parties and voters may view unequal service obligations as unfair, while ultra-Orthodox leaders may resist policies they see as threatening religious study and community autonomy. These wider details are established context beyond the article.

The article itself only states that conscription is contentious and has reshaped the political landscape. Alongside the 7 October attacks and military campaigns, it has eroded support for Netanyahu’s coalition. The issue could therefore influence coalition negotiations after the 27 October election.

Under Israel’s proportional voting system, parties gain parliamentary seats broadly according to their share of the national vote. This differs from a system where one party can win most districts and govern alone. The result is usually a Knesset containing several political parties.

The key mechanism is arithmetic. If no party wins more than half the 120 seats, parties must negotiate to reach the 61-seat majority. A smaller party may hold only a limited number of seats but still become essential to a coalition. It can then seek policy commitments or other concessions in exchange for joining or supporting a government.

The article reflects this structure through Eisenkot’s broad opposition bloc, which spans right-wing, centrist, left-wing Jewish and Palestinian parties. It also says Netanyahu’s Likud allies are struggling to reach 61 seats. Thus, election results alone do not decide power; coalition-building does.