UAE secretly helping Iran-backed Houthis target Saudi forces: Report

The alleged assistance involved intelligence and targeting support. Drop Site News reported that UAE-aligned Yemeni forces helped the Houthis identify targets while Abu Dhabi ignored the arrangement. Two sources also alleged that the UAE directly shared intelligence with the rebels. This matters because the Houthis were using that help against forces backed by Saudi Arabia, a major UAE partner in the Yemen conflict.

The reported mechanism was communication between Houthi leaders and military commanders loyal to the UAE. A Yemeni source said the UAE passed significant intelligence to the Sana'a-based government, meaning the Houthi authorities. The source also said the communication line remained open. Houthi forces reportedly created their own channels with UAE-aligned commanders.

The claims came from four anonymous sources familiar with the matter. They said the cooperation was hidden and unauthorized publicly. If accurate, the arrangement could improve Houthi targeting and weaken Saudi-backed forces, while allowing Abu Dhabi to regain influence after Saudi Arabia sidelined it in Yemen.

The Houthis are an Iran-backed rebel movement in Yemen. In the article, they are also called Ansarallah, which is the movement’s Arabic name. The article identifies them as a force fighting Saudi-backed forces and holding a government based in Sana'a. It does not provide a detailed history of the movement or explain the naming choice.

“Ansarallah” is commonly translated as “supporters of God.” That name presents the movement as a religious and political force, rather than simply a local armed group. The Houthis maintain close ties with Iran, while their opponents include Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces. Their control and military activity make them central to Yemen’s wider conflict.

The name matters because different reports may use “Houthis” and “Ansarallah” for the same organization. In this article, the terms are interchangeable. The movement is also described as attacking Saudi infrastructure and tightening its encirclement of Taiz, showing its reach beyond local fighting.

The recent violence spans Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia reportedly killed 12 people and injured more than 300. The strikes targeted Saudi infrastructure, including the kingdom’s main airport. Their impact was serious enough to cancel the Future Investment Initiative conference, known as “Davos in the Desert.”

Inside Yemen, government officials said the Houthis were tightening their encirclement of Taiz. They reported intensified fighting, attacks on residential districts, and restricted access to water supplies. These reports describe pressure on both military positions and civilian life. The article cautions that some claims had not been independently verified.

The fighting therefore combines cross-border attacks with a worsening ground campaign. Saudi infrastructure remains vulnerable, while Taiz faces increasing isolation and violence. Regional diplomacy is attempting to contain the escalation. Egypt has discussed the crisis with Saudi and Emirati officials and announced military support for Saudi Arabia, calling it strictly defensive.

The UAE and the Houthis appear to have sharply different alliances. Abu Dhabi is closely aligned with Washington and Israel, while the Houthis maintain close ties with Iran. Yet the article reports that their interests partially converged after Saudi Arabia sidelined the UAE in Yemen. Shared tactical interests can create cooperation even when broader political beliefs remain opposed.

The alleged mechanism was practical rather than ideological. UAE-aligned Yemeni commanders reportedly opened communication channels with Houthi forces. The UAE allegedly passed intelligence that helped the Houthis target Saudi-backed government forces. This arrangement could let Abu Dhabi influence events without openly embracing the Iran-aligned rebels.

The cooperation remains an allegation based on anonymous sources, not an acknowledged policy. If the reported channels stay open, the UAE could seek renewed leverage in Yemen, while the Houthis gain information useful against their immediate enemies. That overlap may intensify mistrust among Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other regional actors.

If intelligence-sharing continues, the Houthis could gain better information about Saudi-backed government positions, movements, and vulnerabilities. That could strengthen their military campaign inside Yemen and support attacks against Saudi infrastructure. The reported cooperation would also show that battlefield interests can override the UAE’s opposing alliance with Washington, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

The key mechanism is access to information through UAE-aligned Yemeni commanders. The article reports that Houthi forces established communication channels with commanders loyal to the UAE. Intelligence passed through those channels could improve targeting without requiring a formal public alliance. It could also weaken the Saudi-backed side by exposing its military activities.

The conflict could therefore become more difficult to contain. Saudi Arabia might respond with stronger military or diplomatic pressure, while the UAE could face accusations of undermining its regional partners. Egypt’s defensive support for Saudi Arabia and Iran’s call for dialogue show competing efforts. Continued covert cooperation could complicate those efforts and prolong fighting.

Saudi Arabia supports forces linked to Yemen’s government and is facing Houthi attacks on its territory and infrastructure. The Houthis, also called Ansarallah, are Iran-backed rebels with close ties to Tehran. They control a government based in Sana'a and are fighting to expand or defend their position inside Yemen.

The UAE is another major regional actor. It is closely aligned with Washington and Israel and has supported forces inside Yemen that oppose Saudi-backed government forces. Yet the article alleges that UAE-aligned Yemeni commanders communicated with the Houthis and that Abu Dhabi tolerated or directly supported intelligence-sharing. Yemen’s government forces are therefore caught between Houthi attacks and shifting support from regional powers.

Iran calls for regional countries to handle security through dialogue and opposes intervention by outside powers. Saudi Arabia has sought military backing, while Egypt announced strictly defensive support. The conflict thus combines Yemen’s internal war with rivalry among Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.

Proxy warfare occurs when countries pursue military or political goals through local armed groups instead of sending their own forces into direct conflict. The outside power may provide weapons, intelligence, money, training, or political support. The local group does the fighting and knows the terrain. This can reduce the sponsor’s direct exposure while extending its influence.

The article describes a possible example in Yemen. UAE-aligned Yemeni commanders reportedly communicated with the Houthis, while the UAE allegedly passed intelligence to the Sana'a-based government. The Houthis could then use that information against Saudi-backed government forces. The mechanism is indirect support: a regional power affects the battlefield through local relationships rather than openly fighting its rival.

Proxy warfare can create flexible but unstable partnerships. Groups may cooperate on one battlefield goal while disagreeing on ideology or long-term plans. In this case, the UAE and Houthis have opposing alliances, yet their interests allegedly converged after Saudi Arabia sidelined Abu Dhabi. Such arrangements can complicate accountability and regional diplomacy.