The Guardian view on Israel’s elections: Netanyahu lost his mandate. If opponents unite, he’ll lose power too | Editorial

The Knesset is Israel’s parliament. Its members are elected to 120 seats. The election decides how those seats are distributed among parties, but it does not directly choose a prime minister with an automatic governing majority. This makes coalition-building central to Israeli politics.

A party leader can form a government by assembling support from at least 61 Knesset members. The supporting parties may formally join the cabinet or support it from outside. The key mechanism is parliamentary confidence: a government must command enough votes to pass laws and survive political challenges.

Netanyahu’s bloc remains the largest, but it appears to have fallen below 61 seats. His opponents therefore may have a path to government if they can cooperate, including with Palestinian-led parties. If nobody can build a majority, Netanyahu may remain temporarily in office or another election could follow.

Israel’s Knesset has 120 seats, so a majority requires 61. That number matters because a government needs enough parliamentary support to govern securely. Holding the largest bloc is not enough if its combined parties cannot reach the majority line.

The article says Netanyahu’s bloc remained the largest but appeared to have slumped by around 10 seats. It therefore fell below 61. The result leaves his opponents with a possible opening, even though no single opposition group automatically controls the chamber. They must combine their seats and agree on a governing arrangement.

The final votes were still being tallied, so the exact balance could change. For now, Netanyahu retains political advantages as the incumbent. His opponents, led by Gadi Eisenkot’s bloc, must decide whether cooperation with Palestinian-led parties can produce the 61-seat support needed to remove him.

An election can weaken a prime minister without immediately removing him. Netanyahu’s bloc appears short of a majority, but the article says he remains in office for now. Final votes were still being counted, and the process of deciding who can assemble a governing coalition has not ended.

The central mechanism is negotiation. Netanyahu can try to attract other parties, while his opponents must unite around an alternative. The article notes that Netanyahu, as incumbent, holds extra cards. It also says he may pin his hopes on another election if no stable governing arrangement emerges.

That makes the result unsettled rather than decisive. Gadi Eisenkot’s bloc could potentially remove Netanyahu if it cooperates with Palestinian-led parties, but most opposition politicians had ruled out such a coalition or demanded unacceptable terms. Until a rival majority forms, Netanyahu retains power despite losing his mandate.

If Eisenkot’s opposition bloc cooperates with Ra’am or the Joint List, it could assemble enough parliamentary support to remove Netanyahu. The article says Palestinian parties are open to cooperation, while Ahmad Tibi suggested the opposition could remove Netanyahu “if it is brave enough.” Such cooperation could turn an electoral setback into a change of government.

The mechanism would be coalition arithmetic. Palestinian-led parties hold seats that may be decisive when the main Jewish blocs fall short of 61. They could join a coalition or support it under an agreed arrangement. The article notes that most opposition politicians ruled out cooperation, except on terms the Palestinian parties would not accept.

The choice carries political risks for Eisenkot. Some supporters may reject a deal, but failing to make one could leave Netanyahu in power and let him claim an ideological victory. Cooperation would also affirm that every citizen and vote should count equally.

Palestinian citizens of Israel are a population the article places at around one-fifth of Israel’s people. They possess the formal right to participate in this election, although many have often boycotted that right. The article links this low participation to a political system stacked against them and to Israel’s rightward movement.

Their position differs sharply from Palestinians living under illegal Israeli occupation. Those Palestinians are not described as citizens participating in Israel’s election, and the article states that millions received no vote at all. The distinction is therefore between Palestinian citizens inside Israel’s electoral system and Palestinians living under occupation outside it.

Palestinian Israeli parties surged and were projected to nearly double their previous 10 seats. Their stronger showing could make them important coalition partners. Yet Netanyahu used fear of Palestinian citizens in his campaign, while opposition parties often treated cooperation with their parties as unacceptable.

The 2021 precedent matters because it demonstrates that Palestinian-led parties can influence who governs Israel. The article says Netanyahu himself reportedly made overtures to Ra’am that year. Ra’am did not support him. Instead, it joined the coalition that removed him from power.

The mechanism was parliamentary coalition-building. When no bloc has enough seats to govern alone, a smaller party can become pivotal by joining one side or supporting it. Ra’am’s decision showed that Palestinian-led parties were not merely observers of Israeli politics. Their seats could help create a governing majority and unseat an incumbent.

That history shapes the current choice facing Eisenkot and his partners. Palestinian parties have again signaled openness to cooperation, while most opposition politicians have rejected it or imposed terms they will not accept. The 2021 outcome shows such cooperation is possible, but political willingness remains the obstacle.

Israel’s proportional electoral system aims to translate parties’ shares of the vote into shares of Knesset seats. This allows multiple political movements to gain representation instead of forcing voters into only two large parties. The result is a broad, fragmented parliament in which the largest party may still lack a majority.

The key mechanism is arithmetic. With 120 seats, a government needs 61, but a party or bloc can finish first without reaching that number. It must then negotiate with smaller parties, offering policy influence or other coalition terms in exchange for support. Palestinian-led parties can become especially important when the main blocs are closely balanced.

That pattern explains the current uncertainty. Netanyahu’s bloc remains the largest but appears below 61, while Eisenkot’s bloc also needs partners. The election therefore produces bargaining rather than an automatic winner. If negotiations fail, Netanyahu may remain in place or another election may be needed.