Fast Thinking: How the Israeli election deadlock could end

An Israeli election ends in political deadlock when no party bloc has enough Knesset seats to form a government. The key threshold is sixty-one seats. Without it, even the largest party cannot govern alone and must find partners or outside support.

This election illustrates the problem. Netanyahu’s coalition fell from sixty-eight seats to a projected fifty-three. Likud is still expected to be the largest party, but that lead does not create a majority. Eisenkot’s bloc also lacks a clear route to sixty-one.

The next stage is bargaining. Netanyahu could try to recruit opposition members, while Eisenkot might seek support or abstention from Arab parties. President Isaac Herzog must decide whom to ask first to form a government. If talks fail, Israel could hold another election in about six months.

A government needs sixty-one seats, half of the 120-seat Knesset plus one. That threshold matters because it gives a coalition enough parliamentary support to govern. Winning the most seats is not sufficient if a bloc cannot assemble the required majority.

The clearest figure in the article is Netanyahu’s projected fifty-three seats. His coalition previously held sixty-eight, so it has lost fifteen seats and now sits eight below the governing threshold. Likud may remain the largest party, but its wider bloc is still too small.

Eisenkot’s bloc is also not poised to reach sixty-one. Its path could depend on Arab parties backing a government or abstaining. Both blocs therefore face negotiations, defections, or compromises. If no arrangement succeeds, President Herzog may eventually oversee another attempt or the country may return to elections.

The largest party does not automatically control Israel’s government. What matters is whether it can assemble a coalition with at least sixty-one Knesset seats. A party can lead the results but remain unable to pass measures or sustain a government without additional backing.

The article gives Netanyahu’s bloc as an example. Likud is expected to be the largest party, yet his coalition has only a projected fifty-three seats. Netanyahu would therefore need to recruit one or more opposition members, including possible partners such as Avigdor Lieberman or Naftali Bennett.

Those negotiations are difficult because most opposition parties have refused to sit with Netanyahu. Eisenkot faces a similar problem, since parts of his bloc oppose cooperation with Arab parties. The result is a gap between electoral size and governing power. Coalition agreements, not party ranking alone, determine whether a government can function.

When no bloc reaches sixty-one seats, the country enters coalition negotiations. The president must choose which politician should first receive the mandate to form a government. That person then tries to gather enough parties, defectors, or outside support to reach the threshold.

President Isaac Herzog faces a choice between Netanyahu, as leader of the largest party, and Eisenkot, who might receive more recommendations from Knesset members. Herzog is also expected to push for a unity government joining the rival blocs. Such an arrangement could require painful compromises, including Netanyahu remaining in office.

If negotiations stall, the existing government may continue in a caretaker role. Dan Shapiro says Netanyahu might reject compromises, resume the war in Iran during the formation period, and seek another election. The article presents voting again in about six months as a possible outcome.

President Isaac Herzog acts as the gatekeeper for the next government-forming attempt. He decides which politician receives the mandate to build a coalition. The mandate does not guarantee success; it gives one candidate the first opportunity to secure enough parliamentary support.

Herzog could choose Netanyahu because Likud is the largest party. He could instead choose Eisenkot if Eisenkot receives more recommendations from Knesset members. This creates a distinction between leading the election results and having the strongest possible path to a majority.

Dan Shapiro expects Herzog to press for a unity government involving the main rival blocs. That could leave Netanyahu in office for some time or even involve a pardon in his corruption trial. Shalom Lipner says such appeals have so far been ignored. If no candidate succeeds, the process may continue or lead to another election.

Outside support can change a deadlock without changing the election results. A party does not always need to join a government formally if its members provide enough votes or abstain during the process. That flexibility could help a bloc cross the sixty-one-seat threshold.

For Eisenkot, Shalom Lipner says Arab parties could back his government or abstain. For Netanyahu, Dan Shapiro identifies Avigdor Lieberman or Naftali Bennett as possible opposition recruits. Either route would add parliamentary support to a bloc currently below sixty-one.

The obstacle is political trust. Many opposition members reject sitting with Netanyahu, while some Eisenkot allies oppose cooperation with parties that do not define Hamas as a terrorist organization. Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley notes that red lines can move, citing Bennett’s 2021 partnership with Yair Lapid. The election’s outcome may therefore depend on whether old commitments survive coalition bargaining.

The article focuses on the result, not the voting system’s mechanics. Under Israel’s proportional-representation system, parties win Knesset seats roughly according to their share of the vote. Many parties can therefore enter parliament, while no single party may command a majority. Governments must usually combine several parties.

That structure explains the present impasse. Netanyahu’s bloc is projected at fifty-three seats, even though Likud remains the largest party. Eisenkot also needs partners, possibly including Arab parties. Each potential coalition must reconcile different positions on Netanyahu, Hamas, and cooperation across political divides.

Coalitions can be fragile because every partner matters. If negotiations fail, no stable government emerges even after ballots are counted. Israel can then repeat the process through another election, as the article suggests may happen in about six months. Proportional representation does not automatically cause deadlock, but fragmented results make it more likely.