Did UK pressure on Israel help Netanyahu, or bring his opponents closer to power? - analysis

Israeli settlements are residential communities established by Israel beyond its internationally recognized borders, especially in the West Bank. Their status is disputed because Palestinians claim the territory for a future state, while many governments say settlement expansion changes facts on the ground and breaches international law. The disagreement affects diplomacy, security, land ownership, and any possible peace agreement.

The article focuses on Britain’s effort to target settlement activity rather than Israel itself. Its September measures included an import ban on settlement goods and restrictions on people and companies involved in settlement growth. Britain said the measures did not apply to Israel within its internationally recognized borders.

The dispute remains politically sensitive because pressure on settlements can also be perceived as pressure on Israel. Britain argued that expansion was continuing and that Netanyahu’s policies were making Israel “less secure.” Critics feared the timing, just weeks before voting, could strengthen rather than weaken his political position.

Britain’s September 8 measures targeted settlement expansion, not Israel within its internationally recognized borders. They included an import ban on settlement goods and restrictions against individuals and companies involved in settlement growth. The stated goal was to pressure policies connected with settlement activity while distinguishing those measures from sanctions on Israel as a whole.

The announcement followed earlier action in June 2025. Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway had sanctioned National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. The governments cited alleged incitement of violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. The September measures therefore formed part of a broader deterioration in relations.

The timing made the restrictions politically consequential. Britain announced them on September 8, with Israelis due to vote on October 27. Miliband said the international community could not wait for a future opposition government while settlement expansion continued, but critics warned the policy could affect the election.

Israel’s parliament requires 61 seats for a governing majority. That threshold matters because a prime minister normally needs enough parliamentary support to survive confidence votes and form a stable government. Winning the most votes does not automatically produce control of the parliament when seats are distributed among several parties.

The article reports that exit polls showed Netanyahu’s bloc falling short of the 61 seats needed for a majority. At the same time, his bloc had more votes overall than the change bloc. Likud also “far surpassed” Eisenkot’s Yashar, which pre-election polls had suggested might perform much better.

The immediate result was an uncertain political picture. Netanyahu’s bloc was the strongest side by votes but could not govern alone. It would need support from other parties, while rival parties would need to assemble a competing coalition. The results did not prove that foreign pressure changed voting behavior.

In a proportional parliamentary system, the largest bloc can win the most votes without controlling enough seats to govern alone. It must negotiate with smaller parties and build a coalition that reaches at least 61 seats. Those negotiations can determine who becomes prime minister and which policies survive in parliament.

The article gives this exact situation. Exit polls showed Netanyahu’s bloc below the 61-seat majority threshold, even though it had more votes overall than the change bloc. Likud had also outperformed Eisenkot’s Yashar. Netanyahu’s side therefore had electoral strength but lacked an automatic governing mandate.

The political consequence is uncertainty rather than a settled result. Netanyahu’s bloc may try to bring potential partners into government. Alternatively, rival parties may combine despite ideological differences. If no coalition can be formed, further political steps may be required under Israel’s system. The article does not state which coalition ultimately emerged.

Netanyahu’s supporters argued that foreign sanctions reinforced a familiar message: outside governments were hostile to Israel. That framing could present Netanyahu as the leader defending the country against external pressure. Likud members used this narrative after Britain’s announcement, turning criticism of government policy into a broader national argument.

Opponents made two related claims. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar called the British action “blatant interference” in a sovereign state and its electoral process. British MPs, including Tom Tugendhat, also warned that the sanctions’ timing could help Israel’s far Right. Reports further alleged that some British officials had warned against announcing the measures before voting.

Neither argument proves the sanctions were designed to remove Netanyahu. The article distinguishes deliberate electoral intervention from knowingly accepting political risk while pursuing policy goals. The results showed Netanyahu’s bloc below 61 seats, but they did not establish that foreign pressure caused voters to choose as they did.

Policy pressure can affect an election because voters judge not only the policy being targeted, but also who appears to be attacking it. Foreign sanctions may persuade some voters that their government is internationally isolated. Others may rally around the incumbent, seeing outside action as an attack on national sovereignty rather than a warning about policy.

The article identifies this mechanism directly. British officials reportedly feared sanctions would give Netanyahu an opportunity to present himself as defending Israel against foreign pressure. Sa’ar accused Britain of interfering during an election campaign, while Likud members promoted the same broader narrative. Miliband, meanwhile, argued that Netanyahu’s policies were making Israel “less secure.”

The result can therefore run in opposite directions. Pressure may signal costs and encourage policy change, but it may also harden support for the government. Netanyahu’s bloc fell short of 61 seats, yet the article says this cannot show whether sanctions affected the vote.

Israel’s system turns national vote shares into parliamentary seats through proportional representation. Parties compete for seats, and the parliament contains several blocs rather than one automatic winner. A party or bloc can lead in votes but still lack enough seats to govern. The key threshold is 61 seats, a majority of parliament.

After an election, the strongest political side usually seeks partners among smaller parties. Those partners trade support for influence over policies, ministries, or the governing agreement. A coalition can therefore create a majority from parties that did not win most of the overall vote. Rival parties may also combine if they can agree on a government.

This explains the article’s result. Netanyahu’s bloc won more votes overall than the change bloc but fell short of 61 seats. Its future depended on coalition arithmetic and negotiations, not simply on finishing first. The article does not state which parties ultimately formed a government.