Fake teachers, inflated salaries: Stunning revelations in Bihar’s internal audit

Bihar’s internal audits allegedly found that the HRMS payroll system was manipulated to create or approve payments that did not match authorised salary records. The suspected irregularities included inflated allowances, misuse of login credentials, diversion of Samagra Shiksha funds and payments made in the names of non-existent teachers. These findings matter because HRMS controls large public salary payments.

In Nawada, a teacher’s approved monthly salary of Rs 46,772 was allegedly changed to Rs 4,91,772 in April 2025 through an unauthorised allowance. In May, she allegedly received Rs 3,49,500. Investigators also cited a Rs 2,86,000 Samagra Shiksha transfer. In Patna, a clerk allegedly used the DEO’s Maker Login ID to generate excess payments. Bhagalpur cases involved alleged payments to a fictitious teacher.

Police investigations and departmental proceedings followed. At least four officials were suspended, according to published reports. The minister ordered audits across all 38 districts and said experts would help strengthen HRMS and online-payment controls.

An HRMS, or Human Resource Management System, is a digital platform for maintaining employee information and handling personnel processes such as salary calculation and payment. In a government education department, it can connect teacher records, approved pay, allowances and payment instructions. Accurate records help ensure that the right employee receives the right amount.

The article describes Bihar’s HRMS as the route through which eligible teachers’ salaries were processed. A Block Education Officer approved a salary sheet, while designated Maker and Checker officials handled portal entries and payment processing. In Nawada, the approved salary was allegedly changed by adding an unauthorised allowance. In Patna, a clerk allegedly used the DEO’s Maker Login ID to create excess payments.

The article does not provide a technical definition of HRMS or describe every system feature. It does show that weak access controls, inaccurate records or poor review can affect online transfers. Bihar is auditing all 38 districts and engaging experts to prevent further manipulation.

The article puts the alleged irregular payments across the three reported case studies at about Rs 1.85 crore. That figure is based on amounts cited in complaints and published reports. The cases do not all provide identical details: one Bhagalpur complaint involving a fictitious teacher does not state the amount withdrawn, while another Bhagalpur order cites Rs 98,12,773.

The Nawada FIR says a teacher received unauthorised payments totalling Rs 10,43,950. It includes inflated April and May salary payments and a Rs 2,86,000 transfer from the Samagra Shiksha fund. In Patna, the suspension order cited alleged financial irregularities of Rs 76,71,983. In Bhagalpur, an alleged unauthorised payment of Rs 98,12,773 was made over several months to a fictitious teacher named Tanushree.

These figures are allegations, not final findings. Police investigations and departmental inquiries were continuing. The article also notes that the identity of one bank-account holder and an alleged official link required confirmation.

Government payroll systems move money by linking employee records to approved salary amounts and bank details. If someone changes an allowance, enters a false employee, or uses another official’s login, the system may generate a payment that appears authorised. Weak review between data entry and approval can allow the error or fraud to pass into the banking process.

The Nawada case illustrates the mechanism. A teacher’s approved salary was Rs 46,772, but the Maker and Checker allegedly added Rs 4,52,222 as an unauthorised allowance, producing a much larger payment. In Patna, a clerk allegedly used the DEO’s Maker Login ID. In Bhagalpur, payments were allegedly made in the name of a fictitious teacher.

The article records allegations, not proven conclusions. It says investigators suspected that a Nawada transfer might connect the teacher with an approving official, but the account holder’s identity and the link required confirmation. Police and departmental inquiries were underway.

Irregular payroll payments can reduce the money available for education because public funds are transferred to unauthorised recipients or in excessive amounts. They can also make salary records unreliable. That may complicate legitimate teachers’ payments, budget planning and departmental oversight, even when the article does not document specific delays or losses for other teachers.

The Nawada FIR alleged that a teacher received Rs 10,43,950 in unauthorised payments, including money from the Samagra Shiksha fund. Patna authorities cited alleged irregularities of Rs 76,71,983. Bhagalpur authorities cited an alleged Rs 98,12,773 payment to a fictitious teacher. Such figures explain why officials treated the cases as serious and why investigations followed.

The article reports suspensions, police cases and departmental proceedings, but it does not measure the wider effect on Bihar’s education budget or public trust. The minister said all 38 districts were being audited. Better online-payment controls and expert support are intended to reduce future misuse.

A safer payroll system separates data entry from approval, verifies each employee and bank account, and limits access to the records each official needs. Strong login controls should include individual credentials, secure authentication and activity logs. Payments should also be checked against approved salary sheets, authorised allowances and available funds before release.

The article shows why these safeguards matter. In Nawada, a Maker and Checker allegedly added an unauthorised allowance to an approved salary. In Patna, a clerk allegedly used the DEO’s Maker Login ID. In Bhagalpur, officials allegedly processed payments for a fictitious teacher. Independent bank-account verification and alerts for unusual amounts could have highlighted these transactions.

The article does not describe a complete reform plan. It reports that Bihar is auditing all 38 districts and engaging experts to prevent HRMS manipulation. The minister also called for a better online-payment system. Regular reconciliations, surprise audits and prompt access removal after transfers could strengthen those efforts.

Governments must maintain accurate payroll records because salaries use public money and affect essential services. Correct records show who is employed, what each person should receive and which funds may be used. Financial controls reduce the risk of unauthorised payments and create a clear trail for review. They also help officials plan budgets accurately.

Audits can compare approved salary sheets with HRMS entries, allowances, employee identities and bank transfers. In Nawada, that comparison allegedly revealed a salary rising from an approved Rs 46,772 to Rs 4,91,772. The audit also identified a Rs 2,86,000 payment from the Samagra Shiksha fund. Other cases involved alleged misuse of a login and a fictitious teacher.

The article says Bihar’s internal audit findings led to police investigations, suspensions and departmental proceedings. The government is auditing all 38 districts and seeking expert help. Those steps can identify wider weaknesses, but the article does not report the final outcome of the investigations.