A familiar political crisis could be looming as Israel counts its votes

Israel’s election produced no clear governing majority. With about 90 per cent of votes counted, Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc was projected to win 53 seats, while Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition had 48. Both totals fell short of the 61-seat majority threshold.

Israel’s system requires parties to negotiate alliances because no party has ever won enough seats to govern alone. Those alliances can be difficult because the blocs contain parties with sharply different positions. Neither side has shown an easy route to 61 seats, especially because both have rejected cooperation with Arab parties that could hold 19 seats together.

President Isaac Herzog must choose the leader he believes has the best chance of forming a government, after consulting the parties. If negotiations fail, Israel could face a prolonged stalemate, with another election possible within months. Netanyahu could remain caretaker prime minister during the deadlock.

A coalition government is formed when several parties agree to share power and support a governing programme. In Israel, this arrangement is essential because no party has ever won enough seats to govern alone. Parties must therefore negotiate partnerships after an election.

The key mechanism is parliamentary confidence. A governing alliance needs support from at least 61 seats, the stated threshold for a majority. That support can come from parties formally joining the government or, in some circumstances, backing it without becoming coalition members. The larger the alliance, the more securely it can pass measures and survive political disagreements.

The current election shows why the threshold matters. Netanyahu’s bloc was projected at 53 seats, and Eisenkot’s at 48. Neither reached 61. Arab parties were projected to hold 19 seats together, but both main sides were reluctant to work with them, making coalition arithmetic especially difficult.

With around 90 per cent of votes counted, Netanyahu’s bloc was projected to win 53 seats. Eisenkot’s opposition was projected to win 48. Israel requires 61 seats for a majority, so the figures showed that neither side had secured a governing mandate on its own.

The arithmetic matters because every missing seat must be found through alliances or parliamentary support. Netanyahu’s bloc needed eight more seats, while Eisenkot’s needed 13. The potential support of the Joint List and Ra’am, projected together at 19 seats, could therefore be highly valuable. Yet neither major side had expressed willingness to work with them.

That leaves both camps facing uncomfortable choices. Eisenkot could consider a unity government with Netanyahu or cooperation with Arab parties, although he had said he would do neither. A fragile minority government might also be possible if Arab lawmakers supported an opposition government without formally joining it.

When no bloc can form a government alone, President Isaac Herzog starts the next constitutional stage. He consults each party about whom it supports and then chooses the leader judged most likely to assemble a governing coalition. His role is to identify the candidate with the strongest path through the political negotiations.

The president does not simply select the largest bloc automatically. The numbers matter, but so do declared alliances, possible partners and the chances of winning enough parliamentary support. In this election, neither major bloc had reached 61 seats, while Arab parties could hold significant influence despite both sides resisting cooperation with them.

Herzog urged parties to keep an open mind and said everything should be done to avoid another election. If the person he selects cannot build a government, negotiations may continue, a caretaker government may remain in place, or Israel could face another election and a prolonged political stalemate.

The Joint List and Ra’am were on course for a combined 19 seats, a historic result that could give Arab parties major influence over government formation. Their seats could help either major camp move toward the 61-seat majority, even though neither side had expressed willingness to work with them.

Influence does not require formal coalition membership. Joint List leader Yousef Jabareen indicated that his party might support an opposition government designed to remove Netanyahu without joining it. Such outside support could allow a fragile minority government to take office. It would also make the government dependent on votes from parties outside its formal alliance.

That possibility creates a difficult trade-off for Eisenkot. His bloc includes right-wing parties and the left-wing Democrats, the only Jewish party open to partnering with Arab-led parties. But cooperation with Arab parties could drive away right-wing allies, leaving him with no straightforward route to power.

Israel held five elections between 2019 and 2022, an extraordinary sequence caused by repeated failures to assemble or maintain parliamentary majorities. The pattern shows how quickly government formation can return to the voters when coalition partners cannot agree or an existing alliance collapses.

In April 2019, Netanyahu’s party tied with Benny Gantz’s Blue and White alliance, with both winning 35 seats. Talks failed amid disagreement over military conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews, triggering a September election. That vote also failed to produce a government. A third election in March 2020 eventually produced a unity government.

The source does not detail every later election in the five-election sequence. It states that coalitions repeatedly struggled to assemble majorities or fell apart after forming. The current result suggests the same pattern could return, with another election possible if today’s parties cannot negotiate a government.

Israel’s system makes governing a group project. No party has ever won enough seats to govern alone, so the leader who wants power must assemble support from other parties. This turns election results into the starting point for negotiations rather than a complete governing mandate.

The mechanism is coalition arithmetic. Parties combine their seats until they reach the 61-seat majority threshold. Because alliances can include right-wing, left-wing, religious, centrist and Arab parties, partners may disagree on major issues. The article highlights military conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews as one dispute that helped prevent a government from forming in 2019.

The current election illustrates the risk. Netanyahu’s bloc was projected at 53 seats and Eisenkot’s at 48. Arab parties could hold 19 seats together, but both main camps resisted working with them. The result is a system where alliances are necessary, yet difficult to sustain, creating a real possibility of deadlock or another election.