Ana Iparraguirre: ‘Trump will get more radical if he loses the next elections’

The article refers to the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, which determine the makeup of Congress during a president’s term. The main question was whether Democratic momentum would become a “tsunami” capable of capturing both the House of Representatives and the Senate. That mattered because Republicans then faced the risk of losing control of Congress while Donald Trump remained president.

The key mechanism was voter behavior. Iparraguirre argued that a Democratic victory might mainly represent “No to Trump,” rather than enthusiastic support for Democrats. The article also describes dissatisfaction with both parties and says Republicans would face an internal fight over globalization. A Democratic tide could therefore reflect opposition to the president more than a broad ideological shift.

The article presents a Democratic takeover as increasingly probable, but not certain. It also suggests that losing Congress might have less effect on Trump than expected, because many important actions had already been taken without passing through Congress. The election’s larger consequence could be the Democrats’ struggle to define themselves afterward.

The House of Representatives and the Senate are the two chambers of the U.S. Congress. The House has members elected from congressional districts, while the Senate has two senators from each state. Together, they debate and pass federal legislation. A bill normally needs approval from both chambers before reaching the president.

Control matters because a president’s party can move legislation more easily when it holds both chambers. If the opposing party controls one or both, it can delay, change, or reject proposals. Congress also controls important parts of government funding and conducts investigations. The Senate has additional responsibilities, including approving many presidential appointments and treaties.

The article’s context is Donald Trump facing a potentially more adverse Congress. Iparraguirre says this could have less impact than expected because Trump had already taken actions without passing through Congress. Still, congressional control can shape new laws, budgets, appointments, and scrutiny, even when executive action remains available.

To control both chambers, Democrats would need to win enough seats to hold a majority in the House and a majority in the Senate. That means gaining control of both institutions, not merely winning more votes nationwide. The article does not give the exact number of seats Democrats held or needed, so it does not establish a precise numerical threshold.

The article describes the possible result as a “tsunami” sweeping both the House and Senate. That language suggests a broad victory, but it does not mean every seat would change hands. The essential mechanism is chamber-by-chamber control: Democrats would have to win enough contested races in each chamber to organize it and set much of its agenda.

The scale was therefore politically significant but not precisely quantified in the interview. Iparraguirre calls a Democratic takeover increasingly probable, while stressing that it was not certain. She also warns against reading such a result as automatic Democratic enthusiasm, since voters might mainly be rejecting Trump.

Rejecting Trump and supporting the Democratic Party are different choices. Voters can oppose a president’s conduct, policies, or political style without embracing the alternative party’s program. Iparraguirre says the U.S. election should not automatically be interpreted as an endorsement of Democrats, because the image of both parties remained weak.

Her example is the phrase “No to Trump.” This captures negative voting: people may use an election to express opposition rather than to choose a party they strongly trust. The article connects this with broader dissatisfaction with political leadership. In Brazil, voters were described as rejecting both Lula and Bolsonaro, showing how electoral choices can be shaped by discontent with all available options.

That distinction matters after the election. If Democrats win mainly because voters oppose Trump, they will still need to define what the party represents afterward. Iparraguirre expects a fight between progressive and moderate Democrats, suggesting that victory alone would not settle the party’s direction or guarantee durable public support.

A more hostile Congress would make governing harder, especially for proposals that require legislation. Congress can reject or alter bills, limit funding, investigate executive conduct, and influence presidential appointments. That would reduce Trump’s ability to advance an agenda through ordinary lawmaking and could increase political conflict between the executive and legislative branches.

The article’s central example is Trump’s record before the midterms. Iparraguirre says that “everything he has done until now” that most affected people had happened without passing through Congress. This points to executive actions and other presidential steps that do not require a new act of Congress. Their availability could give Trump ways to continue acting despite opposition on Capitol Hill.

Iparraguirre therefore expects the election to have the least impact on Trump. She argues that he has little loyalty to the Republican Party and might continue doing what he wants even if Republicans lose future elections. A hostile Congress could constrain him, but not necessarily redirect his governing style toward moderation.

The article links a possible succession contest between Marco Rubio and J. D. Vance to the political space available for Javier Milei’s government in Washington. Its concern is not that support would necessarily disappear, but that the margin of support could shrink. Argentina could have less room to rely on a single, unified Republican position.

The mechanism is leadership competition. When potential Republican successors compete, they may emphasize different political priorities, alliances, or ideas about America’s role abroad. Governments seeking support in Washington can then face more conditions and less predictability. The article’s introduction identifies this tussle as a factor that could reduce support for Milei’s government.

The source does not specify which policies Rubio or Vance would promote, nor does it predict a definite break with Milei. It presents the contest as a risk to the government’s diplomatic and political support. The implication is that Argentina’s relationship with Washington could depend partly on how Republican leadership is settled.

Political movements depend on results because voters judge governments by how their lives change. A conservative wave may win elections through dissatisfaction with previous leaders, but that support can fade if prices, jobs, incomes, or public services do not improve. The article says Latin America’s current conservative wave will depend on its capacity to produce concrete economic results.

Iparraguirre connects this to a broader crisis of confidence. She cites a Latinobarómetro question asking what the state had done in the previous three years to improve people’s lives. She says citizens show chronic dissatisfaction because government results do not sufficiently cover an increasingly changing reality. This creates an opening for new political forces, but not permanent loyalty.

The forward implication is conditional. Conservative governments must demonstrate tangible progress rather than rely only on opposition to the left or on ideological identity. If they fail, the same dissatisfaction that helped them rise can turn against them. Political success therefore depends on delivery, not simply on winning office or benefiting from a regional trend.