(2nd LD) N.K. leader may have discussed potential talks with U.S. during China visit: spy agency

The NIS assessed that Kim Jong-un may have used his China visit to communicate Pyongyang’s position on possible talks with Washington. This mattered because China could potentially pass that position to the United States while direct discussions remain uncertain.

Kim’s trip was not treated as a simple war commemoration. He was accompanied by senior diplomats, including Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, and the NIS said his entourage suggested that North Korea-U.S. talks were under consideration. The agency also said Kim may have learned something about U.S. President Donald Trump during his June meeting with Xi Jinping.

The NIS cautioned that it needed more time to determine exactly what Kim conveyed. It did not believe he gave China a definite commitment to hold talks. The agency said China might gently communicate his stance, but did not appear ready to actively mediate.

The National Intelligence Service, or NIS, is South Korea’s national intelligence and spy agency. It gathers information about security issues and assesses developments involving North Korea and other countries. Its judgment about Kim’s China visit therefore offered lawmakers an official intelligence-based interpretation, rather than a public diplomatic statement.

The assessment was presented during a closed-door parliamentary intelligence committee audit. Such meetings generally allow officials to discuss sensitive sources, methods, and judgments without exposing them publicly. The article does not give the specific reason for closing this session, but the format fits the confidential nature of intelligence reporting.

Lawmakers later described the NIS assessment to reporters, including its view that Kim may have discussed potential U.S. talks. The details remained limited. The agency said it would need more time to determine what Kim actually conveyed and did not claim certainty.

North Korea may use China as an indirect channel because Pyongyang and Washington have not yet narrowed their differences over conditions for dialogue. A message passed through Beijing could communicate North Korea’s position without requiring an immediate direct meeting or public commitment.

The possible mechanism was straightforward: Kim would explain his thinking to Chinese officials, and China could then gently pass that position to the United States. The NIS connected this possibility to Kim’s diplomatic entourage, especially Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui. It also said China did not appear to intend active mediation between Washington and Pyongyang.

This channel remains uncertain. The NIS had not determined exactly what Kim conveyed and did not believe he confirmed that talks would definitely happen. Still, it did not rule out a change in circumstances before or after the APEC summit in Shenzhen next month.

Kim’s choice of companions gave the NIS a clue about the trip’s purpose. North Korea described the visit as commemorating China’s participation in the 1950-53 Korean War, but the presence of senior diplomats suggested an additional diplomatic agenda.

Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui was especially significant. She was seen speaking closely with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and North Korean state media kept her prominently positioned during the visit. The NIS also noted that Kim had recently brought Choe to non-diplomatic political events, indicating that talks with the United States were receiving serious consideration.

The agency therefore judged that potential Pyongyang-Washington talks might explain the visit better than commemoration alone. Kim still visited a war memorial, but he traveled with diplomats rather than military officials. The NIS did not say this proved negotiations were agreed, and it stressed that Kim had not clearly confirmed talks.

The NIS said military-related activities made up about 60 percent of Kim Ju-ae’s public appearances. That pattern matters because public appearances can help North Korea shape how people understand her future position within the leadership.

The agency said its analysis began with her first public appearance in 2022. It found that commemorative photographs and other appearances at military events were helping create a narrative of Ju-ae as a military leader. Her repeated visibility in those settings gave the succession message a strong security-focused image.

The NIS assessed that North Korea was gradually solidifying Ju-ae’s status as the likely successor. The article does not provide a formal succession announcement or explain how the process would develop. It does show that military events have become a major part of the public presentation surrounding Kim’s daughter.

If China passes Kim’s position to Washington, the message could clarify what North Korea wants before direct talks resume. That could help the United States judge whether a meeting is possible and whether the current diplomatic impasse is shifting.

The likely mechanism is indirect communication. Kim may have shared his views with Chinese officials during his one-day visit, and Beijing could then gently convey them to the United States. The timing matters because the APEC summit in Shenzhen is scheduled for next month, and Trump is expected to attend. Trump has also expressed interest in resuming dialogue with Kim.

No outcome is guaranteed. The NIS said Washington and Pyongyang had not narrowed their differences over dialogue conditions. It did not rule out a change in the situation before or after APEC, but it did not say that talks had been arranged or that China would actively mediate.

Indirect diplomatic channels allow governments to exchange positions through an intermediary when direct talks are politically or practically unsettled. They can clarify demands, reduce misunderstandings, and test whether negotiations might be possible without announcing a formal meeting.

In this case, Kim may have conveyed North Korea’s position to Chinese officials during his visit. China could then gently communicate that stance to Washington. The mechanism would give the United States information about Pyongyang’s thinking while avoiding an immediate direct commitment. The NIS specifically said China did not appear ready to actively mediate.

The channel does not resolve disagreements by itself. The NIS said North Korea and the United States still had not narrowed differences over the conditions for dialogue. It also said the situation could shift before or after the APEC summit, so indirect messages might help prepare the ground without guaranteeing talks.