US bans Chinese labs from testing electronics ahead of Trump-Xi meeting

The FCC voted to exclude testing laboratories and certification bodies based in China and other economies lacking either a mutual recognition agreement or a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States. These organizations will no longer be allowed to test or certify electronic devices destined for US consumers. The change is part of a wider effort to reduce reliance on Chinese technology infrastructure.

The rule focuses on the organizations that check whether devices meet US requirements before sale. The FCC says more than 80 per cent of such testing currently occurs in China. Chairman Brendan Carr called some facilities “bad labs” and said some were linked to, controlled by, or tied to China’s People’s Liberation Army.

The ban will take effect in December 2028, not immediately. That deadline gives domestic laboratories more than two years to increase their capacity. Until then, the FCC’s existing system remains in place, while companies and testing providers prepare for a major shift away from Chinese facilities.

The Federal Communications Commission, or FCC, is a US regulatory agency responsible for communications-related rules and approvals. In this article, it is using that authority to control which laboratories may test and certify electronic devices intended for the American market. Certification helps regulators check whether products meet required technical and safety conditions.

Testing laboratories examine devices and provide evidence used in approval decisions. The FCC says facilities in China dominate this process, with more than 80 per cent of testing taking place there. Chairman Brendan Carr questioned the trustworthiness of some laboratories, saying some were linked to or controlled by China’s People’s Liberation Army.

That makes laboratory oversight part of the FCC’s national-security strategy. The agency argues that testing is not only a technical service but also a point in the supply chain where foreign influence could matter. Its new rule limits eligible laboratories to those in the United States or reciprocal economies, beginning in December 2028.

According to the FCC, more than 80 per cent of testing for electronics destined for the US market takes place in facilities in China. The article does not provide a precise number of laboratories or devices, but the percentage shows how heavily the US approval system currently depends on Chinese testing capacity.

That testing can involve laboratories checking whether electronic products meet requirements before they are sold in the United States. The FCC’s concern is not simply where testing occurs. Chairman Brendan Carr said some Chinese laboratories were linked to, controlled by, or tied to China’s People’s Liberation Army, which he said made them less trustworthy.

The figure explains why the FCC delayed its ban until December 2028. US laboratories need time to expand and replace much of that capacity. The shift could affect manufacturers, certification bodies, and the timing of product approvals, although the article does not quantify those effects.

The article does not state exactly what will happen if non-Chinese laboratories cannot absorb the work by December 2028. However, because more than 80 per cent of relevant testing currently occurs in China, a capacity gap would likely create a bottleneck in product testing and certification. Devices could wait longer before reaching the US market.

US companies might need to find new testing providers, pay higher testing fees, or redesign approval schedules. Smaller businesses could feel the pressure most sharply if alternative laboratories become scarce. Consumers could then see delayed product launches, fewer available models, or higher prices. These are likely consequences, not outcomes directly reported in the article.

The FCC is allowing more than two years for domestic laboratories to expand. That transition period is intended to reduce disruption while changing the testing system. Whether it succeeds will depend on how quickly US and reciprocal-economy laboratories can replace China’s current capacity.

The FCC’s recent targets span individual products, companies, and whole technology categories. It blocked a dashboard camera and wireless video transmitter containing chips made by Huawei subsidiary HiSilicon. It also announced bans on new Chinese robots and power inverters, restricted new consumer routers, and supported limits involving China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, and Hong Kong carrier HKT International.

The agency’s stated mechanism is risk reduction. It said Huawei-linked devices were “designed for the surveillance market.” For advanced robots, it warned that networked capabilities could create ways to manipulate data and physical operations. It also cited national-security threats, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and concerns about China’s influence over telecom networks.

These steps fit Carr’s two-track approach. The FCC targets specific Chinese companies while also banning broader product categories. The measures build on a December crackdown that included new Chinese drones and have contributed to China’s later export controls, sanctions, and national-security investigation.

A mutual recognition agreement is a pact in which countries agree to recognize designated laboratories, testing methods, and results from one another. In practice, a product tested and certified by an approved laboratory in one country can use that result during the other country’s approval process. This avoids duplicating the same technical checks.

The arrangement depends on reciprocal trust and agreed rules. Participating countries identify eligible laboratories and accept their results under the agreement’s conditions. The FCC’s new policy permits testing laboratories and certification bodies in the United States or economies with a mutual recognition agreement or reciprocal trade agreement with the US.

The article does not list particular agreements or explain their detailed legal terms. It does show why the distinction matters: Chinese laboratories will be barred because China is among the economies the FCC says lack the required arrangement. The policy therefore links technical certification access to trade relationships and regulatory trust.

Technical testing and certification give governments a way to check products before they enter markets or operate on communications networks. Rules can address whether devices work properly, meet required standards, and avoid causing harmful interference. They also create a formal approval process for equipment connected to critical infrastructure.

The article shows this process being used for security as well as technical compliance. The FCC blocked devices containing HiSilicon chips, citing surveillance concerns. It restricted robots because networked systems could allow attacks that manipulate data and physical operations. It also cited supply-chain vulnerabilities when targeting Chinese robots and power inverters.

These rules can therefore control trade and communications access at the same time. A government can exclude products, companies, laboratories, or network operators without banning every technology from a country. The article places the FCC’s actions within a wider US-China contest involving tariffs, export controls, company blacklists, and China’s retaliatory measures.