Delhi’s De-Hyphenation Policy is Taking Shape in the South Caucasus

India’s de-hyphenation policy means it does not treat its relationships with Azerbaijan and Armenia as a single package. New Delhi can cooperate with one country while maintaining separate political, defense, and economic ties with the other. This matters because Armenia and Azerbaijan were long adversaries in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, making India’s regional choices sensitive.

India historically leaned toward Armenia, which became its strongest regional partner, especially in defense cooperation. Azerbaijan’s close relationships with Pakistan and Türkiye added another layer of tension. The August 2025 U.S.-brokered peace agreement aimed at ending the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created more space for India to engage Baku without appearing to abandon Yerevan.

The approach allows India to pursue practical interests with both countries. It supports cooperation with Armenia while expanding energy, trade, investment, and political contacts with Azerbaijan. The article presents this separation as a foundation for the thaw in India-Azerbaijan ties, not as a rejection of India’s partnership with Armenia.

The visit mattered because it reopened high-level engagement after a sharp diplomatic disagreement. Azerbaijan did not publicly condemn the April 22 Pahalgam attack, later urged India and Pakistan to avoid unilateral action, and condemned India’s May 7 Operation Sindoor strikes. Baku also expressed solidarity with Pakistan, making Jaishankar’s October 23 arrival politically significant.

The visit showed that both governments were willing to manage disagreement rather than freeze relations. Jaishankar met President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov. Bayramov acknowledged their different viewpoints, but called the talks long, positive, and fruitful. Jaishankar described them as focused and forward looking.

The contact did not erase the dispute. Jaishankar reportedly raised cross-border terrorism, security, and common threats, bringing India’s main friction with Pakistan into discussions with a country close to Islamabad. Still, both sides agreed to expand practical cooperation and regular political contact, signaling a deliberate thaw.

India-Azerbaijan trade became much smaller over three years. It stood at $1,882 million in 2022, dropped to $1,435 million in 2023, fell again to $958 million in 2024, and reached only $400 million in 2025. The decline from 2022 to 2025 was $1,482 million, or about 79 percent.

The fall reflects a broader weakening in economic ties, even though energy remains important. Azerbaijan reportedly resumed crude oil exports to India in September 2025 after a 10-month pause caused by pricing issues. The restart followed a period in which supplies had stopped, adding pressure to bilateral trade.

There are signs of recovery, but the scale remains limited. Bayramov said trade had already reached $600 million in the first nine months of 2026. The two countries’ agreement to deepen oil and energy cooperation, expand investment, and exchange business delegations could help reverse the decline.

The visit produced a practical cooperation plan rather than a formal treaty package. India and Azerbaijan agreed to deepen cooperation in oil and energy, expand trade and investment, and encourage commercial and business delegations. They also agreed to strengthen regular political consultations and exchange high-level visits.

These measures create repeated channels for contact. Energy cooperation can build on Azerbaijan’s reported resumption of crude oil exports to India in September 2025. Business delegations can address the steep fall in trade, while political consultations allow both sides to discuss disagreements before they become larger obstacles. Jaishankar also raised cross-border terrorism, security, and common threats.

No agreements were signed during the visit. Its importance therefore lies in restoring momentum and setting priorities rather than delivering an immediate legal or economic breakthrough. Continued visits, consultations, and commercial exchanges will determine whether the announced thaw produces measurable results.

India’s traditional tilt toward Armenia grew from the long Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In recent years, Armenia became India’s strongest partner in the South Caucasus, particularly through defense cooperation. Mutual concerns about an Azerbaijan-Pakistan-Türkiye nexus also strengthened the relationship. This made closer ties with Baku politically sensitive.

The August 2025 U.S.-brokered peace agreement aimed to end the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It changed the diplomatic setting by reducing the immediate risk that India’s engagement with Azerbaijan would undermine its position with Armenia. New Delhi could begin separating its bilateral relationships from its position on the conflict.

That opening helped produce more contact with Baku. India restored high-level diplomatic engagement, held foreign office consultations, and sent senior officials to Azerbaijan. Jaishankar’s October visit then focused on energy, trade, investment, political consultations, and security. The article presents peace as enabling balance, not replacing India’s partnership with Armenia.

The relationships form a competing network around India’s South Caucasus interests. Azerbaijan has close ties with Pakistan and has also been linked to Türkiye in the regional landscape described by the article. Armenia, meanwhile, has become India’s strongest partner in the region, partly because of mutual concerns over the Azerbaijan-Pakistan-Türkiye nexus. These alignments made India-Azerbaijan relations difficult.

Pakistan’s role was especially visible during the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis. Azerbaijan did not condemn the Pahalgam attack, condemned India’s Operation Sindoor strikes, and expressed solidarity with Pakistan. India still raised cross-border terrorism and security concerns with Azerbaijan, showing that disagreement was brought into, rather than excluded from, bilateral talks.

New Delhi is now pursuing a more flexible balance. The 2025 peace agreement helped separate India’s ties with Baku from its relationship with Yerevan. India can therefore maintain defense cooperation with Armenia while seeking energy, trade, investment, and political engagement with Azerbaijan.

A country can maintain cooperation with states that disagree with it because different relationships serve different purposes. Security concerns, energy needs, trade, investment, and regional access may continue even when governments clash over another issue. This approach avoids treating diplomacy as an all-or-nothing choice. It is designed to preserve options and protect national interests.

India’s engagement with Azerbaijan illustrates the mechanism. Baku supported Pakistan during the 2025 crisis and condemned India’s military strikes. Yet India still discussed cross-border terrorism, security, energy, trade, and political consultations with Azerbaijan. Both sides acknowledged their different viewpoints while describing the talks as positive and forward looking.

Multi-directional diplomacy does not erase disagreements. Instead, it creates channels for managing them while building cooperation elsewhere. India can keep its strong partnership with Armenia, engage Azerbaijan, and pursue economic and energy interests. The likely goal is greater strategic flexibility, though the article does not state a specific future outcome beyond continued contacts and cooperation.