Ukraine should not agree to limits on size of its armed forces – Admiral Bauer

Admiral Bauer is arguing against limits that would make Ukraine’s armed forces too small or too weak to defend the country. He links military strength directly to sovereignty. A sovereign Ukraine, he says, must be able to choose its future and alliances and run the country as its people want.

The article gives Russia’s demand as the clearest example. Moscow wants Ukraine not to have credible armed forces. Bauer rejects that condition because it would leave Ukraine exposed. He also says a just peace needs credible means of deterring another invasion, not only general promises or political assurances.

This position would shape any future peace settlement. Bauer says Ukraine is unlikely to accept a proposal unless it can maintain credible forces and has effective deterrence. He allows that territorial concessions might be discussed, but only alongside those two protections.

In this context, credible armed forces are forces that can defend Ukraine and preserve its freedom to choose its future. Bauer connects them to sovereignty. Ukraine must be able to run the country as its people want, choose its alliances, and resist demands that would leave it militarily helpless.

The key test is whether an aggressor believes an invasion can succeed. Bauer says Ukraine needs forces strong enough to support credible deterrence. If Russia understands that another attack would fail, Ukraine’s defenses become more than symbolic. They influence the aggressor’s calculations before fighting begins.

The article does not provide troop numbers, equipment lists, budgets, or a formal threshold for credibility. It presents the idea as a condition for peace. Without credible Ukrainian forces and wider deterrence, Bauer considers a settlement highly unlikely to be acceptable.

The supplied article does not state how large Ukraine’s armed forces are. It also gives no figures for Russia or other European countries. Its focus is different: Bauer says Ukraine needs forces credible enough to defend sovereignty and deter another invasion, whatever their exact size.

In broad, established terms, Ukraine has built and sustained a substantial wartime military through prolonged combat. Russia has a larger population, military budget, and resource base. European countries differ greatly. Some maintain major modern forces, while others have smaller militaries and rely more heavily on collective defense. These comparisons change over time.

The important point is capability, not a single headcount. The article says Ukraine must retain credible armed forces and credible deterrence. It does not establish whether Ukraine should match Russia or any European country, nor does it identify a required force size.

Deterrence is the effort to prevent aggression before it starts. It works by convincing a potential attacker that attacking would bring unacceptable costs or would not achieve its aims. Bauer says Ukraine needs credible means of deterrence, not just security guarantees expressed in general terms.

The mechanism is straightforward. If Ukraine can defend itself effectively, Russia must expect a failed invasion rather than an easy victory. Strong armed forces can therefore change Russia’s decision before combat begins. Bauer specifically says Russia must understand that, if it tries again, it will fail. That expectation is the deterrent.

This is why Bauer treats deterrence as a condition for peace. A settlement without effective protection could leave Ukraine vulnerable to renewed attack. He argues that credible Ukrainian forces, supported by a mechanism close to NATO’s Article 5, would make the peace more durable and strengthen security across Europe.

The distinction is between control on the ground and legal ownership. Ukraine might acknowledge that it does not currently control certain territories. That would describe the existing situation. It would not necessarily accept Russia’s claim that those territories are legally Russian.

Bauer gives the example of a settlement that accepts the lack of Ukrainian control only to end the war. The key mechanism is withholding de jure recognition. Ukraine could stop fighting over the immediate situation while preserving its legal position and refusing to recognize the territories as Russian.

This distinction could allow territorial issues to form part of a settlement without formally surrendering Ukraine’s claim. Bauer says even territorial concessions might be possible, but only if Ukraine remains sovereign, retains credible armed forces, and has deterrence against another invasion. The article does not describe a specific agreement or timeline.

The 1994 Budapest Memorandum was an agreement in which Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons left on its territory after the Soviet Union collapsed. In return, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom provided assurances to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders and to avoid force against it. It was not a mutual-defense treaty.

Unlike a military alliance, the memorandum did not require its participants to send forces or wage war if Ukraine was attacked. Its commitments were assurances and consultations, rather than an automatic collective-defense response. Russia’s later invasion showed the practical weakness of relying on assurances without a strong enforcement mechanism.

The article refers to this experience without detailing the memorandum’s terms. Bauer therefore considers it unlikely that Ukraine would accept anything weaker than a mechanism as close as possible to NATO’s Article 5. His argument is that future protection must credibly deter renewed aggression.

NATO’s Article 5 is the alliance’s collective-defense commitment. It says an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all. Each ally must assist the attacked country, although the form of assistance can vary. The promise creates a shared obligation rather than leaving the victim to rely on assurances alone.

For Ukraine, a mechanism close to Article 5 could deter Russia by making another invasion trigger a broader response. That possibility would raise the expected cost of aggression and make success less likely. It would also support Ukraine’s sovereign right to choose its future and alliances, which Bauer identifies as central to a just peace.

Bauer says something close to Article 5 may be necessary because the Budapest Memorandum’s experience was insufficient. He also says Ukraine should become part of Europe’s security in the larger sense. The article does not specify what exact guarantee would be created.