A New War on Iran Would Deal a Death Blow to U.S. Leadership in the Mideast

The reported plan reflects a belief that military pressure could change Iran’s behavior. Netanyahu has been pushing for a new round, and the Trump administration reportedly advised allies to expect a campaign after the U.S. midterm elections on November 3. The campaign might seek negotiations or regime change.

The key mechanism would be force. Strikes, blockade pressure, and episodic violence could raise the costs of refusing talks. But the article argues that pressure may instead reinforce Iran’s regime, strengthen hard-liners, and give leaders an excuse for national suffering. Iran has experience operating through long, unstable conflicts.

The article judges both possible goals unlikely to succeed. A campaign could become a prolonged conflict without a decisive endpoint. It could also endanger Gulf allies, disrupt economic projects, and create new flare-ups around shipping routes. Changing U.S. positions have already made diplomacy difficult, because Tehran may expect any future agreement to be broken.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean. It is the main sea exit for several Gulf states. Control over it matters because ships carrying oil and other goods must pass through this restricted route.

The article says Iran has proved it can close the strait when it wishes. That creates leverage even when the strait remains open. A threat of closure can force governments, traders, and shipping companies to prepare for sudden disruption. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have no alternative shipping routes, making them especially exposed.

A conflict near Hormuz would therefore affect much more than Iran and Israel. It could threaten energy exports, raise shipping risks, and undermine Gulf stability. The article says constant danger would deny Gulf states the security they need to restart major economic projects. Even without continuous fighting, potential closure would shape regional decisions.

The source does not give a figure for the share of the world’s oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Established energy estimates commonly place the amount at about one-fifth of global oil consumption, making the passage one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. That estimate is outside the supplied article.

The mechanism is concentration. Large volumes move through one restricted route, so a closure or serious threat can delay tankers and reduce available exports. Buyers outside the Gulf may face higher prices or uncertainty, even if their own ports and pipelines remain untouched. Insurance, freight, and supply planning can also become more difficult.

The article stresses that Iran can close the strait when it wishes. It also says the Houthi advance toward the Bab el-Mandeb expanded Iran’s options. Together, these pressure points could affect routes into and out of the Gulf, weaken confidence in regional trade, and obstruct the economic projects Gulf states need to resume.

A prolonged conflict is difficult to win because it may continue after the initial fighting, even when active shooting pauses. Every side must prepare for violence to return. In that setting, victory and defeat become unclear, while Iran can use time, uncertainty, and regional pressure to avoid a decisive loss.

The article says blockades and episodic violence hurt Iran, but not evenly. The resulting hardship can reinforce regime control rather than weaken it. Leaders can present suffering as the consequence of foreign attack. Hard-liners then gain influence over moderates, especially when national security dominates public debate.

The article argues that Iran has long thrived in such environments. A new campaign could therefore produce years of instability instead of a clear outcome. Gulf allies would face constant risks, including sudden eruptions near shipping routes. The United States and Israel might claim short-term military gains, but those gains would not necessarily deliver bargaining leverage, regime change, or lasting regional security.

Attacks near the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb could disrupt the routes that connect Gulf energy exports with global markets. Ships would face the possibility of closure, attack, or sudden rerouting. Even without a permanent shutdown, the risk could make trade slower, costlier, and less predictable.

The article gives several examples. Iran can close Hormuz. The Houthis seized Yemen’s Red Sea coast and controlled the Bab el-Mandeb, while attacks targeted Saudi airports and oil facilities. An Iraqi militia drone strike temporarily disabled the East-West pipeline. These events weakened supposed alternatives to vulnerable sea routes.

The consequences would extend beyond shipping schedules. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar lack alternative routes, and Saudi Arabia learned that Red Sea exports could not be relied upon. Constant danger would deny Gulf states the stability and security needed to restore economic projects. It would also leave open the possibility of flare-ups elsewhere in the region.

The article presents the Houthis and other regional militias as forces that widen the conflict’s geography. Their activity creates pressure away from the main U.S.-Iran confrontation. This matters because Iran can retain influence through repeated threats and attacks, even when no large conventional war is underway.

The Houthis seized Yemen’s Red Sea coast and controlled the Bab el-Mandeb. They also launched escalating attacks on Saudi airports and oil facilities. Separately, an Iraqi militia drone strike temporarily disabled the East-West pipeline. These actions threatened both Saudi Arabia and the alternative routes meant to bypass Hormuz.

The article says the Houthi advances and effective targeting of Saudi Arabia expanded Iran’s range of options. It does not describe every group’s command relationship with Tehran. Its broader point is that regional militias can extend instability, threaten infrastructure, and keep Gulf states exposed. Their activity makes a limited conflict harder to contain and a decisive victory harder to achieve.

Diplomacy depends on credible promises. A government must believe that an agreement will survive political changes and that the other side will honor its commitments. If that confidence disappears, negotiations lose value. Iran may decide that concessions would bring temporary relief but no dependable long-term benefit.

The article blames the Trump administration’s constantly changing positions and incoherent messaging for making a deal largely impossible. From Tehran’s viewpoint, any agreement could be broken before the ink was dry. Mark Carney’s quip that Trump’s signature is written in pencil captures the credibility problem described in the article.

That distrust creates a dangerous cycle. Iran has little reason to return to bargaining, while Washington may turn back to blockade pressure or military action. The article says a renewed campaign would then face the same strategic limits: strengthened Iranian hard-liners, prolonged conflict, and unstable conditions for Gulf allies. Without reliable commitments, force becomes more likely but no more decisive.