Netanyahu's unity government gambit: Can he lure Eisenkot from opposition?

Netanyahu's circle is reportedly exploring incentives to bring opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot into a government led by Netanyahu. The central proposal would share the premiership rather than simply add Eisenkot as a minister. This matters because Eisenkot has pledged not to serve under Netanyahu.

Under the reported rotation plan, Netanyahu would remain prime minister until the end of US President Donald Trump's term. He would also seek to finish work on Iran and lead regional peace initiatives before transferring the office to Eisenkot after roughly two years. A second option would provide Eisenkot with a senior ministry but no guaranteed rotation.

These are proposals from Netanyahu's associates, not an agreed deal. The article says Eisenkot has not indicated that he will consider them. Opposition sources call joining Netanyahu politically and morally disastrous, while Netanyahu's allies argue Eisenkot has few workable alternatives after the election.

As a general parliamentary term, a national unity government is a coalition joining major political rivals during a political crisis or deadlock. It seeks wider support than a normal governing alliance. In this case, the proposed arrangement would place opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot in a government headed by Netanyahu.

Netanyahu declared that he wanted a strong national right-wing government. Yet the reported framework would initially include Likud, Eisenkot, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, while leaving out the ultra-Orthodox parties. That would differ from a narrower right-wing coalition built around Netanyahu's existing bloc and political partners.

The proposed unity arrangement could later expand if the ultra-Orthodox parties joined after a conscription law passed. It remains only a reported plan. Eisenkot has pledged not to serve under Netanyahu, and opposition figures say joining him would be morally and politically destructive.

As established constitutional background, Israel's Knesset has 120 seats. A government needs the support of at least 61 members to hold a majority. This makes the final distribution of seats crucial after an election, especially when no single party normally controls enough seats alone.

The article says Netanyahu's ability to form a government will depend on the final seat count and on securing support beyond his existing bloc. A unity arrangement could provide that extra support by bringing in Eisenkot or other opposition figures. The proposed initial framework would include Netanyahu, Eisenkot, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich.

The Central Elections Committee was still updating results, and its final report was not expected to reach the president until the following week. Therefore, the exact coalition arithmetic remained unsettled. The reported negotiations were attempts to reach a majority before the final governing path became clear.

The proposed arrangement depends on attracting support beyond Netanyahu's existing bloc. If Eisenkot refuses, Netanyahu would lose the plan's main opposition partner and its possible wider legitimacy. He might then need to rely on his current allies, negotiate with other parties, or face difficulty forming a government after the final count.

Liberman's position adds uncertainty. N12 News reported that he had cut contact with Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett and stopped answering opposition counterparts. Other reports said he appeared to be moving away from the opposition bloc and favoring unity. That could change the balance of negotiations, but the article does not say he agreed to join Netanyahu.

A refusal by either figure would not automatically end Netanyahu's efforts. The final seat count still mattered, and the ultra-Orthodox parties might later join under the proposed conscription sequence. Still, losing key partners could leave Netanyahu with fewer routes to a majority.

The ultra-Orthodox military-conscription law is central because it could solve a major political dispute while reshaping the coalition. Likud figures say the ultra-Orthodox parties want the issue resolved, but their rabbis fear being blamed for legislation that would draft ultra-Orthodox men into the Israel Defence Forces.

The reported mechanism is a two-stage coalition. Netanyahu, Eisenkot, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich would first form the government without the ultra-Orthodox parties. They would then pass the conscription law without those parties participating in the coalition. After approval, the ultra-Orthodox parties could join and expand the government's support.

Netanyahu's associates believe Eisenkot could present the law as a significant achievement and therefore be persuaded to enter the government. The proposal remains unconfirmed. Opposition figures argue Eisenkot could support the government from outside the coalition, including during a security escalation with Iran.

Benny Gantz's earlier agreement with Netanyahu provides the main precedent for the reported rotation idea. Gantz eventually agreed to share the premiership after three rounds of elections, during the coronavirus crisis and mounting public frustration over political deadlock. That history shows a rival can accept serving with Netanyahu under extreme circumstances.

Netanyahu's allies use this precedent to suggest Eisenkot might also compromise. Their proposed arrangement would have Netanyahu serve first and Eisenkot take over after about two years. However, the comparison cuts both ways. Political figures say Eisenkot would face a different political environment and could damage his career by joining Netanyahu now.

Those critics say opposition voters are reportedly more willing to lift their boycott of Arab parties than accept Netanyahu and his partners. They also argue Eisenkot could support the government from outside during a security crisis. Thus, Gantz's deal establishes possibility, not proof of acceptance.

Israel's parliamentary system makes coalition bargaining necessary because the government must command support in the elected legislature. The Knesset has 120 seats, and a governing majority requires 61. Unless one party wins that threshold alone, the largest party must negotiate with other parties to form a government.

That mechanism explains Netanyahu's post-election calculations. The Central Elections Committee was still updating the results, while Netanyahu's ability to govern depended on the final seat count and support beyond his existing bloc. His associates therefore explored bringing opposition leader Eisenkot into a unity arrangement.

The reported proposal also shows how bargaining can involve policy sequencing. The initial government could exclude ultra-Orthodox parties, pass a military-conscription law, and then invite those parties to join. Liberman's apparent shift away from the opposition added another variable. Until the final results and coalition commitments were settled, no governing formula was certain.