Reeves tells EU ‘the time to act is now’ in seizing Russian assets for Ukraine

The EU taking custody would mean assuming control of the frozen Russian sovereign accounts and managing them for Ukraine’s defence. The proposal is presented as a way to use the money without leaving the Belgian bank holding most assets exposed to legal and financial risks. It is different from simply confiscating the assets outright.

Under the proposal, the accounts would be transferred to the EU together with their associated liabilities. The bloc would then provide cover if Moscow attempted retaliation. This arrangement would shift responsibility from the Belgian bank to the EU while making the funds available for Ukraine.

The article does not describe a permanent change of ownership. It says Russia has an international-law obligation to compensate Ukraine and argues that using the funds would be just. The proposal aims to provide funding now, while managing the risks that blocked an earlier attempt.

The EU has immobilised €210 billion of Russian sovereign assets. Ukraine faces a financial hole of €70 billion next year. The frozen sum is therefore three times the stated annual gap, making it large enough to transform Kyiv’s immediate funding position if it could legally and safely be used.

The article says the quartet believes the money could bankroll Ukraine’s defence into 2029. That would extend support beyond next year’s shortfall. It could also reduce the risk that elections in key EU countries interrupt financial assistance, because funding would already be secured.

The figure does not mean all €210 billion would automatically be spent at once. The proposal is for the EU to take custody of the accounts and use them to help Ukraine defend itself. The article says the assets could fund defence until after the next US presidential election, when Washington might be more supportive.

The article says the EU immobilised €210 billion of Russian sovereign assets in 2022. It links that action to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the wider effort to restrict Moscow. Immobilisation means the assets were frozen rather than available for normal use by Russia.

The proposed mechanism would place the accounts in EU custody and use them to help Kyiv defend itself. The article says Moscow has an obligation under international law to pay compensation for the invasion. It argues that using these funds would be more acceptable than raising more European taxes or borrowing more money.

Ukraine faces a €70 billion financial hole next year and a desperate winter under Russian air attacks. Without fresh support, its defence could be gravely impaired. Using the assets could sustain military resistance, pressure Russia into genuine negotiations, and protect Europe’s security by strengthening what the article calls Europe’s first line of defence.

The central danger is that Ukraine could lose the financial capacity to keep defending itself. The article says Kyiv faces a €70 billion funding hole next year, while Russia is pummelling its people from the air. Without new money, Ukraine’s defence would be gravely impaired.

That means the country could struggle to maintain the effort needed to resist Russian aggression. The article does not give a precise military outcome, but it links Ukraine’s financial strength directly to Europe’s safety. It calls Ukraine Europe’s first line of defence against Russia.

The proposed response is for the EU to lead in filling the gap, with Canada and the United Kingdom also contributing. The authors argue that action would encourage others to follow. They also say funding the defence could pressure Moscow into genuine peace negotiations, especially as the United States is less likely to act.

Most of the frozen Russian assets are held by a Belgian bank. A previous attempt to use them failed because the bank could have been left responsible for the legal and financial consequences. The bank was considered exposed to unacceptable risks if Russia challenged or retaliated against the arrangement.

The proposed solution is to transfer custody of the frozen accounts to the EU. The bloc would take on the associated liabilities instead of leaving them with the Belgian institution. It would also provide cover to reduce the risks if Moscow carried out retaliatory acts.

This changes who stands behind the arrangement. The bank would no longer be the main party carrying the exposure, while the EU would accept responsibility at bloc level. The article presents this as a way to overcome the obstacle that stopped the earlier effort, though it does not say the proposal has been adopted.

The article points to an earlier example involving Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. It says the EU transferred Iraqi assets to an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The article gives no further details about the amount, timing, or legal outcome of that transfer.

The example matters because the current proposal also involves moving control of assets from one setting to another. Supporters want the EU to take custody of the frozen Russian accounts, along with their liabilities, instead of leaving the main risks with the Belgian bank holding most of them.

The Iraqi case is therefore being cited as a precedent for the administrative idea of transferring assets to another account under a different custodian. It does not, from the information provided, prove that the Russian proposal would face no legal objections. It is presented as evidence that a comparable transfer has happened before.

Sovereign assets are generally treated differently from ordinary private property under international law. A state’s unlawful conduct does not automatically erase every protection attached to its central-bank or government assets. The source does not set out the detailed legal doctrine, but it shows that the assets remain frozen rather than simply confiscated.

That legal distinction explains the proposal’s structure. The EU would take custody of the accounts and assume their associated liabilities, while providing cover against possible Russian retaliation. The authors argue that Moscow must compensate Ukraine for its illegal invasion, but they do not claim that this automatically makes seizure risk-free.

The issue remains significant because an earlier attempt failed over concerns that liability would fall on the Belgian bank holding most assets. The proposed transfer aims to manage those risks at EU level. The article presents the Iraqi-assets transfer as a precedent, not as proof that every legal objection has been resolved.