Commentary: Rubio’s visits are not enough to reset India-US relations

Rubio’s choice of Mumbai and Jamnagar pointed to the practical side of India-US relations. Mumbai is a major commercial centre, while Jamnagar hosts Reliance Industries’ huge refinery. The itinerary emphasized business, energy, and economic engagement rather than a symbolic political meeting in New Delhi.

Jamnagar mattered because India had become the second-largest buyer of Venezuelan heavy crude after the United States captured Nicolas Maduro in January. Most of that oil is processed there. The visit also followed Donald Trump’s March announcement that Reliance would invest in a major refinery in Brownsville, Texas.

The stops therefore showed that structural ties remain active. Goods and services trade reached about US$240 billion in 2025, and technology and military cooperation continued. But the article warns that commercial activity does not erase damage caused by unpredictable US policy, especially over Russian oil and tariffs.

A diplomatic reset is a deliberate effort to repair strained relations and establish a more reliable basis for future cooperation. It usually requires consistent policies, restored trust, and agreement on major strategic priorities. A single ministerial visit can open that process, but it cannot complete it.

The article contrasts warm rhetoric with unstable policy. Trump called Narendra Modi “one of my greatest friends,” while Rubio praised India as a “refining superpower.” Yet Washington also imposed 50 per cent tariffs, threatened secondary sanctions, and repeatedly changed its position on India’s Russian-oil purchases.

That mismatch is why the visits are insufficient. They highlighted trade, energy, and technology links, but did not repair weakened democratic ties or restore the China-related strategic logic. A real reset would need sustained, predictable decisions rather than short-term gestures or statements that can quickly be reversed.

India-US ties have substantial economic, security, and technological depth. Their scale matters because it shows the relationship is not resting only on presidential chemistry or temporary political bargains. These institutional links help explain why the article calls the relationship “sticky” despite recent disputes.

The clearest figure is roughly US$240 billion in bilateral goods and services trade in 2025. On security, India conducts more joint military exercises with the United States than with any other country. Technology cooperation includes a joint satellite launched in 2025 and major artificial-intelligence investment pledges by US technology companies.

These ties remain strong even after tariffs, sanctions, and tighter visa rules created friction. They provide continuing incentives for cooperation. However, the article argues that scale does not guarantee trust: unstable energy policy and weakened shared values can still damage the relationship’s strategic foundation.

Jamnagar sits at the centre of several overlapping energy relationships. It is home to the world’s largest refinery, owned by Reliance Industries. That makes it important not just to India’s fuel system, but also to US commercial interests and global oil-market pressures.

India became the second-largest buyer of Venezuelan heavy crude after the United States captured Nicolas Maduro in January. Most of that crude is processed at Jamnagar. Rubio visited amid oil-price pressure from the US-Israel war with Iran, while Trump had announced that Reliance would invest in a major refinery in Brownsville, Texas.

The site therefore symbolized both cooperation and tension. It supports India’s energy access and US-linked investment, but energy policy also produced repeated disputes over Russian crude. Jamnagar showed the relationship’s economic depth, while the surrounding oil politics showed why strategic trust remains fragile.

The changing policy created uncertainty for India and weakened confidence in Washington’s commitments. India first faced criticism for buying Russian crude after the invasion of Ukraine, but Western governments later recognized its strategic and energy-market constraints. Under Trump, that understanding repeatedly shifted.

The United States first imposed 50 per cent tariffs and threatened secondary sanctions. In February, tariffs were reduced as India suspended Russian-oil purchases under a trade framework. That position was partly reversed when Washington allowed India to buy Russian oil stranded at sea after disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. In September, tariffs of up to 100 per cent were authorized, then waived in October.

The mechanism was policy volatility. India could not rely on a stable rule, while Washington prioritized inflation concerns before midterm elections. The article’s conclusion is that such reversals cause lasting diplomatic damage, even when immediate penalties are withdrawn.

Shared democratic values helped frame India and the United States as natural long-term partners. Cooperation linked to China also gave the relationship strategic purpose: India could serve as a counterbalance to China while the United States deepened ties with a major Asian power. These ideas supported cooperation beyond immediate transactions.

The article identifies both as weakened pillars. Trump’s “might-is-right, hemispheric worldview” leaves little room for a values-based discussion. At the same time, both countries are independently trying to reset relations with Beijing, reducing the urgency of their earlier China-centered alignment. Christopher Landau also said Washington would not repeat its “mistake” of allowing India to become an economic competitor.

The result is a thinner strategic foundation. Trade, exercises, and technology links continue, but shared principles and common geopolitical purpose provide less protection against sudden policy changes. Without those pillars, short-term disputes can do more lasting damage.

Foundational arrangements make a partnership less dependent on presidential moods. Trade agreements create predictable economic rules. Technology projects build shared capabilities. Military exercises create operational trust. The Quad, which the source article does not discuss, similarly provides a recurring framework for strategic coordination among its members.

The article illustrates these mechanisms directly. India-US goods and services trade reached about US$240 billion in 2025. The countries launched a joint satellite, US technology companies pledged major AI investment, and India conducted more joint exercises with the United States than with any other country. A US-India interim trade framework also linked policy decisions.

Such structures cannot prevent every dispute, but they raise the cost of abandoning cooperation. They preserve working relationships while leaders change. The article’s warning is that these durable links need stronger political foundations, because tariffs, sanctions, and shifting Russian-oil policy can still undermine trust.