Claws in the sky: Decoding India's massive drone buys

India's planned purchases cover nearly every military operating environment. They include jet-powered kamikaze drones, HAPS and HALE surveillance systems, MALE UAVs, destructive swarms, canisterised drones and Ghatak stealth bombers. The Army, Air Force and Navy are all expanding their unmanned fleets.

The Army plans trials of jet-powered attack drones from a dozen Indian firms and hopes to buy 540. The Air Force has ordered 200 S-UMS systems and plans more than 100 Ghatak drones. It also wants canisterised drones launched from cargo aircraft. The Navy is pursuing long-range jet-powered drones and unmanned surface vessels for mine clearance and attacks.

Together, these purchases create a layered unmanned force. Surveillance systems would find targets, while strike drones, swarms and maritime vessels would attack them. The article says the main weakness is not buying equipment, but building the logistics, doctrine, components and industrial capacity to support it.

A jet-powered kamikaze drone combines an aircraft's flight with a munition's one-way mission. It carries an explosive payload, travels toward a selected target and destroys itself on impact. Its jet engine gives it much greater speed than propeller-driven drones, helping it reach targets quickly and complicate defence.

The article contrasts these systems with surveillance drones, which are used mainly to observe and gather information. A kamikaze drone is instead an expendable strike weapon. It resembles a cruise missile in its one-way attack, but the article highlights its much lower cost. Russia's Filin costs roughly USD 50,000, compared with about USD 2 million for a Tomahawk cruise missile.

This difference changes how commanders can use them. Large numbers can be produced and launched without spending missile-level sums. India is therefore testing jet-powered kamikaze drones from a dozen firms and wants 540 for the Army. The article calls these systems a major new addition to tri-services strike power.

India's planned drone expansion is large in both money and manpower. Over the next five years, the three services will acquire drones worth more than Rs 1.5 lakh crore, or over USD 15 billion. That is roughly half the cost of India's biggest planned conventional defence deal, the purchase of 114 Rafale fighters.

The Army hopes to buy 540 high-speed jet-powered drones and train more than 100,000 operators. The Air Force has ordered 200 S-UMS systems and plans to acquire over 100 Ghatak stealth bomber drones, worth more than Rs 60,000 crore. Its broader plans also include HAPS, HALE, MALE, swarms and cargo-launched drones.

These figures show a shift from small specialist fleets to a three-service drone ecosystem. The Navy is adding long-range jet-powered drones and large fleets of unmanned surface vessels. Yet the article warns that India's industrial production, logistics, components and doctrine have not expanded at the same pace.

Operation Sindoor changed the role of drones in combat. They were no longer only surveillance tools that watched from above. They became strike weapons able to attack targets without troops crossing the border. The article describes the 88-hour conflict as one of the world's first examples of non-contact kinetic warfare.

Army drones struck Pakistani terror training camps. IAF Brahmos missiles shattered runways and destroyed hangars containing aircraft. IAF Harop one-way attack drones then plunged into Pakistani radars and command posts. These systems performed different jobs within the same operation: drones attacked selected targets, missiles delivered heavier effects, and aircraft remained part of the wider strike force.

The lesson was operational as much as technological. Drones extended reach and added disposable attack options, while missiles and manned aircraft supplied complementary capabilities. Air Chief Marshal AP Singh described the change as drones moving from “eyes in the sky” to “claws in the sky.” India is now expanding all three services' drone arsenals.

“Precision mass” means combining accurate targeting with a large quantity of weapons. Traditional precision missiles can be highly effective, but their high prices limit how many can be fired. Cheaper drones change that calculation. A force can attack many targets, repeat attacks and accept losses while spending less per strike.

Russia's Filin illustrates the mechanism. It is a satellite-steered, jet-powered drone that can fly about 1,200 kilometres at 800 kmph. It costs roughly USD 50,000. A Tomahawk cruise missile costs about USD 2 million. The lower price means Russia can build thousands of Filins, creating mass without matching the cost of thousands of cruise missiles.

The military advantage is pressure at scale. Large numbers can saturate or distract air defences, strike several locations and keep attacks going. The article says India recognises jet-powered drones as force multipliers. Its planned purchases aim to add this affordable, numerous strike capacity across the Army, Air Force and Navy.

Small-batch purchasing creates a dangerous industrial gap. A single order for 540 drones may equip a unit, but it does not justify the factories, tooling, suppliers and trained workforce needed for mass production. Without guaranteed follow-on orders, companies face too much risk to invest in large production lines.

The article calls India's orders “penny packets.” It says a 540-drone order does not allow manufacturers to invest confidently because there is no guarantee of more orders. Russia and Ukraine, by contrast, are each expected to produce more than 6 million drones annually. Russia also has the Alabuga complex, which makes over 36,000 Shahed-type drones each year.

India therefore lacks surge capacity: the ability to expand output rapidly during conflict. The article links this weakness to the services treating drones as a niche, cheaper delivery method instead of an integrated, networked force multiplier. Larger, predictable procurement could support industrial scale, but the article does not specify a remedy.

A drone force becomes powerful when its pieces work together. It needs trained operators, reliable supplies, replacement parts, maintenance, launch systems and production capacity. It also needs shared doctrine so the services know when to use surveillance, swarms, missiles, manned aircraft or one-way attack drones. The article says India has focused more on the fighting edge than this long tail.

The planned force already points to a layered system. HAPS, HALE and MALE UAVs can support surveillance at different altitudes. Swarms can add mass. Jet-powered drones can strike targets, while cargo-launched systems extend reach. Unmanned surface vessels can clear mines or attack ships. These capabilities need coordination, communications and satellite support; the article specifically mentions satellite-steered weapons and HAPS, but does not detail communication networks.

India's Army plans over 100,000 operators, yet industrial capacity remains weak. The country also needs components, logistics and doctrine at scale. Otherwise, large purchases may produce impressive inventories without the sustained, networked combat power that makes drones force multipliers.