India slashed U.S. and Russian oil in September, coinciding with ‘Russia Sanctions Act’; import from UAE increases

In September 2026, India changed the country mix behind its crude oil supply. It stopped importing U.S. oil, sharply reduced Russian purchases, and increased its reliance on the UAE. The shift matters because it followed the passage and signing of a U.S. law that threatened heavy tariffs on countries buying substantial amounts of Russian oil and gas.

India imported 209.4 lakh tonnes of crude in September, 9.5% more than August and 4.1% more than a year earlier. Yet Russia’s share dropped from 44% in August to 33% in September. The UAE’s share rose above one-fourth, while the U.S. share fell to zero. Russia and the UAE together supplied 60% of imports.

The change reduced exposure to the threatened U.S. penalties but left sourcing concentrated in two countries. India’s oil bill still rose to nearly $14.3 billion because prices were elevated. The tariffs are currently paused, and October import data was due the following month, so the next import mix remained uncertain.

The U.S. Russia Sanctions Act was a law targeting Russia’s energy trade and countries that continued buying substantial quantities of Russian oil and gas. The House of Representatives passed it on September 16, 2026, and President Donald Trump signed it two days later. Its importance for India came from the law’s potential reach beyond Russia.

The law authorised tariffs of up to 100% on goods from the five largest importers of Russian crude and gas. In practice, that could make Indian exports to the United States much more expensive if India remained a major Russian-oil buyer. The law also authorised sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet of tankers.

The threat appears to have coincided with India cutting Russian imports in September. However, the tariffs were not immediately enforced. On October 16, Mr. Trump temporarily waived them and told Congress the pause served the U.S. national interest. Their future application therefore remained uncertain.

The supply shifts were large because India changed several major sources at once. Russia had supplied 44% of India’s oil imports in August, but its share fell to 33% in September. The UAE moved above one-fourth of total imports. The United States, meanwhile, supplied no imported oil in September.

In volume terms, India imported more crude overall in September, reaching 209.4 lakh tonnes. Yet it cut Russian imports by nearly 18% compared with August. This shows that the change was not caused simply by lower oil demand. India redirected part of its supply toward the UAE while reducing exposure to Russia and eliminating U.S. purchases.

The two replacement patterns left India highly concentrated. Russia and the UAE together accounted for 60% of imports. The article does not state the exact U.S. volume before September, so the precise quantity India stopped importing from America cannot be calculated from the available data.

India increased purchases from the UAE because it needed to replace oil reduced from Russia and eliminated from the United States. The timing followed the U.S. law threatening tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian oil and gas. The UAE therefore became the clearest reported alternative in India’s September import data.

The mechanism was a change in supplier shares. Russia’s portion fell from 44% in August to 33% in September, while the UAE’s share rose above one-fourth. Overall imports still increased to 209.4 lakh tonnes. This means the UAE helped cover India’s crude requirement even as one major supplier was cut back.

The article does not identify a specific contract, price advantage, or policy decision explaining why the UAE was chosen. It does show the consequence: Russia and the UAE together accounted for 60% of imports. India reduced some immediate exposure to U.S. penalties, but its sourcing remained concentrated.

Crude oil is a major cost in India’s energy system, so price increases quickly affect the country’s import bill. Even when the quantity imported changes only slightly, each tonne costs more. That widens the trade and energy burden, leaving less room for consumers, businesses, and oil companies to absorb the increase.

The September figures show the mechanism clearly. India imported 9.5% more crude than in August, but its import bill rose 16.4% to nearly $14.3 billion. Compared with September 2025, the bill was 33% higher. ICRA also estimated that oil marketing companies were losing ₹530 crore daily on retail fuels.

More expensive crude can therefore pressure petrol, diesel, and LPG prices, or force companies and the government to absorb more of the cost. The article does not say that retail prices must rise immediately. It shows that elevated prices already caused substantial financial strain despite growing import volumes.

Russia became a major supplier because India’s Russian-oil purchases expanded after the United States scrapped its Russian oil-linked penal tariffs on India in February 2026. The article presents this policy change as the backdrop to Russia’s rising share. It also notes that India had previously reduced Russian purchases in line with U.S. pressure.

Russia’s share climbed steadily and reached about 51% of India’s oil imports in July. This rise coincided with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the West Asia war and supply constraints from that route. The article links the later fall to renewed U.S. action: Russia’s share dropped to 44% in August and 33% in September, when the sanctions law was signed.

The pattern shows how U.S. policy influenced India’s supplier choices. When penalties were removed, Russian imports increased; when new tariffs threatened, they fell. The October waiver could affect the next direction, but the article says October import data would only be released the following month.

Crude oil is petroleum in its unrefined form, before refineries turn it into products such as petrol, diesel, and LPG-related fuels. It matters because transport, industry, and households rely heavily on these products. India’s oil imports therefore connect international prices and geopolitics directly to its energy costs.

India imports crude from several countries and processes it through domestic oil companies and refineries. The article’s figures show the scale of that dependence: India imported 209.4 lakh tonnes in September 2026. It also paid nearly $14.3 billion for crude that month. When prices rise, the bill can increase much faster than the physical quantity imported.

The supplied article does not explain India’s domestic production or give a precise import-dependence percentage. It does show the practical result of heavy reliance on overseas supply: changes involving Russia, the UAE, the United States, and West Asian shipping routes quickly alter India’s costs and energy security.