A new book of investigative reporting finds out how Jamtara became India’s ‘phishing capital’

Phishing is a fraud method in which criminals pretend to be a trusted person or institution. They create urgency so victims reveal private information themselves. The details can then be used to access accounts or approve transactions. The danger lies in the deception, not just the technology.

In Preneet Kaur’s case, the caller claimed to manage the bank branch where her salary was credited. He said her account had become dormant and that her KYC required an urgent update. Kaur was rushing to Parliament and shared her ATM card details. After the criminals obtained her banking information and OTP, Rs 23 lakh disappeared within minutes.

The episode shows why unexpected calls about dormant accounts or urgent KYC deserve caution. An OTP is meant to confirm a transaction for the account holder, not for a caller. Once victims disclose it, criminals may complete transfers quickly, while the money can be distributed across many accounts before investigators respond.

Jamtara became associated with organized cyber fraud because several local gangs operated from its villages and repeatedly targeted people outside the district. Their work was coordinated rather than isolated. Gang leaders, aides, many phones, SIM cards, bank accounts, and money channels formed a working system. The scams brought enough income to transform some villagers’ lifestyles.

The investigation into Preneet Kaur’s case led police to Phaphnad, also called Fofnad. Informants noticed residents who had suddenly become wealthy. Police later found 700 SIM cards and 20 handsets at Ataul Ansari’s house. Ansari led a gang, while aides such as Pappu Mandal also carried out fraud. Stolen funds moved through 28 accounts, including 21 held by Spice India.

The networks also survived because local police often showed leniency when gangs caused no local law-and-order problems. Teams from other states were sometimes warned in advance. The article says police eventually accepted Rs 3.5 lakh monthly from each gang, allowing the fraud to continue until stronger action began.

The two cases with stated amounts involved at least Rs 24.5 lakh. Preneet Kaur lost Rs 23 lakh, while Kerala MP Premachandran lost Rs 1.5 lakh. Ataul Ansari also confessed to robbing a former IAS officer, a senior ONGC official, and other influential people, but the article gives no amounts for those cases.

The Kaur investigation uncovered a wide money trail. Her Rs 23 lakh was transferred to 28 different accounts. Twenty-one of those accounts were held by the Gurgaon-based company Spice India. Police also found 700 SIM cards and 20 handsets in Ansari’s house, suggesting the operation could use many identities and communication channels.

The fraud was therefore larger than one successful phone call. Ansari had aides, including Pappu Mandal, and operated as a local gang leader. The article also describes gangs paying local police Rs 3.5 lakh monthly. Multiple victims, operators, accounts, devices, and police protection reveal an organized network rather than a lone offender.

Investigators followed several kinds of evidence instead of relying on one trail. Punjab Police examined where Kaur’s money went. Jamtara Police traced the call’s mobile tower to Phaphnad and used confidential informants to identify people whose lifestyles had changed suddenly. This connected a distant phone scam to a local network.

The police then worked through the gang’s structure. They arrested or questioned aides and raided Ansari’s home, finding 700 SIM cards and 20 handsets. Pappu Mandal was eventually located by tracking his cell phone for about a week. A disguised female police team first tried to find him through a marriage proposal, but technology produced the arrest.

The money trail and the communication trail supported each other. Kaur’s money moved through 28 accounts, while phones and SIM cards helped criminals hide their contacts. Ansari was arrested at Karmatar, and Pappu was arrested on the village outskirts. The cases show that patient coordination across state police forces could overcome fragmented evidence.

When local police tolerated the gangs, Jamtara became a safer base for repeated fraud. The criminals rarely caused law-and-order problems within the district, so local officers often treated them leniently. This allowed cybercrime to grow without sustained pressure from the authorities who knew the area best.

The article says police sometimes quietly warned gangs when teams from other states were approaching. After two years, officers realized the gangs were like the goose that laid golden eggs. Instead of cracking down, they made an arrangement in which each gang paid police Rs 3.5 lakh every month. The gangs kept operating and retained their local protection.

The consequences reached victims far beyond Jamtara. Other state police teams returned empty-handed, while the fraudsters continued targeting MPs, former officials, and other influential people. The situation changed after Mr Singh became Superintendent of Police. He treated the problem as a battle of wits, and regular raids and information from villagers began weakening the gangs.

Stolen money becomes difficult to recover when it is rapidly divided and moved through several accounts. Investigators must identify each account holder, obtain records, connect transfers, and act before funds are withdrawn or shifted again. Every extra account can obscure the original source and delay action. Recovery may also depend on whether money remains available.

Kaur’s Rs 23 lakh was transferred to 28 accounts, including 21 held by Spice India, a Gurgaon-based company. The article also says Ansari diverted cyber-fraud proceeds into his legitimate contracting business. He worked as a contractor under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, giving the money a connection to an apparently lawful income stream.

These layers complicate both tracing and proof. A bank transfer can show movement, but investigators still need to establish who controlled an account and how the funds were connected to the scam. If proceeds are mixed with business money or spent, returning the victim’s exact funds becomes harder. Police success therefore requires financial records, arrests, and coordinated investigations.

Bank details, card information, SIM cards, and OTPs are valuable because together they can connect a criminal to a victim’s account and communications. Account and card details identify the target and may help initiate transactions. SIM cards support phone-based contact and can help criminals operate under different numbers. An OTP can provide the final confirmation required for a transaction.

The callers used this combination against Preneet Kaur. They posed as her bank manager, requested ATM card details under the pretext of urgent KYC, and then obtained her banking information and OTP. Within minutes, Rs 23 lakh had disappeared. Police later found 700 SIM cards and 20 handsets at Ansari’s house, showing how extensively the gang used communication tools.

The key security principle is that an OTP is a secret shared only between the service and the genuine account user for one transaction. It is not proof of identity for a caller. Sharing it defeats that protection, especially when a caller creates urgency. A bank-related request should therefore never turn into disclosure of an OTP.