Chinese telecoms giants in Washington’s crosshairs as FCC weighs fresh curbs

The Federal Communications Commission, or FCC, is the US agency responsible for regulating communications. Its work includes telephone numbering, communications equipment approvals, and safeguards for domestic networks. Its authority matters because companies need regulatory permission to connect services, use approved equipment, or operate certain telecommunications services in the United States.

The FCC can propose rules, seek public comments, and vote on final measures. It can also deny applications or revoke existing authorisations. In this case, it proposed preventing certain foreign-controlled providers from obtaining US telephone numbers through internet-based voice services. It also voted to stop recognising mainland Chinese laboratories for testing equipment requiring US approval.

The FCC’s powers do not mean it controls every private call or device. Instead, it regulates access to US communications infrastructure and approval systems. The agency says foreign-controlled access could create national-security and law-enforcement risks. Its proposed number restrictions still required a vote at the November 19 meeting described in the article.

The proposed rule targets access to US telephone numbers, rather than banning every communication involving Chinese companies. It could prevent China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, and other covered providers from obtaining numbers through internet-based voice services. The FCC says the measure would protect domestic networks and reduce risks involving illegal robocalls, malicious activity, and foreign-controlled communications systems.

The rule would apply to providers on the FCC’s national-security Covered List. It would also cover companies using equipment or services included on that list. In practice, an affected provider could lose the ability to secure new US numbers for internet-based calling services. Those numbers help services identify endpoints and connect calls across networks.

The proposal was not yet final in the article. The FCC planned to vote at its November 19 meeting and sought public comment on network protections. Its broader goal is to limit potentially risky access to US infrastructure and sensitive information while addressing robocalls and other abuse.

The proposal would affect telecommunications providers on the FCC’s national-security Covered List. It would also reach companies using equipment or services covered by that list. The immediate examples are China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, although the wording also includes other providers meeting the same criteria.

The three major Chinese operators were added to the list in 2022. The FCC cited national-security and law-enforcement concerns connected with their ties to the Chinese government. The proposal would therefore restrict their ability to obtain US telephone numbers through internet-based voice services, rather than applying only to traditional telephone operations.

The companies’ responses were not available when the article was published. The measure is part of a wider US campaign against Chinese telecommunications and technology firms. It followed earlier actions, including rejection of China Mobile’s application and later revocation of China Telecom’s and China Unicom’s authorisations. The proposed rule still required the scheduled FCC vote.

Mainland China played a very large role in testing equipment that needed US regulatory approval. More than 82 per cent of equipment-authorisation applications in 2025 relied on laboratories there. The figure shows that Chinese testing facilities were not marginal participants; they handled most applications in the period cited.

The FCC voted to stop recognising laboratories in mainland China for this testing. The change is scheduled to take effect on December 1, 2028. Equipment requiring US regulatory approval would therefore no longer be able to rely on those laboratories under the FCC’s recognised testing arrangement.

The decision could force applicants to use other recognised laboratories, although the article does not identify them or describe costs and delays. Beijing criticised the move, saying it disrupted normal business ties and harmed companies and consumers. The scale of China’s role means the change could affect a broad share of equipment approvals.

If foreign-controlled providers retain access to US infrastructure and numbers, the FCC says the risks could include access to sensitive information and communications networks. It describes these as serious national-security and law-enforcement risks. The agency also links the proposed safeguards to illegal robocalls and other malicious activity.

A telephone number gives a provider a recognised identity inside the US communications system. Internet-based voice services can use that identity to connect calls across networks. If regulators believe a provider or its equipment presents a risk, continued access could make monitoring, enforcement, or network protection more difficult. The article does not establish that any named company caused a specific incident.

The likely effects remain uncertain because the proposal had not yet been adopted. Restrictions could reduce perceived security risks, but affected providers might need alternative arrangements. Beijing said the US action could disrupt business ties and harm US companies and consumers. The FCC was seeking public comment before its planned vote.

US restrictions developed in stages. In 2018, a US inter-agency national-security panel recommended rejecting China Mobile’s application to provide international telecommunications services in the United States. The FCC formally denied that application in 2019. This established an early precedent for blocking a Chinese operator on security grounds.

The focus then widened. In 2020, the FCC expanded its scrutiny to China Telecom and China Unicom. The regulator subsequently revoked their authorisations. The article does not give the exact dates of those revocations, but it links them to the same national-security and law-enforcement concerns.

The three operators were later added to the FCC’s national-security Covered List in 2022. The latest proposal would add another restriction by limiting access to US telephone numbers through internet-based voice services. The sequence shows a shift from denying or removing operating permissions to restricting access to numbering and related communications infrastructure.

A telephone number is a recognised address for a person, organisation, or service. Communications networks use it to identify where a call should go. Internet-based voice services carry voice communications using internet connections rather than relying only on traditional telephone infrastructure. Together, numbering and voice services help callers reach destinations across separate networks.

When someone dials a number, the originating network identifies the destination and passes the call toward the provider serving that number. The receiving provider then connects the call to the intended user or service. Internet-based voice providers can use the same numbering system, allowing their customers to communicate with people using other telephone networks.

The article focuses on who may obtain and use US numbers, not on the technical steps of individual calls. The FCC’s proposal would restrict access for Covered List providers and users of listed equipment or services. That matters because controlling number access influences how providers connect into the wider US communications system.