Beijing drills water cannons and drones near disputed South China Sea shoals

China’s coastguard held maritime law-enforcement training near Second Thomas Shoal and Sabina Shoal. The exercise was designed to prepare for what China called “foreign infringement.” It matters because both features are major flashpoints in China-Philippines tensions.

The drill covered surveillance, tracking, maritime traffic control and small-boat tactics. Officers used water cannons and drones, while optoelectronic sensors collected evidence beyond normal human sight. They also practised boarding a dummy foreign fishing vessel, inspecting it, confiscating its gear and catch, and ordering it away.

CCTV did not give the exercise’s date. The report identified the Chinese ship Sanzhouao as a participant; it had been involved in a September clash with Philippine vessels near Sabina Shoal. The training shows that future encounters could involve more organised enforcement actions, evidence gathering and direct confrontations at sea.

A shoal is a naturally shallow part of the sea. It may consist of sand, rock or coral, and it can lie below or close to the water’s surface. Shoals are not automatically islands, but their legal significance depends on their physical character and location.

Strategically, a shoal can sit near sea lanes, fishing grounds or another country’s coast. A state may use nearby features to support maritime claims, monitor traffic or maintain a physical presence. Reefs can also become symbols of sovereignty, especially when rival governments attach different names and legal interpretations to them.

Second Thomas Shoal and Sabina Shoal illustrate this importance. China calls them Renai Jiao and Xianbin Jiao, while the Philippines calls them Ayungin and Escoda. Their surrounding waters have seen coastguard drills, vessel clashes and competing patrols, making small maritime features part of a much larger security dispute.

The South China Sea has overlapping claims from China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. These governments claim different islands, reefs, shoals or maritime zones. Their positions reflect geography, history, security interests, fishing access and control of important waters.

Second Thomas Shoal and Sabina Shoal are part of the disputed Spratly Islands. China calls them Renai Jiao and Xianbin Jiao. The Philippines calls them Ayungin Shoal and Escoda Shoal. China and the Philippines therefore use different names and assert competing rights around the same features. Their coastguard and naval activities turn those legal claims into daily encounters.

The article describes the dispute as especially tense after Ferdinand Marcos Jnr became president and adopted a more assertive approach to Philippine claims. China has criticised Philippine officials, while both sides have exchanged warnings over resupply missions, patrols and foreign vessels near the shoals.

The South China Sea dispute is regional rather than bilateral. China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan make overlapping claims to islands, reefs, shoals and maritime zones. The sea covers roughly 3.5 million square kilometres, so the disagreement affects a vast area that includes major fishing grounds and shipping routes.

China’s widely known nine-dash-line claim is commonly described as covering about 90 percent of the sea. That figure is broader than the specific incidents in the article. The legal basis and extent of China’s claim are disputed, and not every government claims the same areas or uses the same legal reasoning.

The article focuses on two Spratly features, but also mentions Scarborough Shoal. Patrols, coastguard exercises and vessel confrontations show how a region-wide dispute becomes local and operational. Continued incidents near small reefs can keep several governments involved and make wider diplomatic agreements harder to achieve.

Repeated coastguard confrontations can turn a political dispute into a routine safety hazard. Ships operating close together may collide, block one another or use water cannons. Even when crews intend limited enforcement, an injury or damaged vessel could trigger public anger and pressure for retaliation.

The article gives several warning signs. China and the Philippines traded accusations over a medical evacuation near Second Thomas Shoal. The Sanzhouao was involved in a late-September incident near Sabina Shoal. China also warned Manila against challenging its resolve, while Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro called any forced removal of the BRP Sierra Madre an “act of war.”

Relations could worsen if confrontations continue without reliable communication or restraint. The article reports that China has warned of a dangerous situation, while a Chinese envoy said Beijing could easily win a war. Such language raises the stakes and makes maritime incidents harder to contain.

The BRP Sierra Madre is a Philippine warship deliberately grounded at Second Thomas Shoal in 1999. Its presence gives the Philippines a continuing position on the disputed feature. That makes the vessel more than a ship: it represents Manila’s claim and its determination to remain involved around the shoal.

The article describes the ship as central to repeated resupply disputes. China said last week that it had allowed the Philippines to resupply the vessel. On October 23, Gilberto Teodoro said forcibly towing it away would be an “act of war.” China’s defence ministry then told Manila to recognise reality and stop challenging Beijing’s sovereignty claims.

Because the ship is fixed in place, every resupply mission becomes a test of access and enforcement. Any attempt to remove it could sharply escalate the dispute. The vessel therefore links a decades-old presence to today’s coastguard confrontations and diplomatic threats.

The law of the sea sets different maritime zones and rights. A territorial sea normally extends up to 12 nautical miles from a coast, where a coastal state exercises sovereignty subject to navigation rules. An exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, can extend up to 200 nautical miles and gives rights over resources, not full ownership of the sea.

Reefs and shoals do not automatically create the same maritime zones as habitable islands. Their physical condition matters. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, some low-tide features generate limited or no zones of their own, while islands can have broader entitlements. Baselines, distances and competing coastal claims also affect enforcement.

The article does not explain these legal rules or settle the shoals’ status. It shows the practical dispute instead: China and the Philippines use different names, patrol the waters and accuse each other of violations. Legal claims become harder to manage when ships enforce incompatible interpretations.