Feijóo blames the government for the accident in Urda because it failed to renew the safety system

The article concerns a railway accident in Urda in which Feijóo says at least 69 people died. He blames the Government for not renewing the ABC safety system, calling it obsolete. His claim matters because railway protection systems are intended to reduce risks caused by excessive speed, missed signals, or human error.

The article gives no technical account of what happened at Urda. It reports Feijóo’s wording: “Han muerto 69 personas porque el Gobierno no renovó un sistema de seguridad obsoleto.” That is an allegation, not an independently established explanation in the supplied text. The article also says he directly blamed the Government.

Feijóo demanded political consequences. He called for Sánchez and Puente to resign, adding that, if they did not, his party would remove them at the ballot box. The text also reports that he accused Puente of blaming an Atocha operator and that social networks revisited comments about the Angrois driver.

The article names ABC as a railway safety system and describes it as obsolete, but it does not explain what the initials mean or how the system works. That limit matters: the source supports Feijóo’s allegation about renewal, not a detailed technical description of ABC. The following explanation uses established railway knowledge beyond the article.

A train-protection system typically receives information about track conditions, signal aspects, speed limits, or movement authorities. It compares that information with the train’s speed and braking ability. If a driver does not respond to a warning, the system can apply the brakes automatically. The exact equipment varies by railway and by system generation.

In the article’s political dispute, the alleged failure was not renewing an obsolete system. An obsolete system may offer weaker protection or poorer compatibility with modern operations, but the source does not prove that this caused the Urda accident. Determining that would require technical investigations and official evidence not included here.

The reported death toll is at least 69 people. Several headlines reproduce Feijóo’s statement that “69 personas” died, while another says “al menos 69 personas.” This makes 69 the central figure in the supplied material, with “at least” indicating that the number may not have been final in one report.

The figure is important because Feijóo uses it to support a direct political accusation against the Government. He says the deaths occurred because the Government did not renew an obsolete safety system. The text presents that as his claim. It does not provide an independent investigation, a confirmed causal finding, or details about injuries and survivors.

The reported toll therefore has two roles in the story. It measures the scale of the tragedy, and it becomes the basis for Feijóo’s demand for accountability. He calls for Sánchez and Puente to resign, saying that otherwise his party will seek to remove them in elections.

Railway safety systems matter because trains are heavy, fast, and difficult to stop quickly. A protection system can monitor signals, speed limits, and authorised movement. If equipment is outdated, it may lack newer safeguards, work less reliably, or be harder to integrate with current infrastructure. These are general railway principles, not technical findings stated about Urda.

The concrete allegation is political. Feijóo says 69 people died because the Government did not renew an obsolete ABC system. In a typical protection arrangement, track equipment communicates restrictions to the train. Onboard equipment checks the train’s movement. If the train approaches danger too quickly or fails to respond, automatic braking can intervene. The article does not establish whether that mechanism failed at Urda.

Operationally, renewal can affect reliability, compatibility, maintenance, and the level of automatic protection available. The forward question is whether investigations confirm a system deficiency and whether authorities replace or upgrade it. The supplied text only records Feijóo’s accusation and his demand for resignations.

Feijóo directs responsibility at the Government and specifically calls for Sánchez and Puente to resign. His argument is that the Government failed to renew an obsolete ABC safety system, which he links to the deaths in the Urda accident. The supplied text records this as a political accusation, not as a completed independent finding.

His demand is explicit: “Si no dimiten, les dimitiremos en las urnas.” In everyday terms, he says that if Sánchez and Puente do not leave office voluntarily, voters will remove them through elections. The article also reports that Feijóo accused Puente of blaming an operator at Atocha. It says social networks revived what Puente had said about the driver involved in Angrois.

The immediate consequence described is political pressure rather than a confirmed administrative decision. The text does not say that either official resigned, accepted responsibility, or faced a formal sanction. It points instead to a dispute over accountability, public statements, and the next electoral contest.

Several safeguards can prevent a train from exceeding a safe speed or passing a danger signal. Automatic train protection can supervise movement and apply brakes. Cab signalling can display restrictions directly to the driver. Train-control systems can enforce speed limits continuously. Human procedures, such as signal checks, dispatch rules, and mandatory braking protocols, add another layer.

The key mechanism is redundancy. Trackside equipment communicates a signal or speed restriction. Onboard equipment compares that restriction with the train’s actual movement and braking curve. If the driver fails to slow down or stop, the system issues warnings and can intervene automatically. Operating procedures support this by requiring drivers and controllers to confirm routes and respond to abnormal conditions.

These measures do not appear in the supplied article, which only identifies ABC and Feijóo’s allegation that it was obsolete. In practice, railway authorities choose protections based on infrastructure, traffic, train performance, and national rules. Any conclusion about which safeguard was needed at Urda would require evidence from an official investigation.

Railway signalling first separates trains and controls which routes they may use. Signals communicate whether movement is permitted. Interlocking prevents conflicting routes from being set at the same time. This basic arrangement reduces the chance that two trains enter the same protected section or that a route sends a train toward an unsafe movement.

Automatic train protection strengthens the system onboard. Trackside equipment or radio communication sends movement limits, signal information, or speed restrictions to the train. The onboard computer checks speed and distance to the required stopping point. It warns the driver and can apply brakes if the train continues too fast or approaches a danger signal. The exact design varies by railway.

The article does not explain Urda’s signalling layout, the ABC system’s functions, or the accident’s mechanism. It only reports Feijóo’s claim that an obsolete ABC system was not renewed. Establishing whether signalling or protection failed would require technical records, site evidence, and an official investigation.