Russian Help Would Make North Korea’s Missile-test Flurry Worse News

North Korea carried out at least four sets of missile launches between September 20 and October 14. The tests involved several technologies, including suspected hypersonic missiles, intermediate-range missiles, ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles. The variety matters because it suggests work across multiple parts of North Korea’s missile program.

On September 20, North Korea tested a missile believed to carry a hypersonic warhead. On October 3, it fired an intermediate-range missile that state media also described as hypersonic. On October 12, it launched several ballistic missiles of different types. On October 14, it reportedly test-fired two kinds of submarine-launched cruise missiles.

The September weapon was probably an upgraded Hwasong-11MA, called Hwasongpho-11Ma-1. Analysts believe it combines a KN-23 missile body with a hypersonic glide vehicle-type terminal section. The submarine tests are especially notable because they may have used an operational submarine rather than a testbed.

A hypersonic missile is a very fast weapon designed to travel at hypersonic speeds, generally above Mach 5. The article focuses especially on maneuverability. Unlike a missile following a predictable arc, a hypersonic weapon can alter its path, potentially approaching from an unexpected direction and changing its flight during the terminal phase.

North Korean analysts described the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1 as combining a KN-23 missile body with a hypersonic glide vehicle-type terminal section. They said it was designed to penetrate missile defenses through maneuverability. Kim Yo Jong also claimed that another missile could maneuver at low altitude and use a “wavelike trajectory mode.”

These movements complicate defense because tracking systems must continuously estimate the missile’s position and future path. The article reports that Kim claimed Japan and South Korea failed to track targets from their first skip points. Those claims are North Korean statements, but the underlying defense challenge is well established.

North Korea carried out at least four launch sets in the period described. The article does not provide a complete count of every missile fired, so the safest number is four sets rather than four individual launches. Those sets demonstrated several capabilities: hypersonic systems, intermediate-range missiles, multiple ballistic-missile types, and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

Range reports varied. North Korea claimed its October 3 missile struck a target 1,000 kilometers away. South Korea and Japan assessed a shorter range. Separately, South Korea reported that at least one missile fired on October 12 traveled more than 900 kilometers. The September weapon was described as a long-range precision-strike system able to hit targets several hundred kilometers away.

The tests therefore showed breadth as well as distance. They involved air-launched trajectories from the east coast and possible underwater launches from a submarine. However, the article does not establish that every claimed range or capability has been independently verified.

North Korea extended military assistance to Moscow after Russia invaded Ukraine. The article describes arms sales and troop deployment as part of that support. In return, Pyongyang reportedly received economic benefits and access to military technologies. A South Korean think tank estimated that these activities generated more than $10 billion for North Korea.

Most of the reported payment was not ordinary cash. It took the form of sensitive military technology, weapon parts, or other materials. The article also says Russian companies Novator and Raduga could be helping North Korea develop Hwasal-family cruise missiles. South Korean military intelligence has additionally indicated possible Russian submarine nuclear-propulsion and noise-suppression technology transfers.

Russia is also known to have shared drone technology with North Korea. The article warns that Pyongyang could seek more advanced AI-enabled, jet-powered drones such as the Geran-5. Some of these claims remain unverified, especially the nuclear-submarine technology reports, but they illustrate the breadth of the alleged exchange.

Russian technical assistance could shorten North Korea’s development process. Instead of building every system independently, Pyongyang could receive tested designs, components, specialized materials, and engineering knowledge. The article links North Korea’s recent progress to its closer relationship with Russia, while stressing that the exact extent of Russian help is not fully confirmed.

Possible examples include assistance from Russian companies Novator and Raduga with Hwasal-family cruise missiles. South Korean intelligence has also hinted at submarine nuclear-propulsion technology and possible noise-suppression technology. Russian drone technology could provide another path toward more advanced, AI-enabled, jet-powered systems.

The danger is both technical and strategic. Better propulsion, guidance, maneuverability, or underwater stealth could make weapons more difficult to detect or intercept. Kim Yo Jong described one missile as “strategic,” implying a nuclear-warhead role. If Russian support continues, the article says there is more reason to expect rapid North Korean technical progress.

Land-based missiles launch from fixed locations that can be watched, targeted, or attacked. Submarine-launched missiles could add a mobile underwater launch option. That could make the launch site harder to find and create another direction of attack. The article treats this capability seriously because the latest cruise missiles may have come from an operational submarine.

North Korea reportedly fired two kinds of submarine-launched cruise missiles from the Hero Kim Kun Ok. Earlier underwater launches used a testbed rather than an operational submarine. Drones offer a different advantage. They can provide surveillance or attack options, and Russia may help North Korea obtain more advanced AI-enabled, jet-powered drones such as the Geran-5.

These systems would not replace land-based missiles. They would widen North Korea’s choices and complicate defenses. Submarines could threaten from underwater, while drones could operate closer to targets and support attacks. The article does not establish how reliable or mature these capabilities are, so their operational effectiveness remains uncertain.

Nuclear warheads make missile development a security issue far beyond ordinary weapons testing. If a missile can deliver a nuclear warhead, even an unproven capability may affect how governments assess danger and prepare defenses. The article reports that Kim Yo Jong called one missile “strategic,” implying a possible nuclear role, but it does not confirm an operational nuclear payload.

Missile defenses try to detect, track, and intercept incoming weapons. Maneuvering hypersonic missiles can make that task harder by changing direction or flying at low altitude. South Korea and Japan disputed North Korean range claims and questioned flight details, while Kim claimed their tracking systems failed at initial skip points.

In general, deterrence rests on the fear that an attack could bring unacceptable retaliation. North Korea’s advances could pressure South Korea, Japan, and the United States to strengthen defenses and coordination. Russia’s reported technical relationship with Pyongyang adds another strategic concern, because it may increase North Korea’s future capabilities.